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June 10, 1971, the United States and Canada issued a Joint
Communique announcing their intention to conclude a broadranging agreement designed to protect and enhance water quality
in the Great Lakes and to bring the problem of Great Lakes pollu-
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tion under substantial control by 1975.1 The proposed Great Lakes
Water Quality Agreement would establish common water quality
objectives, commit the two governments to the development of compatible national water quality standards to meet those objectives,
and provide for carrying out a wide variety of joint and separate
pollution control programs and related measures. A major role in
overseeing the joint program would be assigned to the International
Joint Commission of the United States and Canada (IJC), which is
a bilateral international commission created by the Boundary Waters
Treaty with Great Britain of 1909 (1909 Treaty).2 In announcing
the two governments' "agreement to agree," Mitchell W. Sharp,
Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, noted that the proposed Agreement would be the "most far-reaching ever signed by two
countries in the environmental field." 3 Russell E. Train, Chairman
of the United States Council on Environmental Quality, described
the proposed agreement as "an historic first" and added that its provisions will be "unprecedented in scope" and provide a model for
similar international agreements in other parts of the world.4
The proposed Agreement would have obvious importance for
United States-Canadian relations and the efforts of the two governments to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of Great Lakes
pollution. But, as the Ministers' statements suggest, it might also
have broader significance. The announcement by the two governments comes at a time of emerging global concern with environmental issues and possible international approaches to their solution11
1. U.S.-Canadian Joint Communique issued by the Joint U.S.-Canada Ministerial
Meeting on Great Lakes Pollution, Washington, D.C., June IO, 1971, Dept. State Press
Release No. 129, published in 64 DEPT. STATE BULL. 828 (1971) [hereinafter Joint
Communique]. See N.Y. Times, June 15, 1971, at 85, col. 7. The Joint Communique
indicated the two governments' intention to conclude the agreement before the end
of 1971. The negotiations, however, have been delayed and the agreement will prob•
ably not be completed and signed until possibly the sprin~ of 1972, (Information
supplied by U.S. Dept. of State.)
2. Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters, and Questions Arising
Between the United States and Canada, Jan. II, 1909, 86 Stat, 2448 (1910), T .S. No.
548 (effective May 13, 1910) [hereinafter 1909 Treaty], art. VII.
3. N.Y. Times, June II, 1971, at II, col. 1.

4. Id.
5. The recent literature in this area is vast. See., e.g., B. COMMONER, Tm: CLOSING
CIRCLE: NATURE, MAN AND TECHNOLOGY (1971); R. FALK, THIS ENDANGERED PLANET
(1971); MAN'S IMPACT ON THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT, REPORT OF THE STUDY OF CRITICAL
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS (C. Wilson ed. 1970); Ritchie-Calder, Mortgaging the Old
Homestead, 48 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 207 (1970); Wolman, Pollution as an International
Issue, 47 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 164 (1968). Particularly relevant here are the various papers
in LAW, !NSTJTUTIONS AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT
Hargrove ed. 1972); Schachter
&: Serwer, Marine Pollution Problems and Remedies, 65 AM. J. INTL. L. 84 (1971);
Symposium, The International Legal Aspects of Pollution, 21 U. TORONTO L.J. 173
(1971).
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-a concern symbolized in the forthcoming United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, which will convene in Stockhlom
in June 1972.6 The Stockholm Conference will have the tasks of
focusing the attention of governments and the public on the importance and urgency of problems of the human environment and of
identifying those aspects of environmental and pollution problems
appropriate for international cooperation and agreement. It will also
consider various proposals for the creation of international institutions and other cooperative measures. Yet, in considering these questions and in attempting to forge any cooperative arrangements, the
Conference will have little guidance from the past. Precedents for
international cooperation and regulation in the environmental area
have thus far been sparse and the relevant international law is
relatively undeveloped.7 This dearth of experience will increase the
6. See G.A. Res. 2398, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. 18, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968);
G.A. Res. 2567, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 38, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969); G.A. Res.
2581, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 44, U.N. D.oc. A/7630 (1969). Cf. Report of U.N.
Secretary General to the 47th Session of the Economic and Social Council on Problems
of the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. E/4667 (1969); Reports of the Preparatory
Committee for the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment for its three
working sessions held in New York in March 1970, Geneva in Feb. 1971, and New
York in Sept. 1971, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.48/ PC.6, .9 and .13.
7. See authorities cited in note 5 supra. Cf. notes 156 &: 167 infra. International
activities in the environmental area are, however, rapidly proliferating, and more than
a score of U.N. organs and agencies and other international organizations are
presently engaged in environmental programs. See generally CONG. REsEARCH SERv.,
STAFF OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY DIV., 92D CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL
ACTIVITIES OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (Comm. Print 1971) (a report prepared
for the use of the Senate Committee on Commerce); COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 200-06 (1970) [hereinafter CEQ 1970 REPORT]; COUNCIL
ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT 29-31 (1971) [hereinafter CEQ
1971 REPORT]; and the various papers included in LAw, INmnmoNs AND THE GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENT, supra note 5. The activities of international organizations include the
World Meteorological Organization's (WMO) World Weather Watch; the World Health
Organization's (WHO) work on fresh water supplies and sewage disposal; the Food and
Agricultural Organization's (FAO) broad concerns with resource management; the
International Labour Organization's (ILO) regulation of the environment of the
work place; the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization's (UNESCO)
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC) and Man and the Biosphere
Program; the International Maritime Consultative Organization's (IMCO) activities
in the field of marine pollution; the International Civil Aviation Organization's (!CAO)
work on air and noise pollution connected with civil air transport; and the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) surveillance of radioactive substances in
the environment. The Environment Committee of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) is conducting significant work on the international economic effects of member countries' environmental policies. The North
Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) Committee on Challenges of Modem Society
is studying special problems of industrialized societies. The Economic Commission for
Europe is serving as a valuable forum for information exchange between Eastern and
Western European nations on pollution control; it held an important symposium on
this subject at Prague, Czechoslovakia, in May 1971 and has established a permanent
body of Senior Environmental Advisers. In 1969, the International Council of Scientific
Unions (!CSU) established a_ Special .Committee on- Problems of the Environment
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difficulties the Conference may encounter both in developing practical programs for effective international action and in securing their
acceptance by governments.
In this context, a study of the proposed Agreement and, more particularly, of the long history of developing United States-Canadian
cooperation that preceded it may be of use. 8 First, this United StatesCanadian experience offers guidance for the solution of some of the
specific problems that programs for international environmental
cooperation may face: questions of framework and approach; institutional organization, function, and authority; determination of
objectives; apportionment of burdens; coordination; and implementation. Second, at a time when international discussion has
focused principally on global approaches to the solution of environmental problems, it calls attention to the important, if less dramatic,
contribution that can be made by more limited bilateral and regional cooperative arrangements; indeed, it is arguable that such
bilateral and regional arrangements will ultimately prove to be the
most significant forms of international environmental cooperation.0
(SCOPE), which is coordinating global research on a number of environmental prob•
!ems.
8. While this study deals primarily with U.S.-Canadian cooperation with respect
to problems of pollution of the Great Lakes and other boundary waters, the two
countries have also developed cooperative arrangements with respect to other aspects
of environmental problems. The work of the International Joint Commission [here•
inaner IJC] respecting boundary air pollution problems, which is briefly mentioned
in this Article, is more fully discussed in Note, International Air Pollution-United
States and Canada-A Joint Approach, IO ARIZ. L. REV. 138 (1968). The Treaty with
Great Britain and Ireland for the Protection of Migratory Birds in the United States
and Canada, Aug. 16, 1916, 39 Stat. 1702 (1916), T.S. No. 628, which was involved in
the famous case of Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), is still in force, On
June 1, 1971, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration announced that
the United States and Canada had agreed on a joint program to use satellites and
aircraft in surveying the natural environment. The joint program will advance remote
sensing technology through monitoring of air, water, land, forest, and crop conditions,
the mapping of ice movements and ocean currents in Canadian and U.S. waters,
and the mapping of geologic, hydrologic, vegetation, and soil phenomena. NASA Press
Release No. 71-95 Gune I, 1971). The United States is also in the process of developing
bilateral relations on environmental problems with Mexico, Japan, and other countries.
See CEQ 1971 REPORT, supra note 7, at 30.
9. See generally Stein, The Potential of Regional Organizations in Managing Man's
Environment, in LAW, INSTITUTIONS AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT, .supra note 5. See
al.so Frey-Wouters, The Prospects for Regionalism in World Affairs, in THE FUTURE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 461 (R. Falk &: C. Black ed. 1969).
The agenda for the 1972 U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, in its
section concerned with the international organizational implications of action pro•
posals, includes an item on "particular organizational requirements for meeting needs
at regional levels." Report of the Preparatory Committee for the U.N. Conference
on the Human Environment, 2d sess., Feb. 8-19, 1971, U,N. Doc. A/Conf.48/C.9, ,i 20
(Agenda Item 6). The Secretary-General of the U.N. Conference on the Human En•
vironment, Mr. Maurice Strong, has suggested as among the principles which might
guide the decision of governments on organizational questions: "7. That it should
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Finally, this experience may serve to suggest that the concept of
international environmental cooperation has limitations as well as
potentialities, and thus may provide a more realistic basis for the
Stockholm Conference's work.
!.

BACKGROUND

United States-Canadian cooperation regarding Great Lakes pollution problems has developed within a special geographical, economic, legal, and political context. A brief description of this setting
may suggest the significance of these pollution problems and some
of the reasons for the particular form this cooperation has taken.10
The United States-Canadian boundary is one of the longest in
the world, extending for about 3,500 miles from Passamaquoddy
Bay on the Atlantic to the Fuca Straits of Vancouver on the Pacific,
and, along the Alaskan-Canadian boundary, for another 1,500 miles
from the Pacific to the Arctic Ocean. About 2,000 miles of this
boundary is water; it passes along rivers such as the St. Croix, St.
John, and the St. Lawrence, through Lake Ontario, the Niagara
River, Lake Erie, the Detroit River, Lake St. Clair, the St. Clair
River, Lake Huron, the St. Marys River, and Lake Superior, and on
to Rainy Lake and Lake of the Woods. In addition, a number of
rivers, such as the Red, the Columbia, and the Yukon, flow across
the boundary.
The Great Lakes constitute the largest fresh-water system in the
world, representing about a quarter of the world's total fresh water
be an important consideration in the establishment of any additional or new machinery
to provide strong capability at the regional level." Quoted in Gardner, The International Organizational Implications of Action Proposals, in I.Aw, INmTIJTIONS AND
THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT, supra note 5, manuscript at 6. See also MAN'S IMPACT ON
THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT, supra note 5, at 6; Schachter & Serwer, supra note 5, at
Ill ("[T)here has come to be a greater recognition of the need for regional pollution
control organs since it is apparent that, although pollution is a global problem, it
is not uniformly global. Regional arrangements in the Baltic, the North Sea, Mediterranean, Caribbean and perhaps the Arctic are now undenvay, and it is likely that these
organs will have a decisive part to play in achieving day-to-day practical controls.')
IO. The factual information in this section is drawn or collated principally from
the following sources: GREAT LAKES BASIN COMMN. & GREAT LAKES PANEL OF THE
COMM. ON MULTIPLE USE OF THE COSTAL ZONE, NATL. COUNCIL ON MARINE RESOURCES &:
ENCR, DEV., GREAT LAKES INSTITUTIONS: A SURVEY OF INSTITUTIONS CONCERNED WITH THE
WATER AND RELATED RESOURCES IN THE GREAT LAKES BASIN 1-2, 7, 12 (1969) [hereinafter
GREAT I.AKES INSTITUTIONS]; INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMM., CANADA AND UNITED STATES,
POLLUTION OF LAKE ERIE, LAKE ONTARIO AND THE INTERNATIONAL SECTION OF THE ST.
LAWRENCE RIVER (1970) [hereinafter IJC LowER LAKES REPORT]; D. PIPER, THE INTEitNATIONAL LAw OF THE GREAT LAKES (1967); MacNish &: Lawhead, History of the
Development of the Great Lakes and Present Problems, in ENc1NEERINc INST. OF CANADA&: AM. Soc. CIVIL ENCRS., PROCEEDINGS OF THE GREAT LAKES WATER REsoURCES CON•
FERENCE 1, June 24-26, 1968, Toronto; Great Lakes :Basin Commn. Communicator, March
1971 (monthly newsletter).
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supply. Of the total Great Lakes water area of 95,000 square miles,
about two thirds is within United States jurisdiction and one third in
Canadian jurisdiction. Of the total Great Lakes drainage basin area
of some 300,000 square miles, about 59 per cent is in the United
States and 41 per cent in Canada. Eight states, Illinois, Indiana,
Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, border on the Great Lakes and a number of others have close
economic links with the region. In Canada, only the Province of
Ontario borders on the Lakes, although the Province of Quebec also
has considerable concern with Great Lakes problems.
In 1966 some 30 million people lived on or near the Great Lakes,
comprising about one out of every three Canadians and one out of
every eight Americans.11 All indications are that the Great Lakes
population is rapidly expanding; projections for the year 2000 suggest the emergence of a Great Lakes megalopolis with a population
approaching 60 million people.12
The immense importance of the Great Lakes region to the two
countries is indicated by the fact that the region accounts for over
one half of the Canadian gross national product and about one fifth
of the American gross national product. About 50 per cent of United
States steel production and much of its automotive production is
concentrated about the Lakes. With the development of the St.
Lawrence Seaway the Great Lakes have now become part of a major
international waterway stretching over 2,300 miles from the Atlantic
Ocean to Duluth, Minnesota. Each year over 600 foreign vessels utilize the Great Lakes system, in addition to a domestic United
States-Canadian fleet of another 600 vessels; over 250,000 pleasure
craft are estimated to use Lakes Erie and Ontario alone. 13
In view of the length of this common boundary and the substantial clustering of people and industry along certain portions of it, it
is not surprising that problems of boundary waters and transboundary pollution have assumed a growing importance in United StatesCanadian relations. While the concern of the two governments with
11. IJC LowER LAKEs REPORT, supra note 10, at 17. Major cities on the rim of the
Lakes include Toronto, Hamilton, Port Huron, and Windsor in Canada; and Duluth•
Superior, Milwaukee, Chicago, Gary, Detroit, Toledo, Cleveland, Erie, Buffalo, and
Rochester in the United States.
12. MacNish &: Lawhead, supra note 10, at 19.
13. IJC LowER I.AK.Es REPORT, supra note 10, at 75-76. In 1966, a total of about
246 million net tons of cargo moved via the Great Lakes. Of this total, about 185
million net tons were domestic, within either the U.S. or Canada; 47 million net tons
moved between the two countries; and 14 million net tons were overseas traffic. In terms
of ton miles, over 40% of all traffic on U.S. waterways moved on the Great Lakes.
MacNish &: Lawhead, supra note 10, at 26.
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boundary pollution problems dates back at least to the early years
of the twentieth century, these problems have assumed a new d~mension and importance as a result of rapid industrial and population development during and after the Second World War.
,
It is now widely recognized that at a time when water demand
problems have become more pressing and complex the environmental quality of the Great Lakes is rapidly deteriorating.14 Recent
studies have confirmed that Lake Erie, particularly its western basin,
is in an advanced state of eutrophication, largely as a result of excessive enrichment by nutrients, especially phosphorus; indeed, Lake
Erie has become a prime example of the consequences of environmental neglect. 15 Accelerated eutrophication is also occurring in
Lake Ontario and the other Lakes are considered seriously threatened.16 A number of industries, such as fishing and recreation, have
already been affected and there is growing concern that future industrial and urban development may be impeded. The sources of
pollution include waste disposal from municipalities and industries,
agricultural run-off, dredging, sedimentation, and waste from commercial vessels and pleasure craft.17 The consequences of this' pollution on the water of the Lakes include eutrophication, oxygen
depletion, biological changes, organic contamination from substances
such as DDT and PCB, accumulation of solids, and accumulation
14. The IJC LowER LAKEs REPORT, supra note 10, represents the most current and
comprehensive discussion of the problem of pollution in the Lower Lakes, and this
discussion is broadly applicable to many aspects of Upper Lakes problems as well.
For good summaries of sources, processes, effects, and costs of water pollution and
water pollution control programs more generally, see, e,g., CEQ 1970 REPORT, supra
note 7, at 29-59; CEQ 1971 REPORT, supra note 7, at 99-153; A. KNEESE & B. BOWER,
l\IANACING WATER QUALITY: ECONOMICS, TECHNOLOGY, INSTITUTIONS (1968); WATER POL•
LUTION CONTROL AND ABATEMENT (T. Willrich & N. Hines ed. 1967). See also D. ZWICK
& M. BENSTOCK, WATER WASTELAND (1971) (Ralph Nader's Study Group Report on
Water Pollution).
15. See, eg., IJC LowER LAKEs REPORT, supra note 10, Conclusion 9, at 140-41.
For comprehensive discussions of Lake Erie problems, see B. CoMMONER, supra note 5,
ch. 6; U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ADMINISTRATION,
LAKE ERIE REPORT: A PLAN FOR WATER POLLUTION CONTROL (1968); Reitze, Wastes,
Water, and Wishful Thinking: The Battle of Lake Erie, 20 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. !,
(1968).
16. See !JC LOWER LAKEs REPORT, supra note 10, Conclusion 9, at 140-41. See also
U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR & N.Y. STATE DEPT. OF HEALTH, WATER POLLUTION PROBLEMS
AND IMPROVEMENT NEEDS: LAKE ONTARIO AND ST. LAWRENCE RIVER BASINS (1968). The
U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the Canadian Centre for
Inland Waters have recently announced plans for a joint U.S.-Canadian year-long
intensive study of Lake Ontario. This effort, which is called the International Field
Year for the Great Lakes, will begin April 1, 1972, and will be the most ambitious
research effort ever directed at any of the Great Lakes, involving some 600 scientists
and technicians and an estimated cost of $15 million. N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1972, § M,
at 31, col. 4.
17. !JC LowER LAxEs REPORT, supra note 10, at 72-83.
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of oil and toxic materials, such as mercury, in trace amounts.18 While
pollution occurs on both sides of the border, the bulk of the problem
appears to originate from the larger concentrations of population
and industry on the American side.19
As these dangers have become more widely perceived, public concern on both sides of the border has mushroomed, and the problem
of control of Great Lakes pollution has now achieved a leading place
on both governments' agendas. A measure of government recognition
of the seriousness of this problem is the statement by Mitchell Sharp,
made at the recent Joint Ministerial Meeting, that pollution of the
Great Lakes had reached the point where "two of the richest societies
on earth are knowingly and wantonly poisoning this unique resource,
and by extension, each other."20 A variety of national and international measures to cope with this situation are now being undertaken, but it has become increasingly clear that effective solutions
will involve major governmental commitments, years of intensive
effort, and very substantial costs.
Solutions may also involve more subtle difficulties. In view of
the federal character of both governments, efforts to control pollution in the Great Lakes raise particularly complex jurisdictional
questions. The waters of the Lakes are not "high seas" for international purposes; each nation treats the Lakes' waters on its side
of the international boundary as its own "internal waters." United
States law regards each of the eight riparian states as owning, in its
respective public capacity, the Lake beds adjacent to its coast out to
the international boundary and also as having certain broad regulatory powers in its adjacent waters, at least in the absence of federal
assertions of authority.21 The same principle appears to be appli18. Id. at 84-107. On the mercury pollution problem, which in April 1970 resulted
in Canada's banning fishing on its side of the St. Clair River and Detroit River and
Lake St. Clair, and in partial bans by Ohio in Lake Erie, see, e.g., TIME, May 4, 1970,
at 85; Wall St. J., April 28, 1970, at 1, col. 1. This situation gave rise to the case
of Ohio v. Wyandotte Chem. Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971), discussed in note 176 infra.
19. As to the Lower Lakes, see IJC LoWER LAKES REPORT, supra note 10, Table 2
at 80, and Table 3 at 82. This U.S. concentration is particularly true of phosphorus
inputs into Lake Erie. In 1967 the input of total phosphorus from U.S. municipal
sources into Lake Erie was 35.7 million pounds, of which 25 million pounds came
from detergents; whereas the input of total phosphorus from Canadian municipal
sources into Lake Erie was 2.5 million pounds, of which 1.3 million pounds came
from detergents. As to Lake Ontario, the U.S. municipal input of phosphorus was
7.7 million pounds, of which 5.4 million came from detergents, and the Canadian
municipal input was 7.0 million pounds, of which 3.5 million came from detergents.
Id. at 83.
20. N.Y. Times, June 11, 1971, at 11, col. 1.
21. See, e.g., D. PIPER, supra note 10, at 19. The principle of state ownership of the
Lake beds is affirmed in § 3 of the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. § 1311
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cable in Canada with respect to the Province of Ontario, the only
Great Lakes riparian province.22 In each country, however, the federal
government retains substantial regulatory powers with respect to matters affecting the Lakes, though the division of power between the
respective federal and state or provincial governments appears to differ somewhat between the two countries. In the case of the United
States, there is little question that the federal government has broad
constitutional authority under the commerce power and other constitutional grants to regulate and control virtually any activity contributing directly or indirectly to Great Lakes pollution. Should the
federal government choose to exercise its authority, any state or local
government interference with such regulation would be considered
unconstitutional and invalid.23 Moreover, the treaty power may constitute an additional source of federal authority in this area.24 In
Canada, however, it is less clear that federal powers are so broad.
Respectable arguments have been made that under relevant provisions of the British North America Act provincial authority over
(1970). See also Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); Hilt v. Weber,
252 Mich. 198, 200, 233 N.W. 159, 161 (1930). The Supreme Court has recognized
the vital interest of the states in the control of water resources and has specifically
conceded the power of the states to exercise control over navigable waters for the
interests of their citizens until Congress in some way asserts a superior power. United
States v. Rio Grande Dam &: Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899).
22. D. PIPER, supra note IO, at 19.
23. Congress has power to regulate all navigable waters under the commerce
clause, U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3, and navigability is broadly defined. See, e.g.,
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I (1824); Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S.
(3 How.) 212 (1845). With respect to pollution, see United States v. Republic Steel
Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960). See also Hines, Nor Any Drop To Drink: Public Regulation
of Water Quality, Part III: The Federal Effort, 52 IowA L. REV. 799, 800 (1967), who
suggests: "It seems relatively clear that constitutionally Congress could preempt nearly
the entire field of water quality control, if it so elected." See generally 2 R. CLARK,
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS ch. 7 (1967); H. ELLIS, J. BEUSCHER, C. HOWARD & J.
DEBRAAL, WATER USE LAW AND ADMINISTRATION IN WISCONSIN ch. 17 (1970); Edelman,

Federal Air and Water Control: The Application of the Commerce Power To Abate
Interstate and Intrastate Pollution, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1067 (1965).
24. U.S. CONST. art. VI. A treaty dealing with Great Lakes pollution problems
appears to be a clearly legitimate subject of U.S. foreign policy concern. See, e.g.,
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw §§ 117, 121 (1965). The interests of the nation are more
important than those of any state, and the federal government may act to prevent
a state from interfering with a national treaty obligation. Sanitary Dist. v. United
States, 266 U.S. 405, 425-26 (1925). Cf. First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. FPC, 328 U.S.
152, 171 (1946); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). Treaty obligations may give
the federal government an additional basis for authorizing improvements in international waterways. Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 457-58 (1931). However, in
view of the broad expanse of the article I powers of Congress it may be questioned
whether the exercise of the treaty power with respect to Great Lakes problems would
in practice constitute any significant addition to existing congressional authority. See,
e.g., Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers: The Law of the Land and
Foreign Relations, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 903 (1959).
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most aspects of water pollution affecting the Great Lakes is constitutionally protected from federal intrusion and that Canadian federal
authority in this field, even when exercised pursuant to treaty, is
inherently limited.25
In any event, whatever the theoretical reach of American and
Canadian federal powers, in practice the regulation of water pollution in each country has remained largely in state, provincial, and
local hands. It is only recently that the respective federal governments
have begun to exercise their regulatory authority in any substantial
way, and the burden of regulation is still primarily nonfederal in
character.26 As a result, the law governing Great Lakes pollution
continues to be a complex hodgepodge of proliferating and occasionally inconsistent laws, regulations, and ordinances issued separately
by the two federal governments and their various agencies, the eight
riparian states of the United States, the Province of Ontario, and the
hundreds of cities, towns, and other local jurisdictions that exercise
relevant authority. This jurisdictional complexity has been a major
obstacle in efforts for the coordinated handling of over-all Great
Lakes problems.27
Finally, it is worth noting that United States-Canadian efforts to
deal with Great Lakes pollution problems are but one aspect of a
broader system of relations between the two countries, which has a
unique and special character. On the one hand, United States-Canadian relations have been remarkably amicable: the two countries
have been at peace since 1814, the border has been demilitarized
since 1817,28 and the tw-o nations have long been linked by strong
cultural and economic bonds. Moreover, the two governments have
developed a strong tradition of formal and informal peaceful adjustment of their disagreements and disputes. They have relied heavily
on such formal legal techniques as international agreement, the
25. See Landis, Legal Control in Canada of Pollution in the Great Lakes Drainage
Basin, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE GREAT LAKEs REsoURCES CONFERENCE, supra note 10, at
158-200; Landis, Legal Controls of Pollution in the Great Lakes Basin, 48 CAN. B. REV.
66, 96-106 (1970). See also Gibson, The Constitutional Context of Canadian Water
Planning, 7 ALBERTA L. REv. 71 (1969); Note, An Opinion on the Constiutional Validity
of the Proposed Canada Water Act, 28 U. OF TORONTO FACULTY OF L REv. 74 (1970),
26. See text accompanying notes 228-52 infra.
27. See pt. III. F. infra.
28. The Rush-Bagot Agreement, April 28-29, 1817, 8 Stat. 231 (1817), T.S. No. 110 1/2.
On the U.S.-Canadian disarmament arrangement, see generally D. PIPER, supra note 10,
at 104-11; 3 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 741-52 (1964), On international boundary arrangements and the Permanent International Boundary Com•
mission established by the Treaty with Great Britain in Respect of Boundary Between
the United States and Canada, Feb. 24, 1925, 44 Stat. 2102 (1925), T.S. No. 720, see
D. Pll'ER, supra note 10, at 8-17.
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establishment of joint institutions, and arbitration.29 There are, for
example, presently some 200 bilateral agreements in force between
the two countries, as well as numerous lower-level and less formal
arrangements.30 On the other hand, United States-Canadian relations
have also .been marked by certain strong and continuing differences.
In particular, Canada has manifested a persistent, strongly felt, and
understandable fear of political, economic, and cultural domination
by its more populous and powerful neighbor to the south, and Canadian nationalists have frequently responded with resentment to any
United States policies that appeared to exploit superior American
power or wealth at Canada's expense.31 When issues of this nature
have arisen United States-Canadian relations have on occasion proved
sensitive and delicate.
In recent years, the problem of Great Lakes pollution appears to
have become, to some extent, one of those sensitive issues between
the two countries.32 The Great Lakes are regarded by Canada as
crucial to its future. Not only does a substantial part of Canada's
population and industry cluster on the Lakes, but in addition Canada
is currently experiencing a broad reawakening of national pride in
its natural environment, and the government has been militant in
efforts to protect the Canadian environment from harm by external
interests.33 Since much of Great Lakes pollution stems from the giant
urban and industrial concentrations on the American side of the
border, the situation from a Canadian viewpoint may seem to call
for the most urgent and far-reaching measures by the United States
in order to prevent irreversible harm to Canadian environmental
interests and economic development. Canadians may consider that,
in view of Canada's lesser contribution to the problem, it should
arguably assume less of the burden of correction. The United States
29. See generally D. DEENER, CANADA-UNITED STATl:S TREATY REr.AnoNs (1963); D.
supra note 10.
30. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 30-42 (1970).
31. See generally NEIGHBORS TAKEN FOR GRANTED (L. Merchant ed. 1966), esp. ix-xv,
148-64; THE AMERICAN AssEMBLY, THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 0- Sloan ed. 1964),
esp. ch. 6; and the various proceedings of the recent series of annual Seminars on
Canadian-American Relations held at the University of Windsor. Cf. Lynch, Canada's
New Anti-Americanism, Wall St. J., Nov. 12, 1971, at 12, cols. 4-6.
32. Certain aspects of this issue, in particular the questions of apportionment and
detergents, are more fully discussed in pt. II. D. & E. infra.
33. I have described this Canadian concern in another context also involving some
element of United States-Canadian policy conflict. Bilder, The Canadian Arctic Waters
Pollution Prevention Act: New Stresses on the Law of the Sea, 69 MICH. L, REv. I (1970).
It is relevant that Canada chose as its project for exploration in connection with the
NATO program on "~hallenges of Modern Society" (see note 7 supra) the subject of
control of pollution in inland waters, with particular reference to the Great Lakes.
PIPER,
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would, of course, prefer that Canada share with it the costs and
burdens of remedial action to the fullest extent possible. Moreover,
while the United States views the problem of Great Lakes pollution
as an important one, it has a relatively smaller proportion of its population and industry centered on the Lakes and tends to see this issue
as only one among a great many problems that press with equal
urgency for its limited resources. These differences between the two
countries have only rarely surfaced publicly and, it is hoped, have
been at least temporarily resolved by the proposed Agreement. Should
current efforts to resolve these Great Lakes pollution problems prove
ineffective, however, significant foreign relations issues could reemerge.
II. THE

DEVELOPMENT OF GREAT LAKES ENVIRONMENTAL

COOPERATION: FRAMEWORK, INSTITUTIONS, AND HISTORY

A.

The 1909 Treaty

The basic framework for American-Canadian cooperation respecting boundary waters problems is the 1909 Treaty,34 which establishes
the International Joint Commission between the United States and
Canada.35 The Treaty, which developed out of earlier ad hoc efforts
34. The 1909 Treaty was signed by Great Britain on behalf of Canada, which did
not acquire full powers in treaty-making until 1923. However, the Treaty has been
implemented completely by Canada. See D. PIPER, supra note 10, at 5-7, See generally
C. BEDARD, LE REGIME JURIDIQUE DES GRANDS LACS DE L'AMERIQUE DU NORD ET DU SAINT•
LAURENT (1966).
35. The literature on the 1909 Treaty and the International Joint Commission
is surprisingly extensive, if relatively inaccessible. L. BLOOMFIELD &: G. FITZGERALD, BOUND•
ARY WATERS PROBLEMS OF CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES (THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT
COMMISSION 1912-1958) (1958), is an extremely useful, concise study containing a history
of the Commission, a summary of its dockets through 1958, and appendices that
include the Treaty, Rules of Procedure, national implementing legislation, membership
on the Commission between 1911-1958, related treaties, lists of boundary waters and wa•
ters crossing the boundary, a selected bibliography, and maps showing the location of
the various references and applications. For an earlier study, see C. CHACKO, THE INTER•
NATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE DO•
MINION OF CANADA (1932). The Commission is also described and its dockets through
the early 1960's summarized in 3 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 28, at 826-71, See also
D. PIPER, supra note 10, at 72-90.
Various IJC Commissioners have also written excellent brief descriptions of the
Commission and its work. I have drawn particularly on Welsh, Role of the Inter•
national Joint Commission, in ENGINEERING INsr. OF CANADA &: AM. Soc, CIVIL ENGRS,,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE GREAT LAKES WATER RESOURCES CONFERENCE 1969, Toronto, at 871-75:
Welsh, The Work of the International Joint Commission, published in 59 DEPT, STATE
BuLL. 311 (1968); Welsh & Heeney, International Joint Commission-United States
and Canada, in 5 INTL. CONFERENCE ON WATER FOR PEACE 104-09 (1967) (Paper P/217
presented at Conference held in Washington, D.C., on May 23-31, 1967): C, Ross,
The International Joint Commission, March 7, 1970 (address at the International
Symposium on Legal Aspects of Pollution, University of Manitoba, on file with the
Michigan Law Review). See also Heeney, Diplomacy with a Difference: The Inter•
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to deal with boundary waters questions,36 was designed primarily to
protect the levels and navigability of the Great Lakes and other
boundary waters against unilateral diversion or obstruction, but it
has provided the basis for an increasing involvement by the Commission in pollution and other problems as well. While the Treaty
is usually referred to as the "Boundary Waters Treaty," its full title,
"Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters, and Questions Arising Between the United States and Canada," is significant.
According to its Preamble, the purpose of the Treaty is
to prevent disputes regarding the use of boundary waters and to
settle all questions which are now pending between the United States
and the Dominion of Canada involving the rights, obligations, or
interests of either in relation to the other or to the inhabitants of
the other, along their common frontier, and to make provision for
tl1e adjustment and settlement of all such questions as may hereafter
arise ..••
Thus, the potential reach of the Treaty extends beyond boundary
waters issues to all boundary questions, and arguably to other questions of common concern as well.
The Treaty distinguishes (1) "boundary waters," which are defined as those waters along which the international boundary runs;
(2) "tributary waters," which are defined as the waters flowing into
national Joint Commission, reprinted from INCO [International Nickel Co.] MAGAZINE,
Oct. 1960, on file with the Michigan Law Review; G. Kyte, Organization and Work of
the International Joint Commission (pamphlet issued at Ottawa in 1937); Weber,
Activities of the International Joint Commission, United States and Canada, 31 SEWAGE
&: INDUS. WASTE 71 (1959); Weber, Functions of the International Joint Commission,
J. OF POWER DIV., PROC. OF fill. Soc. CIVIL ENGRS., Nov. 1968, at 177.
For scholarly discussions, see the excellent recent articles by Erichsen-Brown, Legal
Implications of Boundary Water Pollution, 17 BUFFALO L. REv. 65 (1967); Jordan, Recent Developments in International Environmental Pollution Control, 15 MCGILL L.J.
279 (1969). See also Adams, Water Pollution Control in the Great Lakes Region, 37
U. DET. L.J. 96 (1959); Griffin, A History of the Canadian-United States Boundary
lVaters Treaty of 1909, 37 U. DET. L.J. 76 (1959); Waite, The International Joint Commission-Its Practice and Its Impact on Land Use, 13 BUFFALO L. REv. 93 (1963); Note,
supra note 8.
36. The history of the Treaty is summarized in L BLOOMFIELD &: G. FITZGERALD,
supra note 35, at 2-14; G. Kyte, supra note 35; D. PIPER, supra note 10, at 72-82; Griffin,
supra note 35; Heeney, supra note 35. Briefly, the Treaty grew out of the work of an
Ad Hoc Temporary International Watenvays Commission created by concurrent legislation of the U.S. and Canada in 1903 for the purpose of investigating and reporting
upon the condition and uses of the boundary waters and making recommendations for
navigational improvements and regulations. The temporary group, and particularly its
Chairman George Gibbons, an Ontario lawyer, became convinced that effective development of the boundary water res·ources required some prior agreement on principles
and a permanent body to apply them. Gibbons went to Washington in 1907 to explore
possibilities. U.S. Secretary of State Elihu Root was at first unenthusiastic but was
finally won over. The International Waterways Commission was discontinued after
the 1909 Treaty entered into force.
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boundary waters~ (3) waters flowing from boundary waters; and (4)
the waters of rivers flowing across the boundary.87 For example, since
the International Boundary does not run through Lake Michigan,
that Lake is considered a tributary water rather than a boundary
water.
The rights and obligations of the countries under the Treaty
differ among these various categories of waters. Thus, the Treaty
provides that navigation of all boundary waters shall be free and
open to the inhabitants and vessels of each country without discrimination; this same right shall apply to the waters of Lake Michigan
and to canals connecting boundary waters.88 On the other hand, the
Treaty provides that each country retains exclusive jurisdiction and
control over the use and diversion of all waters on its own side of the
boundary that in their natural channels would flow across the boundary or into boundary waters.39 However, if through interference with
or diversion of such waters injury is caused on the other side of the
boundary, any injured party is entitled to the same legal remedies
as if that injury had taken place in the country where the diversion
or interference occurred.40 Moreover, neither party surrenders rights
it may have to object to interference with or diversion of waters on
the other side of the boundary that would have the effect of materially
injuring navigation on its own side of the boundary.41
A P!incipal purpose of the 1909 Treaty is the regulation of uses,
obstructions, or diversions of the boundary waters, and the Commission is given broad powers in this respect, which again are stated
with reference to particular categories of waters. Unless othenvise
provided by special agreement, the Commission's approval is required
for any uses, obstructions, or diversions of boundary waters on either
side of the boundary that affect the natural level or flow of boundary
waters on the other side of the boundary.42 Moreover, the Commission's approval is required for the construction or maintenance "of
any remedial or protective works or any dams or other obstructions
in waters flowing from boundary waters or in waters at a lower level
than the boundary in rivers flowing across the boundary, the effect
of which is to raise the natural level of waters on the other side of
37. 1909 Treaty Preliminary Article.
38. 1909 Treaty art. I.
39. 1909 Treaty art. II, first para.
40. 1909 Treaty art. II, first para.
41. 1909 Treaty art. II, second para.
42. 1909 Treaty art. m, first para.

I •
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the boundary. " 43 In passing upon such cases, the Commission is to be
guided by certain rules and principles.44 One of these is that each
party shall have, on its own side of the boundary, equal and similar
rights in the use of the boundary waters. 45 Another is that an order
of precedence is established among various uses of the waters, namely:
(I) uses for domestic and sanitary purposes; (2) uses for navigation;
and (3) uses for power and irrigation purposes. No use shall be permitted by the Commission that tends materially to conflict with or
restrain a preferred use.46
Article IV of the Treaty includes a provision that "boundary
waters and water flowing across the boundary shall not be polluted
on either side to the injury of health or property on the other."47
Neither the term "pollution" nor the term "injury" is defined, and
the Treaty is silent with respect to any procedures for enforcement
of this obligation.
Finally, the Treaty establishes broad and flexible provisions concerning the handling of disputes and other questions between the
governments. Article IX authorizes the Commission to render advisory reports to the governments at their request. It provides that
"any other questions or matters of difference arising between [the
two countries] involving the rights, obligations, or interests of either
in relation to the other or to the inhabitants of the other, along the
common frontier ... shall be referred from time to time to the ...
Commission for examination and report" whenever either government requests such reference. The Commission is authorized in each
case so referred to examine and report upon the facts and circumstances of the particular questions, together with such conclusions
and recommendations as may be appropriate, subject, however, to
any restrictions that may be imposed by the terms of the reference.
"Such reports of the Commission shall not be regarded as decisions
of the questions or matters so submitted either on the facts or the
law, and shall in no way have the character of an arbitral award."48
Procedures are set forth governing such advisory references. In addition, Article X provides detailed procedures under which questions
or matters of differences may be referred to the Commission, by the
consent of the two governments, for a binding arbitral decision or
43.
44.
45.
46.
47,
48.

1909 Treaty art. IV, first para.
1909 Treaty art. Vill.
1909 Treaty art. VIII, second para.
1909 Treaty art. Vill, third para.
1909 Treaty art. IV, second para.
1909 Treaty art. IX, third para.
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finding. To date, however, the provisions of Article X have never
been utilized. 49

B.

The International Joint Commission and Its Procedures

The provisions of the Treaty are implemented principally
through the activities of the International Joint Commission. The
Commission consists of six members, three (including a chairman)
from each country. 50 United States Commissioners are appointed by
and serve at the pleasure of the President; Canadian Commissioners
are appointed by order-in-council of the Canadian government and
serve at the pleasure of that government. 51 Each of the two national
sections has appointed a permanent secretary; the two national secretaries act as joint secretaries at Commission meetings. 52 Otherwise
the Commission maintains an exceptionally small staff, typically drawing on personnel of agencies of the respective governments, as need
has arisen, for the performance of specific tasks. Permanent IJC offices
are maintained in Washington and Ottawa,53 but meetings and public
hearings are held wherever convenient,54 the Canadian chairman
presiding at meetings in Canada and the United States chairman
presiding at meetings in the United States.mi Under its rules the
Commission is required to meet at least semiannually,56 but in practice, especially in recent years, it has met much more frequently.
Decisions of the Commission are made by a majority of the Commissioners, irrespective of their nationality, with provision for separate
dissenting reports. 51
Broadly speaking, the IJC's responsibilities fall into two principal
categories. First, under Articles II, IV, and VIII, it exercises the essentially regulatory or licensing function of passing upon applications
for works that affect boundary water levels or flows. No individual or
corporation may erect a mill or dam upon a boundary water or certain other waters without securing the Commission's prior approval.
This licensing process is initiated with the filing of an application
49. See, e.g., 3 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 28, at 816.
50. 1909 Treaty art. VII.
51. 1909 Treaty art. VII.
52. 1909 Treaty art. XII, second para.; IJC R.P. 4. (The Commission's various
activities are governed by published Rules of Procedure. 1909 Treaty art XII, final
para. The Rules are available from the Commission in pamphlet form.)
53. IJC R.P. 3.
54. 1909 Treaty art. XII, first para.; IJC R.P. 5.
55. IJC R.P. 2.
56. IJC R.P. 5(1).
57. 1909 Treaty art. VIII, final para.
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for approval by the persons or corporate bodies concemed.158 Such
applications have concerned work ranging from simple log booms on
the Rainy River to major hydroelectric developments on the St.
Lawrence. The applicant has the burden of furnishing all necessary
information and data, and other persons interested may intervene in
support of or opposition to the application. The Commission usually
holds public hearings on the application, frequently in both countries. The Commission then issues its order, which is final. If it
wishes, the Commission may make its approval conditional upon the
construction of remedial or protective works to compensate as far as
possible for the particular use or diversion proposed, and may also
require suitable and adequate provision for protection against injury
of any interests on either side of the boundary. In some cases, when
the IJC has given only conditional approval, it has appointed an
international board of control to exercise continuing supervision and
ensure compliance with the conditions.69
The Commission's responsibilities under Article IX of the Treaty,
which concerns requests by the two governments for investigation of
and recommendation on specific problems, are performed pursuant
to "references." 00 Only the national governments can initiate investigations; the Commission has no independent power of inquiry.
Moreover, while the Treaty suggests that a single government may
make a reference, in practice all references have been made by
joint or concurrent requests. 61 Under Article IX, the subject of
a reference is not restricted to boundary waters or to even closely
related problems but may embrace "any other questions or matters
of difference arising between [the two countries] involving the rights,
obligations, or interests of either in relation to the other or to the
inhabitants of the other, along the common frontier." References
have in fact been made on an extremely wide range of subjects,62
including regulation of the level of the Great Lakes,63 preservation
58. The application procedures are contained in !JC R.P. 12-25.

59. Fourteen international boards of control are presently operating; they cover
Kootenay Lake, St. Lawrence River, Niagara River, Rainy Lake, Osoyoos Lake, Skagit
River, Columbia River, Souris River, Prairie Portage, Lake Champlain, St. Croix River,
Lake Superior, Lake of the Woods, and the apportionment of the waters of the St.
Marys and Milk Rivers.
60. Reference procedures are contained in IJC R.P. 26-29.
61. See, e.g., Waite, supra note 35, at 111.
62. See, e.g., the listing and description of the various dockets, including references,
in L. BLOOMFIELD &: G. FITZGERALD, supra note 35, and in 3 M. WHITEMAN, supra note
28, at 826-72.
63. IJC Doc. No. 82 (1964).
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of the American Falls at Niagara,64 the water resources of the Columbia River region,65 the tidal power potential of Passamaquoddy
Bay,66 and a considerable number and variety of water and air
pollution problems.67 Some of these references have been of outstanding significance: The 1944 Columbia River reference laid the
basis for the negotiation of the landmark Columbia River Treaty of
1961 between the two countries; 68 the 1964 Great Lakes water levels
reference, which is in effect today, involves the most extensive hydrological survey ever attempted; 69 and the 1964 Lake Erie-Lake Ontario-International St. Lawrence Pollution Reference involved what
is probably the most extensive, detailed, and scientifically sophisticated study of a major water environment yet undertaken and has
led to current negotiation of the proposed Agreement.70
A reference is normally initiated by identical letters from each
government to the IJC specifically describing the subject matter for
investigation and the action requested. 71 The letters typically authorize the Commission in conducting its investigation to utilize the
services of specially qualified personnel of the technical agencies of
the two countries, acting in an expert rather than a representative
capacity, and also to draw upon such information and technical data
as those agencies may possess.72
Upon receipt of the reference, the Commission has occasionally
held an initial round of public hearings to acquaint itself with the
problem. When appropriate it has frequently carried out the investigative phase of its assignment through appointment of an inter•
national technical advisory board, which normally includes personnel
64. IJC Doc. No. 86 (1967).
65. IJC Doc. No. 51 (1944).
66. IJC Doc. No. 60 (1948).
67. See pt. II. C. infra.
68. See, e.g., J. KRUTILLA, THE Coun.mIA RIVER TREATY: THE ECONOMICS OF AN INTER•
NATIONAL RIVER BASIN DEVELOPMENT (1967), esp. ch. 4.
69. See, e.g., Piper, A Significant Docket for the International Joint Commission,
59 AM. J. INTL. L. 593 (1965).
70. See notes 110-16 infra and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., the questions presented in the Lower Lakes Pollution Reference, IJC
Doc. No. 83 (1964), set forth in text accompanying notes 125 infra. For the text of the
Reference in that matter, see IJC LowER LAKEs REPORT, supra note 10, at 161·62,
72. See, e.g., the language in the Lower Lakes Pollution Reference:
In the conduct of its investigation and otherwise in the performance of its duties
under this reference, the Commission may utilize the services of engineers and
other specially qualified personnel of the technical agencies of Canada and the
United States and will so far as possible make use of information and technical
data heretofore acquired or which may become available during the course of
the investigation.
IJC LowER LAKEs REPORT, supra note 10, at 162.
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from federal, state, provincial, or other official departments or
agencies of the two governments, who have particular responsibilities·
and expertise concerning the subject matter of the reference. 73 The
technical board organizes and carries out the necessary technical
work and field studies, drawing when necessary upon the facilities
of relevant agencies of the two governments and consulting with
interested and knowledgeable persons. Progress reports may be
submitted to the Commission as appropriate. Upon completion of
its work the board files its formal report and recommendations with
the Commission.
Upon receipt of the board's report the Commission normally
publishes and distributes it to interested persons and organizations
in both countries. It will then usually schedule public hearings,
typically in each country in the particular areas concerned, during
which interested persons may under informal procedures present
evidence or comment on the board's findings and recommendations.
Then, drawing upon the board's report, material presented at the
hearings, and other information and advice received, the Commission prepares and submits its own report and recommendations to
the tw'O governments. In contrast with applications, the Commission's recommendations respecting references are not binding, and
either government is free to accept or reject them. With but few
exceptions, the governments have formally "accepted" the recommendations,74 although such acceptance does not necessarily imply
that further governmental action has been taken pursuant to those
recommendations.
While the IJC's role in the reference procedure has typically ended
with the submission of its report, in recent years the Commission has
on occasion recommended that the governments authorize it to appoint an international advisory board to maintain continuing surveillance over compliance with objectives recommended in the
Comission's report. The governments have in several instances
complied with this recommendation and five such advisory boards
are presently operating.75 In addition to the regular activities of the
73. Eight international investigative boards are currently operating; these concern
the American Falls, St. Clair-Detroit Rivers air pollution, Lake Ontario-St. Lawrence
River water pollution, Lake Erie water pollution, Great Lakes levels, St. John River
engineering, Souris-Red Rivers engineering, and Roseau River engineering.
·
74. The Commission's 1967 Report on the 1962 reference on cooperative development of the water resources of the Pembina River Basin, Doc. 76, has not yet been
accepted.
75. International Air Pollution Advisory Board; International Red River Pollution
Board; International Rainy River Water Pollution Board; Advisory Board of Control
of Water Pollution St. Croix River; and Advisory Board to the IJC on Control of
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advisory boards, the IJC has recently experimented with the technique of calling public international meetings to inquire into the
progress being made with respect to recommendations accepted by
the governments.76 These developments have involved the Commission in a continuing, though very limited, administrative role.
Since the IJC commenced operations in 1912, it has dealt with 92
applications and references. 77 During this sixty-year period, there has
been a gradual but steady shift in the burden of the Commission's
work from applications to references: During the period 1912 to
1944, the Commission dealt with 39 applications and 11 references;
in the period since 1944, it has handled 19 applications and 23
references. 78 Moreover, many of the recent applications have been
comparatively minor in importance, whereas a number of the recent
references have involved issues of major significance. The fact that
references now comprise the major work of the Commission reflects
the increased willingness and desire of the two governments to employ the IJC for a widening range of common problems and tasks, a
situation which imposes upon the Commission a far greater role than
the limited one originally envisioned in 1909. It also demonstrates
the remarkable adaptability of the 1909 Treaty, which through this
change of emphasis in the nature of the Commission's work has assumed a growing importance in United States-Canadian relations.
Pollution of Boundary Waters (Lake Erie-Ontario Section and Lakes Superior-Huron•
Erie Section). For an example of the work of such boards, see the Report prepared by
the Lakes Erie-Ontario Advisory Board, The Niagara River Pollution Abatement
Progress (Aug. 1971).
76. See Welsh, The Work of the International Joint Commission, supra note 35, at
313. The first such meeting was held in January 1968; it concerned pollution of the
Niagara River. Similar meetings have been held at St. Stephen, New Brunswick (pol,
lution of the St. Croix River), at Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan (pollution of the St
Marys River), and Windsor, Ontario (pollution of the St. Clair and Detroit Rivers),
See, e.g., the IJC Notice of Oct. 8, 1971, of the convening of a public meeting on
Dec. 16, 1971, in Niagara Falls, N.Y., "to inquire into the progress made in the U.S',
and Canada since 1967 in the abatement of pollution of the Niagara River from
municipal and industrial sources and to ascertain why the Water Quality Objectives for
the River are not being met," and also informing the public of the availa'!>ility of the
Advisory Board Report on this subject, supra note 75.
77. See IJC Doc. Index. The dockets are also listed and described in L. BLOOMFIELD
8: G. FITZGERALD, supra note 35, at 65-205 (through Doc. No. 72, Aug. 1956), and in 3
M. WHITEMAN, supra note 28, at 826-72 (through Doc. No. 80, March 1964). The latest
docket number is No. 93 (1971), an application concerning Cominco Kootenay Lake.
The discrepancy in the docket numbers may be explained by the fact that Doc. No. 50
was assigned to the Rainy Lake Investigation under the Protocol, which was technically
neither an application nor a reference.
78. See IJC Doc. Index. For a similar breakdown of the docket as of several years
ago, see Welsh &: Heeney, supra note 35, at 106; Welsh, The Work of the International
Joint Commission, supra note 35, at 313.
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The Commission's Activities Regarding Pollution

Our particular concern, of course, is the IJC's work in dealing
with problems of boundary waters pollution and, in particular,
pollution of the Great Lakes. While Article IV of the Treaty provides that boundary and transboundary waters shall not be polluted
on either side of the boundary to the injury of health or prcperty on
the other, it does not confer any specific power on the IJC to enforce
the provision or provide any other procedures for implementing this
obligation. Nevertheless, the IJC has been gradually entrusted with a
growing role in dealing with pollution matters through a series of references under Article IX, and pollution has become one of the Commission's principal concerns. To date, the IJC has handled ten
references relating to pollution, eight of which have been received
since the Second World War.79
It is interesting to note that one of the first references to the IJC
under Article IX of the Treaty, made only shortly after the Commission was constituted, was a 1912 request that it investigate and
report upon the causes, extent, location and remedies of pollution
of boundary waters on one side of the boundary which extended to
and affected the boundary waters on the other side. so The request
was apparently related to recurrent outbreaks of typhoid fever in
various of the Great Lakes and connecting waters communities, and
the Commission's subsequent investigation was essentially a bacteriological study of this region. The Commission submitted a comprehensive report in September 1918 with a finding that, while the
Great Lakes beyond the coastal waters and mouths of tributary
rivers were pure, the shore waters and river mouths themselves were
in various states of serious pollution to an extent that rendered the
water unpure and unfit for drinking purposes.81 The survey disclosed "a situation along the frontier which [was] generally chaotic,
79. These pollution references have the following IJC docket numbers and titles:
No. 4, Pollution of Boundary Waters (1912); No. 25, Trail Smelter (1928); No. 54,
Pollution of Boundary Waters (1946); No. 55, Pollution of Boundary Waters from
Lake Erie, Lake Ontario-Waters of Niagara River (1948); No. 61, Smoke Abatement
Investigation (1949); No. 71, St. Croix River (1955); No. 73, Pollution of Rainy River
and Lake of the Woods (1959); No. 81, Pollution of the Red River (of the North)
(1964); No. 83, Pollution of Lake Erie, Lake Ontario, and International Section of the
St. Lawrence River (1964); No. 85, Air Pollution (1966). The St. Croix River reference
(Doc. No. 71) was not by its terms a pollution reference, but since the IJC dealt with
basin pollution problems in some detail, I have included it in the subsequent discussion.
80. Pollution of Boundary Waters, IJC Doc. No. 4 (1912).
81. !JC, FINAL REPORT ON THE POLLUTION OF BOUNDARY WATERS REFERENCE (1918).
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everywhere perilous, and in some cases disgraceful." 82 Pollution was
"very intense along the shores of the Detroit and Niagara Rivers"
and "conditions exist[ed] which imperil[ed] the health and welfare
of the citizens of both countries in direct contravention of the
treaty."83 To deal with this situation, the IJC recommended that
the two governments confer jurisdiction upon the Commission to
regulate and prohibit such transboundary pollution. The governments accepted the report and requested the IJC to prepare reciprocal legislation or a draft convention for this purpose.
The IJC submitted a draft convention in October 1920.84 In view
of the current proposed Agreement, some history of this early effort
may be of interest. In submitting the draft convention, the IJC stated
that it was
firmly of the view that the method best adapted to avoid the evils
which the Treaty is designed to correct is to take proper steps to
prevent dangerous pollution crossing the boundary line rather than
to wait until it is manifest that such pollution has actually physically
crossed, to the injury of health or property on the other side; and
that to this end the Convention should clothe the Commission with
authority and power, subject to all proper limitation and restrictions,
to make such orders, rules and regulations ... as may be proper and
necessary to maintain boundary waters in as healthful a condition
as practicable in view of conditions already created, and should contain proper provisions for the enforcement of such orders, rules and
directions.85
Under the draft convention, the Commission would have been given
authority to investigate any alleged violation of Article IV of the
Treaty and to report its findings to the governments. On the basis of
the Commission's findings of fact, which were to be "final and conclusive," the governments would have been obligated to take such
measures as might be necessary to prevent a continuation of the
breach. The Commission would also have been given authority to
define classes of vessels "in which apparatus for the disinfection of
the sewage, bilge-water or water ballast discharged therefrom should
be installed to prevent the pollution of waters," 86 and the parties
could not have granted licenses to vessels that fa:iled to meet IJC
requirements. Finally, the parties would have agreed to enact or
82. Id. at 31.
83. Id. at 51, quoted in IJC LowER LAKEs REPORT, supra note 10, at 2.
84. Draft Convention of October 6, 1920, on file with the Michigan Law Review.
85. Letter accompanying Draft Convention, supra note 84, at 5, on file with the
Michigan Law Review.
86. Draft Convention, supra note 84, art. V,
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recommend legislation: for full enforcement of the convention. The
draft convention was discussed by the governments, but they were
unable to reach agreement and negotiations terminated in 1929.87
Apparently, one obstacle was the objection of the United States to
the provision that the Commission's findings of fact regarding the
existence of pollution and its injurious nature would be final. 88
Canada attempted to reopen the negotiations in 1942, but the State
Department took the position that the time was not propitious.89 Many
years were to pass before the governments were again to consider an
expansion of the IJC's formal authority, 90 and even then the proposal
was framed in much less sweeping terms than in the Commission's
1920 draft.
The IJC's activities regarding pollution were limited during the
interwar years. However, the Commission did play a role in the
famous Trail Smelter arbitration, 91 a landmark case in the development of pollution law. In 1928 a reference was filed by the United
States and concurred in by Canada concerning the extent to which
property in the State of Washington had been damaged by fumes
drifting from a smelter located at Trail, British Columbia; the
amount of indemnity to compensate for past damage caused by such
fumes; the probable effects of future operations of the smelter on
the State of Washington; and the method of providing indemnity
for any future damages. In its report of February 28, 1931, the IJC
recommended payment of $350,000 to cover damages sustained in
the State of Washington by reason of the operation of the Trail
Smelter to the end of 1931.92 The two governments decided to entrust the remaining aspects of this problem to a special tribunal and
under the terms of a 1935 convention93 established an ad hoc arbitral
tribunal to determine, inter alia, whether further damage had been
caused in the State of Washington by the Trail Smelter subsequent
to January 1, 1932, and, if so, the amount of that damage. In its
decision, reported to the two governments on April 16, 1938, the
arbitral tribunal concluded that damage had indeed been caused
87. See D. PIPER, supra note 10, at 86; 3 M. WlilTEMAN, supra note 28, at 828-29.
88. See D. PIPER, supra note 10, at 86.
89. Id.
90. See pt. II. D. infra.
91. Trail Smelter, IJC Doc. No. 25 (1928).
92. See 3 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 28, at 789.
93. Convention with the Dominion of Canada Relative to the Establishment of
a Tribunal To Decide Questions of Indemnity and Future Regime Arising fro~ the
Operation of Smelter at Trail, British Columbia, April 15, 1935, 49 Stat. 3245 (1935),
T.S. No. 893 (effective Aug. 7, 1935).
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between January 1932 and October 1937, and that an indemnity of
$78,000 with interest should be paid.94 In its final decision, reported
March 11, 1941, the tribunal concluded that no damage had occurred
since 1937, but recommended a "prescribed regime to avoid future
damage." 95 In the course of its opinion, the tribunal made what is
still the broadest judicial suggestion of international liability for
transnational pollution:
[U]nder principles of international law, as well as of the law of the
United States, no State has the right to use or permit the use of its
territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the
territory of another or the property or persons therein, when the case
is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and
convincing evidence.uo
Following the Second World War, the problem of pollution of
boundary waters, as well as other transboundary pollution problems,
assumed a position of increasing importance in the two countries.
In view of the provisions of Article IV of the 1909 Treaty and the
expertise and patterns of United States-Canadian cooperation already
developed by the IJC, it is not surprising that the two governments
turned increasingly to the Commission in an effort to deal with these
problems.
In 1946 the two governments requested that the IJC investigate
problems arising from pollution in the St. Clair River, Lake St. Clair,
the Detroit River, and the St. Marys River-the so-called Connecting
Channels Reference.91 A further reference was submitted in 1948 to
include the Niagara River as well, 98 and the two references were thereafter administered as one. The Commission's 312-page report on the
Connecting Channels Reference,99 submitted on October 11, 1950,
constituted a major advance in international pollution control experience in terms of both its technical comprehensiveness and the
nature of its recommendations. The report disclosed serious pollu94. Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada), 3 U.N,R.I.A.A. 1911 (1949),
33 AM. J. INTL. L. 182 (1938).
95. Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada), 3 U.N,R.I.A.A. 1938 (1949),
35 AM. J. INTL. L. 684 (1941).
96. Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada), 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1965 (1949),
35 AM. J. INTL. L. 716 (1941). Since Canada had accepted liability by the terms of the
arbitral agreement, the statement is technically dictum. The history of the arbitration
is well covered and the decisions analyzed in Read, The Trail Smelter Dispute, l CAN,
Y.B. INTL. L. 213 (1963); Rubin, Pollution by Analogy: The Trail Smelter Arbitration,
50 ORE. L. REv. 259 (1971).
97. IJC Doc. No. 54 (1946).
98. Pollution of Boundary Waters from Lake Erie, Lake Ontario-Waters of Niagara
River, IJC Doc. No. 55 (1948).
99. IJC, REPORT ON THE POLLUTION OF BOUNDARY WATERS (1951).
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tion in the various connecting channels, which resulted principally
from the discharge of domestic sewage and industrial wastes and
which, the Commission suggested, required urgent action. As a
method of dealing with the problem the Commission recommended
adoption by the two governments of a number of specific "Objectives
for Boundary Water Quality Control." In essence, these objectives
were technical criteria to be met in order to maintain the waters in
a satisfactory condition. The idea of recommending technical water
quality objectives was a major innovation, which the Commission
has followed in subsequent pollution references. The objectives,
which were the first of their kind to be formulated on an international basis, anticipated national action in both countries; 100 the concept was ultimately embodied in the federal Water Quality Act of
1965101 fifteen years later. The Commission also recommended appointment of two advisory boards on control of pollution--one
for the Superior-Huron-Erie section connecting channels and the
other for the Erie-Ontario section connecting channels. The boards
were to assist the Commission in surveillance of the connecting
channels to ensure compliance with the recommended objectives,
notifying those responsible for objectionable pollution, and, in the
absence of corrective measures, making appropriate recommendations
to authorities having jurisdiction. Again, it has now become standard
practice for the Commission to recommend that an advisory board
be established to maintain surveillance on developments surrounding
a particular reference. The Connecting Channels Report was approved by the governments, and the two boards were established
and have since functioned continuously. A program of periodic conferences with interested persons was also commenced to assist in
promoting compliance, and this practice has also continued.
In 1949 the IJC was asked to investigate the contribution made
by vessels on the Detroit River to atmospheric pollution in the
Detroit-Windsor area.102 The Commission established a technical
board on atmospheric pollution to conduct the investigations. The
IJC's report, issued May 31, 1960, found serious air pollution on
both sides of the river causing health and economic injuries. 103 The
Commission concluded, however, that the major sources of atmospheric pollution were industrial and transportation activities in the
100. IJC

LowER LAKEs REPORT,

supra note 10, at 4.

101. 33 u.s.c. §§ 1151-75 (1970).
102. Smoke Abatement Investigation, IJC Doc. No. 61 (1949).
103. !JC, REPORT ON THE POLLUTION OF THE ATMOSPHERE IN THE DETROIT RlvER
.AREA (1960).
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surrounding land areas and that fumes from vessels contributed only
a minimal amount to this pollution. It recommended that the governments adopt certain regulations for the emission of smoke from
vessels and concluded that for other sources there was already adequate legal and administrative authority in each country to enforce
proper controls on emission of wastes into the atmosphere. On January 30, 1961, the governments authorized the IJC to continue its
surveillance program pending communication of the views of the
governments on the report. An advisory board has been established
and its work continues.
On June 10, 1955, the two governments submitted a reference
to the IJC requesting it to investigate and study redevelopment of
the St. Croix River Basin for the purpose of the improvement of the
use, conservation, and regulation of the waters of the basin.104 While
the reference did not expressly refer to pollution the Commission
dealt with that subject extensively. The Commission established the
International St. Croix River Engineering Board to conduct the investigation. In 1957 the Engineering Board completed a preliminary
report and on October 13, 1959, the Commission reported to the two
governments on the regulation and pollution of the waters of the
Basin.105 The report recommended, inter alia, that the "Objectives
for Boundary Waters Quality Control," which were set forth in the
Commission's Report on the Pollution of Boundary Waters (the
Connecting Channels Report) be adopted by the governments of
Canada, the United States, New Brunswick, and Maine as the criteria
to be met in maintaining the Basin Waters in satisfactory condition;
that those responsible for existing or potential pollution put into
effect remedial measures necessary to meet these "Objectives"; and
that the Commission be authorized to establish and maintain supervision over boundary waters pollution problems in the Basin through
a technical advisory board. On October 2, 1961, the governments
announced that they had approved the recommendations of the Commission, with an exception not here pertinent. The advisory board
was established and is presently functioning.
In May 1959 the two governments submitted a reference to the
IJC concerning pollution of Rainy River and the Lake of the
Woods.106 The Commission established a technical board on water
104. St. Croix River, IJC Doc. No. 71 (1955).
105. !JC, REPORT ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WATER REsoURCES OF THE ST. CROIX
R.lvER BASIN (1959).
106. IJC Doc. No. 73 (1959).
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pollution, which submitted a comprehensive report to the Commission on April 4, 1963. The Commission issued its report in February
1965, which concluded that the waters of the Rainy River were being
seriously polluted, primarily by the discharge of wastes from pulp
and paper industries, but that the water quality of Lake of the Woods
appeared satisfactory.107 It recommended that the concerned state and
provincial governments adopt specified water quality objectives for
the Rainy River; that appropriate authorities require the industries
and municipalities concerned to initiate, at the earliest possible date
and pursuant to a definite time schedule, construction of pollution
abatement facilities; and that the Commission be authorized to establish and maintain supervision over pollution of the waters of the
Rainy River. The report was accepted by the governments and a
supervisory board established.
In October 1964, in the only pollution reference concerning a
river that was not a boundary water, the two governments requested
the IJC to investigate pollution of the Red River.108 The Commission created the International Red River Pollution Board to undertake the necessary technical investigations and studies, and the Board
submitted a two-volume report in October 1967. In its final report,
submitted in April 1968,109 the Commission concluded that during
the survey period the river waters crossing the boundary were not
polluted to an extent that caused injury to health or property in
Canada, and that injury was unlikely to occur if standards established
pursuant to legislation in Minnesota and North Dakota were adhered
to in those states. It further concluded that to ensure maintenance of
satisfactory water quality conditions at the boundary it was necessary
to adopt mutually acceptable water quality objectives for the Red
River at the international boundary and to provide for continuous
supervision to assure compliance with such objectives. Accordingly,
the IJC recommended general and specific water quality objectives
for the area and the establishment of an international board to maintain supervision. These recommendations were accepted and the
board established.
Also in October 1964, in one of the most significant and broadranging postwar pollution references, the two governments requested
that the IJC inquire into the extent, causes, and location of pollution
of Lake Erie, Lake Ontario, and the International Section of the St.
107. !JC, REPORT ON THE POLLUTION OF RAINY RIVER AND LAKE OF THE WOODS (1965).
108. IJC Doc. No. 81 (1964).
109. !JC, REPORT ON THE POLLUTION OF THE RED RlvER (1968).
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Lawrence River-the so-called Lower Great Lakes Pollution Reference.110 The Commission established two international technical advisory boards, the International Lake Erie Water Pollution Board
and the International Lake Ontario-St. Lawrence Water Pollution
Board, to conduct the technical investigations. The Boards' investigation was the most extensive water pollution study to be undertaken
anywhere to date, involving the concerted efforts of twelve agencies
of the two national governments, the states of New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Michigan, and the Province of Ontario, and the
work of several hundred scientific, engineering, and technical experts
from a variety of disciplines.111 During the period from 1964 to 1970
the Boards submitted 10 semiannual progress reports and two interim
reports to the IJC.112 The IJC itself made three interim reports to
the two governments. In September 1969 the Boards submitted to
the Commission a comprehensive 800-page joint final report on the
subject of the reference, containing detailed technical findings and
a wide variety of recommendations.113 During the period of December 1969 through February 1970 the IJC held six hearings on this
report in eight United States and Canadian cities. On January 14,
1971, the IJC issued its own final report to the two governments114
which adopted most of the Board's recommendations. 116 These recommendations, which were to play a crucial role in the proposal and
negotiation of the proposed Agreement, will be described later in
greater detail.116
On September 23, 1966, the governments expanded upon the
1949 Detroit River air pollution reference by requesting the !JC to
llO. I.JC Doc. No. 83 (1964). See also Dept. of State Press Release No. 441 (Oct. 8,
1964). The reference is reprinted in full in the IJC LOWER LAKES REPORT, supra note
IO, at 161-62. The Commission's procedures and method of work with respect to this
reference are set out in detail in IJC LowER LAKES REPORT, supra note 10, at 1·6, 25•33.
111. IJC LowER LAKES REPORT, supra note IO, at 25. The Board's multimillion
dollar investigation required nearly 450 man years of work by scientists, engineers,
and technical experts. The offshore studies involved over 100 cruises on Lake Erie
and 200 on Lake Ontario to obtain water samples on a regular basis and to retrieve
data at 13,000 stations. The Ontario Water Resources Commission alone deployed
as many as 12 survey vessels to collect data at 50,000 sampling locations. In all,
600,000 samples were analyzed for various constituents. Id. at 26-27.
ll2. See, e.g., International Great Lakes Levels Bd., Interim Report to the IJC:
Regulation of Great Lakes Levels, Feb. 1968.
ll3. International Lake Erie Water Pollution Bd. &: International Lake Ontario•
St. Lawrence River Water Pollution Bd., Report to the IJC on Pollution of Lake Erie,
Lake Ontario and the International Section of the St. Lawrence River, Sept. 1969
(3 vols.).
114. IJC LowER LAKES REPORT, supra note IO. The Report is summarized in 64
DEPT. STATE BULL. 203 (1971).
115. IJC LowER LAKES REPORT, supra note IO, at 149-57.
116. See text accompanying notes 125-29 infra.
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ascertain whether the air in the Port Huron, Michigan-Sarnia, Ontario, and Detroit, Michigan-Windsor, Ontario vicinities was being
polluted on either side of the boundary to an extent that was detrimental to the public health, safety, or general welfare of citizens or
property on the other side of the boundary. 117 If this question were
answered in the affirmative, the Commission was to indicate the
sources and extent of the air pollution and to recommend to the
governments the most practical preventive or remedial measures.
This reference also authorized the IJC to call the attention of the
governments to any air pollution situation along the entire boundary
meriting concern. 118 The Commission assigned this study to its
existing International St. Clair-Detroit Air Pollution Board.
On February 4, 1971, the Board submitted a report to the Commission.110 The report concluded that the transboundary fl.ow of air
pollutants produces pollution levels that are in excess of the air
quality standards established in Ontario and about to be established
in Michigan. In the Detroit-Windsor area far more sulfur oxides and
particulate matter are being transported from the United States into
Canada than are carried in the opposite direction. In the SarniaPort Huron area the contribution of sulfur oxides and particulate
matter from each country to transboundary air pollution is approximately equal; however, odors that have long been a source of
complaint by residents in the Port Huron area are considered in the
Board report to be a mixture caused by petroleum refining and
petroleum-related organic chemical maunfacturing in Sarnia. The
report recommends that the responsible control agencies in both
countries accelerate abatement programs to bring all sources of air
pollution into compliance; that both countries and their respective
air pollution control agencies establish uniform air quality standards
as soon as possible; and that the governments of Canada, the United
States, the State of Michigan, and the Province of Ontario cooperate
to control transboundary air pollution from existing sources and to
prevent creation of new sources. At the time of this writing, a final
report on this reference is reportedly in preparation.
117. Air Pollution, IJC Doc. No. 85 (1966).
118. The penultimate paragraph of the reference states:
The Commission is also requested to take note of air pollution problems in
boundary areas other than those referred to in Question I [the vicinity of
Port Huron-Sarnia and Detroit-Windsorl which may come to its attention from
any source. If at any time the Commission considers it appropriate to do so,
the Commission is invited to draw such problems to the attention of both governments.
119. Joint Air Pollution Study of St. Clair-Detroit River Areas for International
Joint Commission, Canada and the United States, Jan. 1971.
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Following the Santa Barbara Channel oil pollution incident off
the coast of California in the winter of 1969,120 the two governments
became concerned with the situation in Lake Erie, where some oil
and gas exploration has been carried on in Canadian waters since
1913. In March 1969 the governments requested the IJC, within the
framework of its existing study of Lower Lakes pollution and as a
matter of urgency, to investigate and make a special report on the
adequacy of existing safety requirements applicable to underwater
drilling and production operations to prevent oil from spilling into
Lake Erie; the adequacy of knmm methods of clearing up any major
oil spill that may occur from any source; and the adequacy of existing
contingency plans in both countries for dealing with oil spills.121 The
Commission instructed its existing International Lake Erie Water
Pollution Board to carry out the technical investigation. Five months
later the Board issued a report122 concluding that the current regulations of Ontario, New York, and Pennsylvania pertaining to oil and
gas exploration and production are adequate and if effectively enforced would provide satisfactory protection for the water resources
of the Lake. It further found that while oil and gas exploration and
development is a potential source of oil pollution in Lake Erie,
other potential sources might pose a greater threat. It pointed out
that the daily discharge of oil to the Detroit and St. Clair Rivers
exceeds the peak daily flow that escaped from the well off Santa
Barbara and that possibly the greatest threat to the water resources of
the Lake is the significant amount of oil carried in ships for their
own use, on the average 1,000 tons per vessel, as well as the oil and
other hazardous cargoes carried by some ships. The Board carefully
examined technical aspects of containment and clean-up of major oil
spills and existing contingency plans in both countries and emphasized the urgent need for international coordination and cooperation
to set up procedures to deal effectively with a major oil spill. It
recommended an accelerated and expanded program for containment
and clean-up of oil spills; the development of a coordinated international contingency plan and more complete national contingency
plans; the temporary limitation of drilling and production in certain
parts of Lake Erie pending development of such plans and programs;
120. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1969, at 50, col. 3.
121. The text of the request is set forth in the IJC LoWER LAKE.s REPORT, supra
note 10, at 163·64. The U.S. letter, which is identical to the Canadian letter, is re•
printed in 60 DEPT. STATE BULL. 296 (1969).
122. International Lake Erie Water Pollution Bd., Report to the IJC on Potential
Oil Pollution Incidents from Oil and Gas Well Activities in Lake Erie: Their Pre•
vention and Control, Sept. 1969.
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the exclusion from the Great Lakes of ships and masters likely to
present unreasonable risks of oil pollution; and provisions to alert
appropriate officials when hazardous materials are in transit over
Lake waters.
The Commission held public hearings on the Board's report in
December 1969. On May 21, 1970, the IJC submitted to the two
governments its third interim report on the progress of its Lower
Lakes study. The report, entitled "Special Report on Potential Oil
Pollution, Eutrophication, and Pollution from ·watercraft," adopted,
inter alia, most of the conclusions of the Board with respect to the oil
pollution question.123 The Commission's interim conclusions were
subsequently confirmed in its January 1971 final Report on the
Lower Great Lakes Pollution Reference.124
This survey may be concluded by returning to a fuller description
of the final Report on the Lower Great Lakes Pollution Reference,
perhaps the most important reference on the topic of pollution.
Briefly stated, the questions posed to the Commission in the reference were as follows:
I. Were the boundary waters of Lake Erie, Lake Ontario, and
the international section of the St. Lawrence River being
polluted on either side to an extent injurious to health or
property on the other side?
2. If so, to what extent, by what causes, and in what localities was
such pollution taking place?
3. What remedial measures would be the most practical from
economic, sanitary, and other points of view, and what would
the probable cost of these measures be?125
The IJC's Report is extremely comprehensive. It contains an
extensive discussion, based on the Joint Boards' technical studies, of
all aspects of the Lower Great Lakes pollution problems; a number
of specific conclusions; a listing of both general and specific proposed water quality objectives; and twenty-two specific recommendations for action by the two governments and responsible jurisdictions
in both countries.
In response to the particular questions posed, the Co:mmission
found that the waters of the Lower Great Lakes are being seriously
polluted on both sides of the boundary to the detriment of both
countries. While it is difficult to establish positively that the concentration of a particular pollutant on one side of the boundary is due
123. The report is summarized in 62 DEPT. STATE BuLL. 807 (1970).
124. IJC LowER LAKEs REPORT, supra note 10, at 52-61.
125. Id. at 5. The full reference is reprinted in id. at 161-62.
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to a specific source on the other side, there is no doubt that contaminants originating in one country do move across the boundary
and degrade the quality of water in the other country to the extent
of causing injury to health and property on that side of the boundary.
In answer to the second question, the Commission found that
water pollution extends throughout the Lower Lakes; that the principal causes are wastes discharged into the boundary waters and
tributaries by municipalities and industries; and that pollution is
taking place in all jurisdictions sharing the boundary waters. It
found that Lake Erie, particularly its western basin, is in an advanced state of eutrophication, or aging, and that accelerated eutrophication is occurring in Lake Ontario. A controlling factor in this
process is the discharge of phosphorus from detergents and other
municipal and industrial wastes.
Finally, in answer to the third question, and as a result of its previous answers, the Commission found that urgent measures are required, and it recommended that both Canada and the United States
adopt specific water quality objectives-as set out in the Reportand enter into agreement on a wide range of programs, measures,
and schedules to achieve them. The Report lists specific remedial
actions to be taken on an urgent basis, including immediate reduction of the phosphorus content in detergents and the prompt implementation of a vigorous program to treat municipal and
industrial waste to reduce phosphorus inputs. Estimated cost in terms
of 1968 dollars for municipal and industrial treatment facilities in
Canada is 211 million dollars and in the United States 1,373 million
dollars.126 The Commission recommends that, until it is in a position
to recommend quality objectives for Lake Huron and Lake Superior, the states of Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota, and the
Province of Ontario recognize the objectives recommended for the
Lower Lakes as the initial basis for the establishment of water pollution control programs for the Upper Lakes.
The Commission Report, however, is not limited to technical
evaluations and recommendations. It also deals extensively with the
surveillance, monitoring, and implementation required to achieve
the recommended remedial measures,127 and, to this end, concludes
by recommending a substantial expansion of its own authority and
jurisdiction. Recommendation 20 urges that the two governments
extend, at the earliest practicable date, the existing Lower Lakes
126. Id. at 137-38.
127. Id. at ll!0-35.
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Reference to authorize the Commission to investigate pollution in the
remaining boundary waters of the Great Lakes system and the waters
tributary thereto.128 The final recommendation of the Report is more
far-reaching. The Commission recommends that
The Governments of Canada and the United States specifically con- ,
fer upon this Commission the authority, responsibility and means for
coordination, surveillance, monitoring, implementation, reporting,
making recommendations to governments all as outlined in Chapter
XIII of this Report [which contains a detailed discussion of needs
respecting surveillance, monitoring, and implementation], and such
other duties related to preservation and improvement of the quality
of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence System as may be agreed by the said
Governments; the Commission to be authorized to establish, in consultation with the Governments, an international board or boards
to assist it in carrying out these duties and to delegate to said board
or boards such authority and responsibility as the Commission may
deem appropriate.120

D.

The Proposed Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement

The completion in September 1969 of the two Lower Lakes
technical boards' intensive study of Lower Great Lakes pollution,
and the boards' strong conclusions and recommendations to the
IJC concerning the grave deterioration of water quality in many
areas of the Lakes, coincided with several factors that surely aided
their effectiveness: a surge of public anxiety over environmental
problems in both the United States and Canada, public demands in
both countries for government action to deal with these problems,
and strong international pressures by the Canadian government upon
the United States government for the adoption of more effective
measures to cope with Great Lakes pollution. Influenced no doubt
by all these factors, President Nixon charged the Council on Environmental Quality to work with Canada on this matter.130
On June 23, 1970, the two governments convened a high level
ministerial meeting in Ottawa to discuss common Great Lakes pollution problems. 131 The Canadian delegation was led by Mitchell
Sharp and the American delegation by Russell Train. Both delegations included state and provincial as well as federal officials
and representatives. At the conclusion of the initial meeting the
128. Id. at 155.
129. Id. at 156.
130. Information based on interviews with U.S. government officials.
131. See Dept. State Press Release No. 189 CTune 23, 1970) (Communique of the
Canada-United States Ministerial Meeting on Great Lakes Pollution), published in
63 DEPT. STATE BULL. 36 (1970},
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Ministers expressed deep concern about the critical situation in the
Great Lakes, noted the determination of the governments to take
decisive action, and agreed on a number of specific remedial measures.132 The Ministers further agreed to the establishment of a
joint Working Group, composed of representatives of federal, state,
and provincial agencies with responsibilities in the field of water
quality, to consider various aspects of the problems of Great Lakes
pollution, possible common water quality objectives, and such
implementing programs as either government might wish to propose.
The Working Group was charged to report back to the Ministerial
Conference, which would be reconvened subsequent to the IJC's
issuance of its final Report on the Lower Great Lakes Pollution
Reference.133
The Working Group divided into ten subgroups, each dealing
with particular aspects of the Great Lakes problem. The reports of
the subgroups were presented to the full Working Group in February and March 1971, and the final report of the Working Group was
approved by the full Group in April 1971 and presented to the
Ministerial Meeting in June 1971.134 The central recommendation of the Working Group report was that the United States
and Canada enter into a comprehensive new agreement on Great
Lakes water quality control and that the agreement should include
adoption of common water quality objectives for the Great Lakes,
programs for achieving these objectives, and an expansion of the
IJC's authority to permit it to monitor effectively these efforts.
On June 10, 1971, the Ministerial Conference reconvened in
Washington to review the Working Group's report. The result of
that meeting was broad acceptance of the Working Group's major
recommendations, including its proposal for a new agreement on
Great Lakes water quality control. A Joint Communique was issued
at the conclusion of that meeting committing the two governments
to conclude such an agreement.135
The details of the proposed Agreement are still in the process of
negotiation by the two governments. However, the general character
and coverage of the proposed Agreement and associated arrangements
are spelled out at some length in the Joint Communique, and at
132. Id. The agreed measures included coordination of national contingency plan5
for spills of oil and hazardous materials, reduction of inputs of phosphates into the
Lakes, and achievement of compatible regulations concerning waste disposal by com•
mercial vessels and watercraft.
133. Id.
134-. Information supplied by U.S. government officials.
135. Joint Communique, supra note 1.
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least some of the probable details may be surmised from the recommendations in the IJC's Report and other sources. 136
The Agreement will be a formal and binding international agreement, which will, however, reportedly be entered into by the United
States as an executive agreement rather than as a treaty ratified
pursuant to formal constitutional processes.137 It will presumably
first establish certain broad general objectives for water quality
throughout the boundary waters of the Great Lakes system. These
will probably conform closely to the general objectives stated in the
IJC's Report and will include, for example, such objectives as keeping the waters free from substances in concentrations that are toxic
or harmful to human, animal, or aquatic life; free from nutrients in
concentrations that create nuisance growths of aquatic weeds or
algae; and free from floating debris or other materials in amounts
sufficient to be deleterious or objectionable.138
To achieve these general objectives, the parties will agree to
adopt specific common water quality objectives,139 perhaps with
associated target loadings and target dates, applicable to specific
areas. Most likely, these specific water quality objectives will again
be essentially the same as those recommended by the IJC in its Report; these suggest specific technical criteria for the quality of the
receiving waters with regard to microbiology, dissolved oxygen, total
dissolved solids, temperature, taste and odor, pH, iron, phosphorus,
radioactivity, and, as required, toxic materials, oils, and heavy metals.140 Presumably there will be some arrangement under which these
136. See, e.g., OCEAN SCIENCE NEws, Sept. 10, 1971, at I, which reports that the
heart of the Agreement will be contained in nine annexes dealing with water quality
objectives, contingency plans, vessel construction, vessel wastes, a navigation study,
dredged spoils, onshore and offshore facilities, transportation by land, and coordination
of research. It also notes that the 1975 target date for implementation of objectives will
be set back to 1976 and that among the differences remaining to be negotiated is
the fact that, while Canada wants a definite financial commitment from the U.S.
for setting up the Joint Water Quality Board under the IJC, the U.S. must anticipate
variations in the funds that will be approved by the House Appropriations Committee,
whose Chairman, Representative John Rooney, has not reacted favorably to IJC funding requests.
137. The proposed Agreement will presumably be an "umbrella-type" arrangement
in that it will commit each government to use the legislative and regulatory powers
available to it from time to time to take action to control pollution. Thus, the initial
U.S. programs will not require additional legislation, but, with enactment of new
legislation, the U.S. will be able to expand such programs. (Information supplied by
U.S. government officials.)
138. See IJC LoWER LAKES REPORT, supra note 10, at 144-45, set out in note 191
infra.
139. Joint Communique, supra note 1, ,r 5.
J40. See IJC LoWER LAKEs REPoRT, supra note 10, at 145-48, set out in part in note
192 infra.
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objectives, loadings, and dates may be supplemented or modified from
time to time under agreed procedures without the necessity for
revising the Agreement as a whole.
To meet these specific objectives, each party will undertake to
establish, through its own legal procedures, a broad range of national
water quality standards for the boundary waters of the Great Lakes
system; these standards must be compatible with and, it is hoped,
may exceed the common water quality objectives set forth in the
Agreement. 141
As a further measure to achieve the common water quality objectives, the two governments will exchange commitments to carry
out a variety of pollution control programs within agreed time periods, or as rapidly as feasible, including:
(a) construction of treatment facilities for municipal and industrial
wastes and animal husbandry operations, (b) reduction of phosphorus discharges, (c) elimination of mercury and other toxic metals
from discharges, (d) control of thermal pollution, (e) control of pollution from radioactive wastes, (f) control of pollution from pesticides,
and (g) developmentof controls for pollution from combined sewer
overflows. 142

The two governments will also agree to effective and compatible
regulations "(a) for ship design and construction to prevent fuel and
cargo loss, (b) for control of vessel waste discharges, (c) for disposition
of polluted dredge spoils, and (d) for preventing discharges of oil and
hazardous polluting substances from on- and off-shore facilities and
transportation on land." 143 The Agreement will also provide for a
joint investigation by the two governments for the purpose of agreeing upon measures respecting new navigation equipment, establishing traffic lanes on the Lakes, and the manning and operating of
vessels.144 The Communique also announces that, without waiting
for the negotiation of the Agreement, the governments are proceeding immediately with certain additional measures, including "a joint
contingency plan for a coordinated response to pollution incidents
involving spills of oil and other hazardous materials" on the Great
Lakes.145
The Communique expresses the two governments' agreement
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Joint Communique, supra note 1, ,i 5.
Id.
Id., ,I 7.
Id., ,I 8.
Id., ,I 13.
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that they should assign additional responsibilities and authority to
the I JC to assist the governments in their efforts to restore and protect Great Lakes water quality and gives considerable emphasis to the
enhanced role envisioned for the Commission.146 More specifically,
the Commission will be given a greater role in collecting, analyzing,
and disseminating relevant data and information; surveillance of
water quality in the Great Lakes system; monitoring of the effectiveness of governmental programs to achieve the common water quality
objectives; coordinating activities to improve water quality; tendering advice and assistance; and recommending legislation and programs.147 Arrangements will be established within the IJC for the
coordination of water quality research. Presumably the IJC will
render regular reports on progress made under the Agreement. The
Communique also states that the governments intend to extend new
references to the IJC, requesting it (a) to conduct an investigation of
water quality in Lake Superior and Lake Huron and (b) to extend
its surveillance of water quality to Lake Huron and Lake Superior.148
A separate reference may provide for a study by the IJC of pollution
from agriculture, forestry, and other land sources.
The Communique also addresses the question of IJC institutional
arrangements to carry out these new responsibilities.149 The two
governments agreed that it will be necessary to provide the Commission additional staff and resources; the new appointments will be the
Commission's responsibility, although the governments will be consulted. The establishment of an IJC office in the Great Lakes area is
suggested. The Ministers further suggest establishment of a special
pollution advisory board under the Commission to assist in implementing the new Agreement; it is also suggested that subboards
might be created to deal with specific functional responsibilities and
specific geographical areas within the Great Lakes basin. The pollution advisory board or boards should have a balanced binational
membership. The Communique makes clear, however, that the two
governments do not intend to grant the Commission any specific enforcement authority. While the Commission is to aid the governments
by providing an independent overview and other assistance, the various agencies of the federal, state, and provincial governments will
146. Id., 11 9.
147. Id. The authority contemplated is presumably a reflection of the arrangements
for surveillance, monitoring, and implementation suggested and more fully discussed in IJC LOWF.R LAKES REPORT, supra note 10, at 130-35.
148. Joint Communique, supra note 1, 11 13.
149. Id., 1111 10-11.
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continue to implement the programs and measures required to
achieve the water quality objectives.150
In the Joint Communique, each government addressed itself
J:>riefly to certain domestic measures that it was already undertaking
to meet these problems and various related issues.151 American representatives reviewed the extensive federal programs directed toward
remedying Great Lakes pollution that were underway. The Canadian
Ministers indicated the desirability of a 1975 deadline for completion
of certain of the proposed Lower Great Lakes programs, particularly
those directed to the reduction of phosphorus inputs. They also
noted that implementation of many of the Canadian commitments
under the proposed agreement will be the joint responsibility of the
Canadian federal government and the government of Ontario and
that the apportionment of responsibility among the Canadian government, the government of Ontario, and the municipalities concerned
for the financing of the required accelerated program of improvements to municipal sewage treatment facilities in the Lower Lakes
area will be the subject of a detailed agreement to be negotiated between the Canadian government and the government of Ontario.
Bodi groups of Ministers expressed in the Communique their
optimism for the future. But in a significant note of caution they
added: "In designing the agreement, it was accepted that programs
and other measures established to meet urgent problems would in no
way affect the rights of each country in the use of its Great Lakes
waters.'' 152 In an interesting conclusion to the substantive part of the
Communique, the Ministers noted that the process of intergovernmental.cooperation employed in designing the proposed Agreement
might be applied to the solution of other common environmental
problems-for example, air pollution.153 Finally, it should be noted
that the Communique makes no mention of any special procedures
for dispute-settlement for use in the case of claims of noncompliance
·with the proposed Agreement. Presumably, such claims will be dealt
with under the dispute-settlement provisions of the 1909 Treaty.
Ill.

SOME AsPECTS OF THE UNITED STATES-CANADIAN EXPERIENCE

While every international environmental arrangement is necessarily unique, there are certain common problems that the parties
will face in reaching any agreement. These include the initial de150.
151.
152.
153.

Id.,
Id.,
Id.,
Id.,

11 12.
1111 13-18.
,I 17.
1[ 18.
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cision that a particular environmental problem or set of problems
is an appropriate subject for international treatment; the determination of the form any international cooperation should take; the
structuring of required institutions; the determination of objectives;
the apportionment of burdens; the establishment of coordination;
and the formulation of provisions for implementation. It may be useful to take a closer look at how the United States and Canada have
dealt with these pro~lems.
A.

The Need for International Cooperation

'A threshold stage of any arrangement for international environmental cooperation is a recognition by governments that the particular problems involved are appropriate matters for international
treatment. With a few exceptions,154 pollution and other environmental problems were long regarded as primarily of national rather
than international concern. It is only within the past few years that
this view has undergone substantial change and the propriety of
broader international involvement in environmental issues has become more widely accepted. Nevertheless, states are still inclined to
think of these questions as primarily national in character and, unless they see some national interest that can be pursued through
international environmental cooperation, will have little inclination
to participate. Thus, with respect to each proposal for international
environmental measures, it is useful to ask why such measures are
needed and what they can add to approaches based on national action
alone.165 There are at least three types of situations in which international treatment seems generally advisable.
First, the clearest case for international cooperation is the one in
which a particular environmental problem both produces significant
and potentially harmful international effects and is of such a nature,
or manifested in such a context, that measures to deal effectively
with it inherently require some type of joint or coordinated international action. The typical case arises where several countries share
a river, a lake, or an enclosed sea, or :where all nations share an environment beyond the reach of any single national jurisdiction, such
as the high seas or outer space. Clearly, pollution problems in these
settings cannot be adequately assessed or controlled except through
154. See note 178 infra.
155. See generally CEQ 1970 REPORT, supra note 7, at 199-200; Russell & Landsberg, International Environmental Problems: A Taxonomy, 172 SCIENCE 1307 (1971);
Report of the U.N. Secretary General on Problems of the Human Environment, supra
note 6; authorities cited in note 5 supra.
·
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common or joint action by all of the states that are contributing to
the problem or sharing control of the relevant environments. Over
time a broad consensus has developed favoring international treatment of many of these issues.m In the broadest sense, perhaps all
environmental problems are of this character because of their ultimate effect on the global environment. Of course, different types of
measures may be appropriate to different cases: some situations may
suggest only limited programs of exchange of information and data,
coordinated or joint monitoring or surveillance, or, as in the case of
recent American-Canadian cooperation, the setting of minimum common objectives; other situations may call for more far-reaching
techniques of international or supranational regulation or enforcement.
Second, international measures may be useful when a state fails
for some reason to control adequately what is primarily its own national environmental problem, with consequent spill-over effects of
a type that damage other countries. The passage of fumes from a
smelter across an international boundary, as in the Trail Smelter arbitration,157 is an example of such a situation. The type of international measures suggested may vary with the case. Thus, a state may
156. See note 178 infra. The principal convention dealing with pollution of the
oceans is the International Convention for the Prevention of the Pollution of the
Sea by Oil, opened for signature May 12, 1954, [1961] 12 U.S.T. 2989, T.I.A.S, No,
4900, 327 U.N.T.S. 3, as amended April 11, 1962, [1966] 17 U.S.T. 1523, T.I.A.S, No.
6109, 600 U.N.T.S. 332, and 1969 (annexed to IMCO Ass. Res. A.175(VI) (Oct, 21, 1969),
See also Geneva Convention on the High Seas, opened for signature April 29, 1958,
[1962] 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, art. 24 (oil pollution): art,
25 (pollution by radioactive materials and other harmful agents); Geneva Convention
on the Continental Shelf, opened for signature April 29, 1958, [1964] 15 U.S.T, 471,
T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, art. 5(7) (coastal state engaged in c.xploring or
exploiting the resources of the shelf must take appropriate measures for protection
of the living resources of the sea from harmful agents); International Convention
on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, opened for signature Nov, 29, 1969, re•
printed in 64 AM. J. INTL. L. 481 (1970); International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, opened for signature
Nov. 29, 1969, reprinted in 64 AM. J. INTL. L. 471 (1970); Agreement for Cooperation
in Dealing with Pollution of the North Sea by Oil, June 9, 1969, between the various
states bordering on the North Sea, reprinted in 9 INTL. LEGAL MATERIALS 359 (1969),
During the past several years, the U.N. General Assembly has adopted a number of
resolutions dealing with various aspects of marine pollution. See generally Hardy,
International Control of Marine Pollution, 11 NATURAL REsouRCEs J. 296 (1971):
Schachter &: Senver, supra note 5.
Both the Antarctic Treaty, Dec, 1, 1959, [1961] 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780,
402 U.N.T.S. 71, and the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, [1967] 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No, 6347, contain provisions
directed at protecting these unique environments. The Treaty Banning Nuclear
Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, signed at
Moscow Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S, 43, was also
motivated largely by global environmental considerations.
157. See text accompanying notes 91-96 supra.
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simply be unaware of the international impact of its environmental
policies, in which case international admonitions may alert it to the
problem. Or a state may be indifferent to the international environmental consequences of its actions, in which case some type of international persuasion or pressure may be required to induce it to
change its attitude. A state may be concerned that, in taking national
measures to control pollution, it will be put at an economic or military disadvantage vis-a-vis other states that have similar problems but
do not take any corrective action. This situation is illustrated by the
current widespread concern regarding the impact of different national
environmental quality programs on international trade and investment.158 Problems of this nature might be met by international
measures requiring similar levels of national action by all, or at least
most, of the states concerned.159 Finally, a state may simply not have
the financial resources or scientific and technical expertise necessary
to develop and maintain required pollution control programs; measures of international financial and technical assistance could help to
fill such a gap.
Third, even in cases in which the international impact of particular environmental problems is minimal and in which the national
governments are prepared to take necessary action to control them, if
the problems are common to various countries, there may be substantial mutual gains to governments from sharing and exchanging
relevant scientific data, technology, and institutional experience.
The problem of pollution of the internationally shared environment of the Great Lakes and other United States-Canadian boundary
waters is one in which both countries have an obvious common concern and in which the solution can clearly be advanced by international cooperation; indeed, it is perhaps the best example of a
situation for which international treatment is appropriate. A major
accomplishment of the 1909 Treaty was its early recognition of this
158. See, e.g., CEQ 1971 REPORT, supra note 7, at 131-33. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development is currently experimenting with techniques for
harmonizing environmental standards, as in its introduction, for an initial period of two
years, of a "Procedure for Notification and Consultation on Measures for Control
of Substances Affecting Man or His Environment," adopted on May 18, 1971, O.E.C.~.
Doc. C (71), 73/Annex (1971) (described by Stein, The Potential of Regional Organizations in Managing Man's Environment, in I.Aw, INSTITtJnONS AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT, supra note 5, manuscript at 15-16).
159. Compare the analogous concept of mutual limitation in the Treaty Banning
Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, signed
at Moscow Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43. Similar
considerations are an important factor in the negotiation of international commodity
arrangements. See, e.g., Bilder, The International Coffee Agreement. A Case History
in Negotiation, 28 LAW &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 328 (1963).
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fact at a time when m_ost o~her countries with similar problems still
regarded pollution as strictly a matter of national concern. By including in the Treaty the provision of Article IV prohibiting pollution, the United States and Canada not only recognized this common
concern but established a broad international jurisdictional basis for
subsequent joint treatment of environmental problems. Indeed, pollution references under Article IX of the Treaty have traditionally
contained language directing the IJC to conduct its investigations
"with reference to the principles contained" in Article IV, and it can
be assumed that the Preamble to the proposed Agreement will contain a similar direction.
However, while Article IV provides a broad jurisdictional basis
for further cooperative efforts between the United States and Canada
to implement its prohibition of pollution, it does not in itself require
such action. Despite the broad acceptance by both countries of the
principle of international concern in Article IV, they have in practice
continued to exercise careful control over the extent to which specific boundary waters environmental problems are dealt with on an
international basis.
The technique by which the two governments make a particular
boundary waters pollution problem the subject of international
treatment is submission of a joint reference on the problem to the
Commission under Article IX of the Treaty.160 While unilateral
Article IX references are theoretically possible,161 neither government has sought to make a unilateral reference. The suggestion and
initiative for particular pollution references may come from various
sources-from concerned agencies of the federal, state, or provincial
governments of either country; from complaints by affected groups
or individuals; or from information brought to the attention of the
governments by the Commission itself. The governments have not as
yet seen fit broadly to authorize the Commission to institute investigations on its mm motion, though on occasion, as in the case of the
"watching brief" given the Commission under an air pollution reference, the governments have in effect conferred certain limited investigatory powers.162 If one of the governments considers a proposed
reference too sensitive, it will simply refuse to agree to its submission.
160. The reference procedure is described in text accompanying notes 60-70 supra.
161. Article IX provides that questions or matters of differences shall be referred

to the IJC for examination and report "whenever either the Government of the
United States or the Government of the Dominion of Canada shall request that such
questions or matters of difference be so referred." 1909 Treaty art. IX, first para.
(emphasis added).
· 162. See note ll8 supra and '.1CC01:f1.panying text.
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In any event, the terms of the reference will be carefully negotiated.
Moreover, the Commission's jurisdiction, and thus the scope of international cooperation, is limited by the terms of the reference. The
reference procedure permits each country to retain an effective veto
over the Commission's investigation, and consequently over the international handling of particular problems; and such vetoes have
occasionally been exercised.163 The reference procedure is nonetheless important, for, as previously discussed, 164 the history of United
States-Canadian Great Lakes cooperation is in effect a history of the
various references agreed to by the two governments.
The proposed Agreement and its related arrangements will presumably serve to bring the entire range of Great Lakes problems into
the sphere of the IJC's concern and ,rill involve at least limited joint
action by the two countries. But the caution and reluctance of the two
governments to abandon the prerogatives of sovereignty remain evident. The proposed Agreement will probably provide little in the
way of effective international enforcement procedures and the Commission's role in this respect continues to be carefully restricted.
B.

The Role of Legal Prohibitions and Remedies

One way of attempting to prevent transnational pollution is simply to prohibit it through some operation of international law, with
resort by an injured state to the usual processes of international
claim and adjudication. One interesting aspect of American-Canadian experience is that, while this technique is expressly available to
each country, it has been employed on only one occasion-the Trail
Smelter arbitration,165 which dealt with air rather than water pollution. Instead, the two countries have chosen to deal with their
common pollution problems through the establishment of ongoing
institutional arrangements and cooperative techniques of investigation and assessment, or, more recently under the proposed Agreement, through the establishment of broad cooperative programs and
agreed minimum water quality objectives.
As previously noted, the 1909 Treaty contains a specific prohibition on transnational pollution. The relevant provision states that
"It is further agreed that the waters herein defined as boundary
waters and water flowing across the boundary shall not be polluted
163. For example, Canada has reportedly been reluctant to extend a pollution
reference to the Commission concerning pollution of the St. John's River. (Information
based on interviews with U.S. government officials.)
164. See pt. II. C. supra.
165. See text accompanying ·notes 91-96 supra.
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on either side to the injury of health or property on the other." 160
This provision is an early and still significant precedent in international environmental law, for even today there is considerable question whether customary international law has progressed to the point
where transnational water pollution is clearly prohibited.167 While
166. 1909 Treaty art. IV, second para.
167. See generally the excellent discussions in Bourne, International Law and
Pollution of International Rivers and Lakes, 21 U. TORONTO L.J. 193 (1971); Jordan,
supra note 35, at 285-89; Lester, River Pollution in International Law, 57 AM. J. INTL.
L. 828 (1963); Lester, Pollution, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS 89
(A. Garretson, R. Hayton 8: C. Olmstead ed. 1967). The authors appear to agree that
relevant international law is sparse, general in terms, and often closely related to
specific situations and agreements-in the words of one of the authors, "rudimentary"
and "embryonic" Gordan, supra at 285).
International agreements that do refer to water pollution problems generally do
so in differing terms and with respect to special situations, so no clear rule can be
adduced from them other than a very general tendency to condemn pollution, a term
which is usually undefined. See Lester, River Pollution, supra at 841-42, See also
Bourne, supra at 200; Jordan, supra at 287-88; Lester, Pollution, supra at 102-06. See
generally the compilation in Legal Problems Relating to the Utili:iation and Uses of
International Rivers, U.N. Doc. A/5409 (1963); 3 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 28, at
1043-45. Bourne, supra at 200, notes that up to 1965 there were some fifty-two treaties
that referred to pollution. Of these, some forty were European and twelve were non•
European; and only six dealt exclusively with pollution questions, all of these six
being European and all being entered into between 1960 and 1965, The agreements
establishing permanent international commissions are, of course, of particular interest.
See note 178 infra. State practice is similarly sporadic and specialized and docs not
permit assertion of any clear customary norms. See Lester, Pollution, supra at 109,
Relevant decisions by international tribunals are few in number and largely dicta. Thus,
in the Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania), [1949) I.C.J. 3, in dealing with
the alleged responsibility of the Albanian government for the mining of an interna•
tional strait, the Court referred to "[e]very State's obligation not to allow knowingly its
territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States." [1949] I.C.J. 22,
In the Lake Lanoux Arbitration (Spain v. France), which involved the right of
France to divert and use certain waters of a transnational river system that flowed
into Spain when it eventually returned those waters to the system unchanged in
quantity or quality, the tribunal, while refusing relief to Spain, commented that its
decision might have been othenvise if pollution of the waters had been established.
The arbitral decision is reported in 53 AM. J. INTL, L. 156 (1959), and commented
on in Laylin 8: Bianchi, The Role of Adjudication on International River Disputes:
The Lake Lanoux Case, 53 AM. J. INTL. L. 30 (1959). In the Trail Smelter arbitration
(see text accompanying notes 91-96 supra), the tribunal asserted in very broad language
the existence of a principle of international responsibility for transnational air pollu•
tion of serious consequence (see text accompanying note 96 supra), but since Canada
had already assumed responsibility, the tribunal's statement is essentially dictum.
A recent effort to restate the international legal principles relating to international
drainage basins is the International Law Association's Committee on the Uses of
the Waters of International Rivers HELSINKI RULES, adopted by the International
Law Association in 1966. See INTERNATIONAL LAW AssN., FIFTY-SECOND REPORT-HELSINKI
484-533 (1967); THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS, supra at 779-830. Article
IV of the Rules provides that "[e]ach basin State is entitled, within its territory, to a
reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the waters of an international
drainage basin." Article V provides that "[w)hat is a reasonable and equitable share
within the meaning of Article IV is to be determined in the light of all the relevant
factors in each particular case." With reference to pollution, the Rules provide as
follows:
Article IX
As used in this Chapter, the term "water pollution" refers to any detrimental
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provisions in treaties relating to water pollution have become more
numerous, they vary widely in content, context, and application.
The 1909 Treaty is silent about specific procedures to be followed
in the event that either country claims a violation of Article IV and
seeks traditional international legal remedies. However, since Article
IX permits either government to refer "any other questions or matters of difference arising between them" to the IJC for examination
and an advisory report, each country may, at least in theory, unilaterally compel an advisory opinion on its claim that the other has
violated Article IV. Article X goes further by providing procedures
under which both governments, by common consent, may submit
questions or differences to the Commission for a binding decision.
Since the Treaty predates the establishment of either the Permanent
Court of International Justice or its successor, the International
Court of Justice, there is, of course, no reference in the Treaty to the
submission of disputes to those bodies. However, between the years
1946 and 1970 international pollution disputes under the 1909
Treaty would arguably have been within the compulsory jurisdiction
of the International Court of Justice under the terms of both the
United States and Canadian acceptances of the International Court's
change resulting from human conduct in the natural composition, content, or
quality of the waters of an international drainage basin.
Article X
1. Consistent with the principle of equitable utilization of the waters of an
international drainage basin, a State
(a) must prevent any new form of water pollution or any increase in the degree
of existing water pollution in an international drainage basin which would
cause substantial injury in the territory of a co-basin State, and
(b) should take all reasonable measures to abate existing water pollution in
an international drainage basin to such an extent that no substantial damage is caused in the territory of a co-basin State.
2. The rule stated in paragraph I of this Article applies to water pollution
originating
(a) within the territory of the State, or
(b) outside the territory of the State, if it is caused by the State's conduct.
Article XI
1. In the case of a violation of the rule stated in paragraph l(a) of Article X
of this Chapter, the State responsible shall be required to cease the wrongful
conduct and compensate the injured co-basin State for the injury that has been
caused to it.
2. In a case falling under the rule stated in paragraph l(b) of Article X, if
a State fails to take reasonable measures, it shall be required promptly to enter
into negotiations with the injured State with a view toward reaching a settle•
ment equitable under the circumstances.
See Bourne, supra at 195-98 for a recent analysis of the Rules.
On the law of international drainage basins more generally, see, e.g., THE LAW
OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS, supra, which contains a number of excellent
monographs and reprints; 3 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 28, at 872-1075; the HELSINKI
RULES, supra; Bourne, The Development of International Water Resources: "The
Drainage Basin Approach," 47 CAN. B. REV. 62 (1969); Griffin, The Use of Waters of
International Drainage Basins Under Customary International Law, 53 AM. J. INTL. L.
50 (1959); Shapiro-Libai, Development of International River Basins: Regulation of
Riparian Competition, 45 IND. L.J. 20 (1969).
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jurisdiction through the "optional clause" of the Court's Statute; and
either country could have sought to invoke the Court's jurisdiction.168 While the Connally Amendment160 might have been invoked
by the United States to attempt to defeat the Court's jurisdiction over
any such claim brought by Canada or invoked on the basis of reci- .
procity by Canada with respect to a claim brought by the United
States, the propriety of the reservation's use in a case so clearly involving international treaty as well as customary rights would at least
have been open to serious question.170 Thus, while the Treaty's dis168. The jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice generally depends
upon specific consent of the parties to the dispute, expressed either in a special agree•
ment or in a dispute settlement provision of a more general international agreement,
However, under Article 36(2) (the so-called "optional clause" of the Statute of the
Court (59 Stat. 1055 (1945), T.S. No. 993)) the state parties to the Statute may at any
time declare that they recognize the jurisdiction of the Court in certain broad classes
of legal disputes as compulsory without special agreement in relation to any other
state accepting the same obligation.
Canada made such a declaration, with certain conditions, with respect to the
Permanent Court of International Justice, on September 20, 1929, and this declaration
was made applicable to the International Court of Justice, as the Permanent Court's
successor, by I.J.C. STAT. art. 36(5). The 1929 Canadian Declaration is reprinted in
[1960-61] I.C.J.Y.B. 198; J. CASTEL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 844 (1965).
The U.S. made a declaration accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter•
national Court under the "optional clause" on Aug. 14, 1946, 61 Stat, 1218 (19-17),
T.I.A.S. No. 1598, reprinted in [1960-61] I.C.J.Y.B. 217; 15 DEPT. STATE BULL. 452
(1946). The U.S. acceptance, however, includes a "self-judging" reservation added
by the much-criticized Connally Amendment. By the terms of that Amendment the
U.S. acceptance does not apply to "disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America as determi11ed
by the United States of America" (emphasis added).
On April 7, 1970, the Canadian representative to the United Nations presented
to Secretary General U Thant a declaration amending Canada's acceptance of the
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court by adding a reservation that
Canada retains jurisdiction over
disputes arising out of or concerning jurisdiction or rights claimed or exercised
by Canada in respect of the conservation, management or exploitation of the
living resources of the sea, or in respect of the prevention or control of pollution
or contamination of the marine environment in marine areas adjacent to the
coast of Canada.
See N.Y. Times, April 9, 1970, at 12, col. I. The full text of the present Canadian
declaration is reprinted in 9 INTL. LEGAL MATERIALS 598 (1970). There is some ques•
tion whether the language "prevention or control of pollution or contamination of
the marine environment in marine areas adjacent to the coast of Canada" was intended
to cover or could be interpreted to cover pollution control in the Great Lakes. If so,
since the U.S. acceptance of the "optional clause" is on terms of reciprocity, the U.S.
could presumably now invoke the Canadian reservation as a bar to any attempt by
Canada to bring the U.S. before the Court under the "optional clause."
169. See note 168 supra.
170. The reciprocal availability of such a self-judging reservation was sustained
by the International Court in the Case of Certain Non11egian Loans, [1957] I.C.J. 9,
The Department of State was subjected to heavy criticism when it invoked the
Connally Reservation in the Interhandel Case, [1959] I.C.J. 6, with respect to the
limited issue of its right to sell or otherwise dispose of General Aniline and Film Co.
shares after Switzerland had taken that case to the International Court. The case
was ultimately disposed of on other grounds. For references to the criticism of the
U.S. action in the Interhandel Case, and on the Connally Amendment problem gen•
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pute-settlement procedures leave something to be desired, traditional
international claims procedures for Treaty violation would appear
to have been available to the United States and Canada with respect
to Great Lakes pollution problems~ at least in principle, for over
sixty years. Pollution problems benveen the two countries have been
of growing urgency and significance in this period, and Canada has
not been remiss in charges that the United States bears major responsibility. Nevertheless, the provisions of Article IV have never been
invoked by either government as the basis of a formal specific international claim.
This is not to suggest that Article IV has not had an important
influence in the handling of pollution problems. As previously indicated, the Article has traditionally been invoked as an additional
jurisdictional basis for pollution references to the IJC under Article
IX of the Treaty; typically, the reference directs the Commission to
conduct its investigation "with reference to the principles contained
in Article IV," and the first question usually asked by the governments in each pollution reference is, in effect, whether the situation
in question reveals a general violation of Article IV.171 But, with a
few exceptions such as the Trail Smelter reference,172 the terms of
such references have been broad rather than specific, with their
thrust clearly toward technical assessment and the recommendation
of ongoing and future-directed proposals rather than the determination of legal responsibility and specific remedies for past treaty violations.
Various explanations have been suggested for this failure of the
United States and Canada to use traditional legal techniques as a
method of dealing with boundary waters pollution problems. 173 First,
any specific claim by one government that the other is in violation of
Article IV would probably encounter both legal and evidentiary
difficulties. The scope of the prohibition is unclear; the terms "pollution" and "injury" are undefined, and their interpretation would
raise difficult issues of policy. Evidentiary issues likewise abound. It
may be relatively easy for one country to show broadly the existence
of specific sources of pollution· on the other side of the boundary
waters and specific injury from pollution on its side. But to establish
erally, see, e.g., Bilder, The Office of the Legal Adviser: The State Department Lawyer
and Foreign Affairs, 56 A11r. J. INTL. L 633 n.77 (1962).
171.
in text
172.
173.
292-93;

See, e.g., Question l of the Lower Great Lakes Pollution Reference, indicated
accompanying note 125 supra.
See text accompanying notes 91-96 supra.
See, e.g., Erichsen-Brown, supra note 35, at 65-66; Jordan, supra note 35, at
Lester, River Pollution, supra note 167, at 848.
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the necessary causal link between the two will usually be extremely
difficult. Absent exceptional situations, such as a massive oil spill or
possibly a significant discharge of particularly toxic heavy metals or
chemicals, the pollution of a large body of water such as a lake typically occurs through gradual and cumulative processes. Normally,
pollution arises from a variety of sources on both sides and the effluents and other inputs into the lake's waters slowly mix under complex
hydrological processes. In general, the most that can be said with
confidence is that mutual transboundary pollution does occur. Thus,
in the IJC's Report on the Lower Great Lakes Pollution Reference,
the Commission concluded:
It is difficult to establish positively that the concentration of a particular pollutant on one side of the boundary in the lakes is due to
a specific source on the other side. However . . . there is no doubt
that contaminants originating in one country do move across the
boundary and degrade the quality of the waters in the other
country.174

Second, even if a causal link could be established, obtaining a
binding decision with traditional international legal remedies may be
difficult, cumbersome, and, in the end, impractical. Article X permits a binding decision only with the consent of both governments.
While it has been suggested that the International Court of Justice
might arguably have had compulsory jurisdiction over such matters
during most of the postwar period, this question is not free from
doubt. Even if resort to an international tribunal is possible, the
process of adjudication is likely to be expensive and time-consuming.
Moreover, in view of the rudimentary state of international pollution
law, the outcome will necessarily be uncertain. Finally, the impact of
pollution is most typically an accumulation of small and often subtle
harms, affecting large numbers of people, and money damages may
be hard to calculate and ineffective as a solution. The injunctive
powers of international tribunals are limited, and, in any event, injunctions appropriate to the complexities of large scale Great Lakes
pollution would be difficult to fashion and administer.
174. IJC LoWER LAKES REPORT, supra note 10, at 70. These considerations may also
help to explain why there has been no use made of the following provisions of Art.
II, first para. of the 1909 Treaty:
[l]t is agreed that any interference with or diversion from their natural channel
of such waters on either side of the boundary, resulting in any injury on the
other side of the boundary, shall give rise to the same rights and entitle the in•
jured parties to the same legal remedies as if such injury took place in the
country where such diversion or interference occurs ••••
Both the U.S. courts (including state courts) and the Canadian courts are open to
foreigners. See generally . D. PIPER, supra note 10, at 77-78; Scott, The Canadian•
American Boundary Waters Treaty: Why Article 111, 36 CAN. B. R.Ev. 511 (1958};
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Third, each country has been well aware of its own contributions
to boundary waters pollution and consequently of its own potential
exposure to complaints under Article IV. A resort to formal claims
by one country might have invited a retaliatory submission of counterclaims by the other, with considerable risk to both and little possibility of gain to either.
Finally, governments have traditionally been reluctant to entrust
their own significant national concerns to the unpredictable and
inflexible outcomes of international adjudicative processes and have
in general preferred the less risky technique of negotiated settlement
of their mutual differences. 175
In view of these considerations, it is not surprising that the two
governments have chosen not to adopt liability-based approaches to
Great Lakes pollution problems and have tended instead to use the
technique of advisory references to the Commission under Article IX
of the Treaty. In effect, the Article IX technique offers each country
significant advantages at little risk. It permits the two countries to
explore the possibilities of useful international cooperation while
retaining full control over the most significant decisions and policy.
Moreover, it reflects their judgment that the most sensible way of
dealing with such technically complex and politically sensitive problems is through flexible and ongoing programs that take account of
a multiplicity of factors and are founded on the necessity for compromise and balancing of interests, rather than through legal techniques
based on rigid rules and adjudication of past liability.176
Waite, International Law Affecting Water Rights in the Western States, 4 LAND 8e WATER
L. REv. 67, 74.79 (1969). Cf. 3 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 28, at 767-68.
175. See, e.g., L. BLOOMFIELD, LAW, PoLmcs AND INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES, (Intl.
Conciliation Pamphlet No. 516, 1958); Falk, Realistic Horizons for International Adjudication, 11 VA. J. !NTL. L. 314 (1971).
176. The desirability of handling international pollution problems through cooperative procedures rather than through adjudicative techniques has been stressed by
a number of commentators. See, e.g., Jordan, supra note 35, at 288-89; Lester, Pollution,
supra note 167, at 109-10. See also Hines, Nor Any Drop to Drink: Public Regulation
of Water Quality, Part II: Interstate Arrangements for Pollution Control, 52 IOWA L
REV. 432, 434 (1966):
Although it has long been settled that one state may maintain an action against
another state to enjoin harmful pollution of shared waters, the states almost
never resort to litigation to settle their water quality differences. Instead, where
real or potential conflicts appear in the uses to be made of water in a watershed
encompassing two or more states, the states involved usually seek to resolve their
differences through cooperative arrangements.
While the Supreme Court has adjudicated pollution controversies between one state and
another state or citizens of another state (see New Jersey v. New York City, 283 U.S. 473
(1931); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,
206 U.S. 230 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901), 200 U.S. 496 (1906)),
it has noted the difficulties involved in such adjudications. A recent illustration is
Ohio v. Wyandotte Chem. Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971), in which the State of Ohio
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Institutional Structure

International environmental cooperation can be implemented
through a variety of formal or informal institutional arrangements.177
The United States and Canada, of course, have employed principally
the technique of the binational commission,178 thus far with considerable success.
As previously indicated, the IJC is composed of six members,
three of whom are nationals of each country selected by their respective governments. The Commissioners need not be technical experts;
they have in general tended to be well qualified, though varied in
background.179 During recent years at least, only the chairman of the
United States section has received a regular salary; other members
for some time received only expenses but are presently being paid
when they are actually working on Commission affairs. Up to the
present, the Commission's permanent staff has been very small, con•
sisting principally of permanent secretaries for each of the nvo national sections, who together act as the Commission's administrators.
filed a motion for leave to file a bill of complaint invoking the Court's original
jurisdiction against Wyandotte Chemicals Corp. (incorporated in Michigan), Dow Chem•
ical Co. (incorporated in Delaware), and Dow Chemical Company of Canada, Ltd.
(incorporated in Ontario). The complaint was directed at an alleged nuisance resulting
from the contamination and pollution of Lake Erie by the dumping of mercury into
its tributaries. The Court, in an eight-to-one decision with Justice Douglas dissenting,
declined to exercise jurisdiction since the issues involved local law that the Ohio
courts were competent to consider, several national and international bodies were
actively concerned with the pollution problems involved, and the nature of the case
required the resolution of complex and novel technical questions that the Court felt
did not implicate important problems of federal law, which are the primary responsibility of the Court.
177. See generally LAw, !NsrrrunoNS AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT, supra note 5.
See also the various arrangements noted in notes 7 and 156 supra and note 178 infra.
178. A number of international agreements relating to international rivers or lakes
establish international commissions to implement certain of their provisions, For
listings of agreements establishing such commissions, see Stein, The Potential of Re•
gional Organizations in Managing Man's Environment, in Li\W, INSTITUTIONS AND THE
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT, supra note 5, manuscript at 46; Yates, Unilateral and Multilateral
Approaches to Environmental Problems, 21 U. TORONTO L.J. 182, 187-88 n.27 (1971).
See generally Ely & Wolman, Administration, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE
BASINS, supra note 167, at 126; Kiss & Lambrechts, La lutte contre la pollution de
l'eau en Europe occidentale, 15 ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE DROIT INTL. 718 (1969); Stainov,
Les Aspects Juridique de la Lutte Internationale contre la pollution du Danube, 72
REVUE GEN. DE DROIT INTL. PUB. 97 (1968).
179. The present membership of the Commission is as follows: U.S. Section-Christain A. Herter, Jr., Chairman, an attorney and presently a high official in the U.S.
State Department; Eugene W. Weber, an engineer who was for many years Chief of
Civilian Planning with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; Charles R. Ross, an
attorney and formerly a member of the Federal Power Commission; Canadian Section
-Louis J. Robichaud, Chairman, an attorney and former Premier of New Brunswick;
'A. ,D. Scott, a Profei,sor of Economics at the University of British Columbia; Bernard
Beaupre, an engineer with long experience in the field of water resources.
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While the Canadian section has long included an ~ttorney and a~
engineer on its staff, the American section 'has not; this situation· is in
process of being changed by additions of an attorney and an environmental expert to the United States staff. The Commission has typically operated on a limited budget.180 The recent Joint Communique
raises a possibility that the Commission's situation, with respect to
both staffing and budget, may improve.
An important characteristic of the IJC has been its tradition of
independence and impartiality, a characteristic somewhat akin to an
international civil service tradition. The Commission has long
prided itself on the fact that, despite its binational structure, it has
consistently put aside national loyalties and operated in an essentially
apolitical manner. It has seen its task primarily as one of reaching
reasoned judgments on the basis of scientific investigation, technological data, and impartial assessment. The strength of this tradition is
suggested in a recent article by the two then joint chairmen:
The concept of the treaty negotiators was that solutions to problems
in which the two countries had differing-even opposing-interests
should be sought, not by the usual bilateral negotiation, but in the
joint deliberations of a permanent tribunal composed equally of
Canadians and Americans. In other words, the commissioners were
to act, not as separate national delegations under instruction from
their respective governments, but as a single body seeking common
solutions in the joint interest ....181
The fact that the Commission has divided along national lines or
failed to reach agreement in only three of the cases and references
it has dealt with is often cited in Commissioners' writings as evidence
of the effectiveness of this commitment to impar~iality and a search
for the common interest. 182
Another significant characteristic of the Commission has been its
use of the technique of appointing special joint technical and advisory boards. As indicated, these are composed of var:ious experts
dra,;vn from knowledgeable federal, state, and provincial agencies of
the nvo governments, who serve in an expert rather than representa180. For fiscal year 1972, the total budge~ for the U.S. section of the IJC is approximately $549,000. Of this amount, $138,000 is allocated to the Environmental
Protection Agency for its work on pollution references, $221,000 to the Geological
Survey for hydrologic data gathering, and the balance of $190,000 is available for U.S.
Section staff and administrative expenses. (Information supplied by IJC, U.S. Sectibn.)
181. Welsh &: Heeney, supra note 35, at 106.
·
182. See, e.g., Heeney, supra note 35, at 4; Welsh, Role of the International Joint
Commission, supra note 35, at 4. The U.S. Section has identified one of the cases as the
Belly-Waterton Rivers Investigation, Doc. No. 57 (1948), a reference in which each
Section of the Commission reported separately to its government and no joint report
was filed.
•- • ... •
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tive capacity. A joint board is given the task of carrying out the necessary investigations and making preliminary recommendations on the
reference in question, and the Commission in most cases bases its
own report largely on that of the board. The governments in their
references to the IJC have frequently specifically authorized the use
of this technique.183 Through the use of such boards, the Commision,
while retaining its nominally small staff, has been able to mobilize
and deploy a substantial task force of highly trained experts whose
collective services might not othenvise be available on a permanent
basis. There is apparently an international civil service type of tradition associated with the boards as well as with the Commission itself.
A third important feature of the Commission has been its capacity
to respond effectively to the varied tasks the governments have assigned it. Over the years, the Commission has dealt successfully with
a remarkable variety of references involving a wide array of problems
and disciplines. Its flexibility in dealing with these problems is, of
course, in large part a reflection of the breadth of the reference pro•
cedures of Article IX itself. But it may also reflect both the adapta•
bility of the joint technical board technique and the Commission's
own spirit.
However, while the IJC's performance as an international institution generally merits high marks-and it has achieved considerable
respect and credibility-a note of caution may be in order before any
generalizations are drawn from this experience. In particular, it may
be worth reflecting upon whether the Commission's independence
and impartiality are necessarily inherent in its structure, or may instead be related to factors that are coincidental and temporary. It is
arguable that the Commission has been left relatively free from political pressures by the two governments principally because until
recently they have had only limited interest in its work and have consequently had little reason to exert such pressures. From the perspective of the United States government at least, the Commission has
been relatively obscure; its work for the most part has been regarded
as of minor political significance. Its functions have been largely
limited to scientific and technical investigations, the results of which
government officials would presumably not wish to, and probably
could not, influence. It has in general had little occasion or tendency
to ruffie important feathers. Moreover, the governments have been
in a position readily to protect their national interests against adverse
Commission action through means other than attempts at direct influence· on their national sections. They have consistently retained
183. See note 72 supra.
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careful control and veto power over the submission and the terms of
references and are, in any event, free to reject, or to "accept" and ignore, the Commission's advice.
It is possible that with the growing political importance of the
problems with which the IJC deals, with increasing governmental
concern over those problems, and with the Commission's growing
responsibilities, the two governments may in the future prove less
inclined to respect its traditional independence. There may consequently be at least some pressures toward its politicization. The recent
appointment of Christian A. Herter, Jr., the Director of the Office
of Environmental Affairs and Special Assistant to the Secretary of
State, to serve simultaneously as chairman of the United States section could herald such a trend, though that appointment was reportedy based more on budgetary than on policy considerations.
Attempts to bring governmental political influence to bear on the
Commission's purely scientific and technical investigations and recommendations would, of course, have a disastrous effect on the Commission's usefulness and credibility. But there are also arguments
that limited politicization of the national sections in other respects
would be less threatening and might enhance rather than diminish
the Commission's usefulness. Thus the governments might be more
prepared to give greater regulatory or enforcement powers to a more
"political" Commission, in which they could trust their national sections to better reflect and protect their respective interests, than to an
"independent" Commission, whose actions they could neither predict
nor control. A "political" Commission might also better reflect the
real problems and differences between the countries and furnish a
continuing forum for negotiation of these differences. Moreover,
each national section of a "political" Commission would presumably
have more direct access to and influence with the respective national
agencies on whose decisions the real solutions of Great Lakes pollution problems must ultimately depend.

D. Determining Objectives
A basic issue in any pollution control program is deciding how to
define pollution: what types of man-made changes in the environment should be regarded as unacceptable and made the target for
corrective action. 184 Clearly, it is neither possible nor desirable to
184. On the special problems of international standard-setting in the area of
pollution, see, e.g., International Environmental Regulation: Means of Achieving Environmental Quality (prepared by D. Serwer in consultation with O. Schachter}, and
Contini 8: Sand, Methods To Expedite Environmental Protection: International Ecostandards, in I.Aw, INsrrrunoNs AND nm GLOBAL ENvmoNMENT, supra note 5.
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prevent every kind of human impact on the environment. Human
activity inevitably produces waste as a by-product, and the capacity
of the natural environment to receive, assimilate, and recycle such
waste is one of its most significant resource characteristics. As an
essentially pejorative term pollution is typically applied not to all
waste discharges into the environment but only to those types or
levels of wastes whose adverse impact on particular receiving environments suggest a need for social action. Even within this framework
scientists, engineers, economists, social planners, and politicians
might each define pollution differently. Pollution control thus involves determining the kinds and levels of wastes that merit attention, assessing the costs and benefits of alternative ways of dealing
with particular wastes, deciding on priorities, planning balanced programs, deploying and implementing effective measures of control,
and monitoring progress made with a view to possible readjustment
of programs.
There is increasing recognition that many of these tasks involve
essentially policy or value judgments rather than purely scientific or
technical assessment.18l• The role of science in this process is, of
course, vital. Scientists alone can alert societies to the existence of
environmental threats and provide data relevant for rational decisions-in particular, the sources, amounts, and pathways of various
pollutants and the potential consequences in terms of the specific
degrees of risk that may result from exposure to particular types and
levels of pollutants under varying circumstances. Similarly, engineers
perform an essential role in defining technological possibilities and
options for control. But questions about the goals, priorities, and
weights a society should properly give to the costs, risks, and benefits
of alternative courses of action in differing circumstances-the basic
choices about what we really want and what we are willing to pay to
get it-are questions that science and technology can rarely answer,
although we could, if we desired, let scientists or engineers make the
necessary policy decisions for us.
The 1909 Treaty does not define pollution,186 and the difficulties
185. See, e.g., J. DAVIES, THE PoLmc.s OF POLLUTION 17-21 (1970).
186. See 1909 Treaty art. IV. In practice, however, the Commission has frequently
been prepared in its reports on various references to conclude that transboundary
pollution was occurring to the detriment of both countries. Note also the following
statement by the Commission:
The Commission regards the word "injury" when used in the reference or
treaty as having a special significance-one somewhat akin to the term "injuria"
in jurisprudence. It does not mean harm or damage but harm or damage which is
in excess of the amount of harm or damage which the sufferer, in view of all the
circumstances of the case, and of all the co-existence rights • • • and of the para-
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of formulating a simple, sufficiently broad, generally applicable, and
operationally useful definition are apparent. 187 The Commission,
however, has in effect provided a way of defining pollution, applicable to varying circumstances, through its technique of recommending
common water quality objectives.188 Since the water quality objectives recommended in the IJC Lower Lakes Report189 will reportedly
be incorporated in substance in the proposed Agreement, the Commission's approach should be briefly described.
The Lower Lakes Report defines common water quality objectives as desirable levels of quality to be attained in the receiving
waters, taking into account the scientific requirements or criteria for
a broad spectrum of water uses: "supplies for municipal, industrial
and agricultural purposes, recreation, aesthetic enjoyment and the
propagation of aquatic life and wild life."190 The Report recommends both "General Objectives" and "Specific Objectives." The
General Objectives are the goals of an effective pollution control
program stated in very broad terms.191 The Specific Objectives are
mount importance of human health and life, should reasonably be called upon to
bear.
'
IJC, REPORT ON POLLUTION OF BOUNDARY WATERS (1918), quoted in Erichsen-Brown,
supra note 35, at 68.
187. For an example of such a definition, see Article IX of the HELsINKI Ruu:.s, supra
note 167, at 494:
As used in this Chapter, the term "water pollution" refers to any detrimental
change resulting from human conduct in the natural composition, content, or
quality of the waters of an international drainage basin.
Compare § 2(l)(k) of the Canada Water Act, STAT. CAN. c. 52 (1969-1970), which defines
"waste" as
any substance that, if added to any waters, would degrade or alter or form part
of a process of degradation or alteration of the quality of those waters to an
extent that is detrimental to their use by man or by any animal, fish or plant that
is useful to man, and includes any water that contains a substance in such a
quantity or concentration, or that has been so treated, processed or changed, by
heat or other means, from a natural state that it would, if added to any waters,
degrade or alter or form part of a process of degradation or alteration of the quality
of those waters to an extent that is detrimental to their use by man or by any
animal, fish or plant that is useful to man.
The definition of "waste" is similar in the Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, STAT. CAN. c. 47, § 2(h) (1969-1970).
188. As indicated in text accompanying notes 99-100 supra, this technique was first
used in the Commission's 1950 Report in the Connecting Channels Reference.
189. IJC LowER LAKES REPORT, supra note 10, at 112-29, 144-48.
190. IJC LOWER LAKES REPORT, supra note 10, at 113.
191. The proposed General Objectives, which are described as the "five freedoms"
of a pollution control program, are
The receiving waters of Lake Erie, Lake Ontario, the International Section of the
St. Lawrence River and the Connecting Channels of the Great Lakes at all places
and at all times should be:
(a) free from substances attributable to municipal, industrial or other discharges that will settle to form putrescent or otherwise objectionable sludge
deposits, or that will adversely affect aquatic life or waterfowl.
(b) free from floating debris, oil, scum and other floating materials attributable
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the desirable levels of water quality, stated for the most part in terms
of specific scientific indices. These indices set forth the maximum permissible levels and concentrations of the pollutants in the waters
considered necessary to achieve the General Objectives. These objectives are to apply to all jurisdictions sharing the waters of the Lower
Great Lakes at all times and places; they apply in particular to inshore waters. Specific Objectives are recommended for microbiology
(coliform group), dissolved oxygen, total dissolved solids, temperature, taste and odor, pH, iron, phosphorus, and radioactivity; when
required, appropriate specific standards will be established for water
quality including, but not restricted to, toxic wastes, oils, and heavy
metals.192
The Report contemplates that these objectives will be implemented by each government through appropriate national, state, or
provincial action. Thus, the Specific Objectives are intended both as
the minimum basis for formulating provincial and state water
quality standards and as parameters against which the effectiveness
of such programs can be measured.193 Presumably governmental authorities will establish compatible ambient water quality standards
for the Lakes with at least as stringent maximum permissible levels
for each relevant pollutant; will establish, as needed, effluent, discharge, or emission standards setting the ma."'imum acceptable release
of a particular pollutant from a given source to the water under
specified circumstances; and will take other action to ensure that the
to municipal, industrial or other discharges in amounts sufficient to be un•
sightly or deleterious.
(c) free from materials attributable to municipal, industrial or other dis•
charges producing colour, odour or other conditions in such a degree as
to create a nuisance.
(d) free from substances attributable to municipal, industrial or other discharges in concentrations that are toxic or harmful to human, animal or
aquatic life.
(e) free from nutrients derived from municipal, industrial and agricultural
sources in concentrations that create nuisance growths of aquatic weeds and
algae.
Id. at 144-45.
192. Id. at 145-48. Examples of the Specific Objectives are
{a) Microbiology (Coliform Group)--The geometric mean of not less than five
samples taken over not more than a 30-day period shall not exceed 1,000/100
ml total coliforms, nor 200/100 ml fecal coliforms in local waters. Waters used
for body contact recreation activities should be free from bacteria, fungi,
or viruses that may produce enteric disorders, or eye, ear, nose, throat and
skin infections.
{b) Dissolved Oxygen-In the Connecting Channels and in the upper waters of
the Lakes not less than 6.0 mg/I at any time; in the hypolimnetic waters not
less than the concentrations necessary for the support of fishlife, particularly
cold water species.
Id. at 145-46. Contrast the objective for: "(d) Temperature-No change which would
adversely affect any local or general use of these waters." Id. at 146.
193. Id. at 114-15.
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objectives are achieved. The Commission stresses that the important
criterion of compliance is not the degree of treatment of wastes but
the amount of wastes left in the effluent and, from the standpoint of
a broad pollution control program, the total amount of contaminants
discharged by all sources within the jurisdiction.194
The Lower Lakes Report gives special emphasis to the problems
of phosphorus wastes as a critical factor in Lower Lakes pollution. It
points out that of the nutrients involved in eutrophication of Lake
Erie and Lake Ontario, "phosphorus is the only one that is both
growth-limiting in the lakes and controllable effectively by man with
present technology."195 The Commission takes the position that the
reduction of phosphorus input into the waters will significantly delay
further eutrophication and will permit the recovery of the Lakes to
begin through natural processes.196 It indicates that the recommended Specific Objective for phosphorus197 can be achieved if all
phosphorus is eliminated from detergents, and if ninety-five per cent
of the predicted 1986 load of phosphorus is removed at municipal
and industrial waste plants.198 The Commission gives the following
reasons for emphasizing a reduction in phosphorus in detergents: (1)
if a replacement for detergent phosphorus can be developed rapidly,
a significant reduction of phosphorus input can be achieved before
completion of phosphorus removal facilities at sewage treatment
plants; (2) the effect would be to reduce phosphorus input from small
communities, cottages, and individual homes, in which it would be
very costly to install phosphorus removal facilities; and (3) treatment
costs for phosphorus removal at sewage treatment plants would be
reduced substantially by removing phosphorus from detergents. 199
Id. at 115-16.
Id. at 141.
Id. at 123.
Phosphorus-Concentrations limited to the extent necessary to prevent nuisance growths of algae, weeds and slimes which are or may become injurious to any
beneficial water use. (Meeting this objective will require that the phosphorus loading to Lake Erie be limited to 0.39 g/m2/yr and the phosphorus loading to Lake
Ontario be limited to 17 g/m2/yr.)
Id. at 147.
198. Id. at 125. "The major source of phosphorus is municipal sewage. In the U.S.
70% of the phosphorus in sewage originates· from detergents, and most of the remainder
from human excreta. In Canada, approximately 50% originates from each sewage
source. Apart from municipal sewage the other significant sources of phosphorus are
agricultural run-off and some industrial wastes." Id. at 141. The research results of
"Project Hypo," a joint U.S.-Canadian project carried on in Lake Erie in the summer
of 1970 to obtain more precise data on Lake nutrients, suggest that the 95% removal
goal may have to be attained by 1975 rather than 1986 if eutrophication of the Lake
is to be effectively reversed. (Information based on interviews with U.S. government
officials.)
199. Id. at 125.
194.
195.
196.
197.
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Canada has already taken steps to limit the phosphorus content of
detergents, expressed as phosphorus pentoxide, to twenty per cent by
weight, effective August 1, 1970, and has announced a further reduction to five per cent by December 31, 1972. Some of the Lake
states and local authorities have adopted or introduced legislation to
limit the phosphorus content ·of detergents.200
The Commission's concept of establishing specific water quality
objectives is a significant contribution to pollution control techniques and is being widely copied.201 It focuses on a matter of principal
international concern-the quality of the receiving waters-while
leaving to each jurisdiction wide flexibility regarding the 'choice of
the means that, in terms of local circumstances and conditions, are
best suited to achieving those objectives. It embodies an approach to
to problems of international pollution that is based on continuing
regulation and control to attain goals, rather than on rights, duties,
and legal liability for past actions. It provides concrete scientific
standards against which performance and compliance can be measured. Finally, it permits ready revision and adjustment of objectives
in the light of new information or other current considerations.
The process by which the Commission arrives at its recommendations of Specific Objectives is not entirely clear. Presumably, the
Commission will as a rule accept the Specific Objectives suggested
by its technical boards. Since the boards include members from the
principal federal, state, and provincial standard-setting and implementing agencies, it is not surprising that the recommended international objectives in general tend to be compatible with and do not
exceed already established state and provincial standards. In some
cases, however, the recommended international objectives will require a tightening of particular state or provincial standards. Despite
the policy component in all such decisions, the process of establishing
200. See Joint Communique, supra note 1, ,I 6; note 245 infra. Compare the
European Agreement on the Restriction of the Use of Certain Detergents in Washing
and Cleaning Products, adopted by the Council of Europe on Sept. 16, 1968, 16 EunoPEAN Y.B. 335 (1968), and already implemented by several member states, establishing
an 80% biodegradability level.
201. See text accompanying notes 99-100 supra. See also, e.g., the 1971 Draft Euro•
pean Convention on the Protection of Freshwater Against Pollution, prepared by the
Council of Europe, which now envisages the establishment of "minimum water
quality standards," Report of the First Meeting (Feb. 1971) of the Expert Commission
on a Draft European Convention on the Protection of Freshwater Against Pollution:
and the 1971 Draft Agreement on Water Conservation and Utilization in the Lake
Chad Basin, prepared by FAO and the Lake Chad Basin Commission, which provides
standards for water abstraction and pollution control. FAO Doc. AGL:SF/REG/79
(1971). See Contini &: Sand, Methods To Expedite Environmental Protection: Inter•
national Ecostandards, in LAw, lNSflTUTIONS AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT, supra
note 5, manuscript at 12.
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objectives has apparently been treated as a matter of purely scientific
and technical judgment, though some internal negotiation may occur.
I£ the Commission were ever to consider recommending Specific
Objectives considerably more stringent than those then applicable
in the various states and provinces, it is conceivable that substantial
policy issues might emerge. This situation would, of course, cast the
Commission in a new and more difficult role.
A final issue is posed by the September 15, 1971, announcement
of the United States Surgeon General, Jesse L. Steinfeld, advising
housewives to continue using phosphate detergents. 202 The basis for
the Government's shift of policy is its judgment that some phosphate
substitutes are highly caustic and may constitute a health hazard.
Environmental Protection Agency Administrator William A. Ruckelshaus stated, in connection with the Surgeon General's announcement, that the Government would increase its financial assistance for
the removal of phosphates at sewage treatment plants as an alternative to the banning of phosphate detergents.203 The new United
States position could raise doubts about its ability to achieve the
Commission's recommended phosphorus objectives by the proposed
Agreement's 1975 target date. First, it is questionable whether, if the
use of phosphate-based detergents is permitted to continue, it will
be technically possible through more intensive sewage treatment
techniques alone to reduce phosphate loadings into the Lakes to the
extent recommended by the Commission. Second, the additional
techniques proposed will presumably involve substantial additional
costs, making the programs more politically vulnerable. In view of
the pivotal role of phosphorus in the solution of Great Lakes pollution problems and of Canada's particular concern over high United
States phosphorus loadings204 and its present commitment to the
202. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1971, at I, col. 2 (joint announcement with William
D. Ruckelshaus, EPA Administrator, Russell E. Train, and Dr. Charles C. Edwards,
FDA Chairman). For further comments and developments following the announcement,
see id., Sept. 16, 1971, at 37, col. 2; id., Sept. 17, 1971, at I, col. 4, and at 20, col. I; id.,
Sept. 18, 1971, at 58, col. I; id., Sept. 19, 1971, at 52, col. 3; id., Sept. 22, 1971, at 46, col.
I (editorial); id., Sept. 24, 1971, at 40, col 3 (letter to editor).
203. N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1971, at I, col. 2. See also the October 27, 1971, statement
by CEQ Chairman Russell E. Train before the House Government Operations SubCommittee on Conservation and Natural Resources that the elimination of phosphates
would not eliminate eutrophication, that the principal strategy in controlling eutrophication will be provision of adequate waste treatment, and that, given the present
state of knowledge, there is no one answer as to which discharges of phosphorus should
be controlled to limit accelerated eutrophication and the possible problems with currently available substitutes for phosphates. See BNA ENVIRONMENT REP., CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 763 (1971).
204. See, e.g., the comment by J.J. Greene, the Canadian Minister of Energy, Mines
and Resources, Policy on the Environment, 21 U. TORONTO L.J. 241, 246 (1971):
Even between nations that do not have disparate levels of economic development,

528

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. '10:469

banning of phosphate detergents, 205 the recent United States action
could raise new difficulties for the negotiators of the proposed Agreement.

E. Apportioning Burdens
Another major issue of international environmental cooperation
is how the burden of international pollution control is to be shared
or apportioned among the various governments contributing to a
particular pollution problem. This question arises most clearly in
situations involving pollution by several riparian states of a confined
and complex mixing environment, such as the Great Lakes and enclosed or semi-enclosed seas such as the Baltic, Mediterranean, Black,
Caribbean, and North Seas.
A first step in any process of apportionment is agreement on broad
water quality objectives, from which can be derived at least a broad
estimate of the maximum total amount of each pollutant that can
be permitted to be discharged into the total basin environment.
Once this total basin-wide maximum for permissible waste discharges
is determined, the job of complying with the standard might then be
divided or apportioned among the contributing states according to
various bases or formulas. 206 The possible apportionment formulas
might include division in equal shares; in proportion to relative total
populations; in proportion to relative total gross national products;
in proportion to relative basin populations; in proportion to relative
basin GNPs; in proportion to the ratio of basin to total populations;
in proportion to the ratio of basin to total GNPs; in direct proportion
to relative past waste discharges or contribution to total existing
pollution; in inverse proportion to relative past waste discharges or
contribution to total existing pollution; and so forth. Alternatively,
a total basin-wide quota of the necessary or desired amounts of
agreement is difficult to achieve. The record of co-operation between Canada and
its closest friend and neighbour, the USA, is anything but bright, notwithstanding
the excellent investigatory work of the International Joint Commission. It is now
clearly established on the basis of independent expert evidence that the Great
Lakes water system will not be cleaned up until the USA takes the tough decision
to ban phosphates from detergents. This it seems reluctant to do. I feel that the
only way to achieve real progress in the cleaning of our international boundary
waters would be to equip the IJC with the authority to enforce its ruling with
regard to pollution of international boundary waters.
205. See Joint Communique, supra note I, ,I 6; note 245 infra.
206. See, e.g., the interesting paper by A. Sparring, Pollution Control as a Problem
of International Politics: Models for a Baltic Convention, prepared for the 21st Pug•
wash Conference on Science and World Affairs, "Problems of World Security, Environ•
ment, and Development," Sinaia, Romania, Aug. 26-31, 1971, on file with the Michigan
Law Review.
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reductions in waste discharges could be determined, and this system
of necessary cutbacks could then be apportioned on one or another
of the above bases. Finally, the burden of pollution control could
be indirectly apportioned through the establishment of uniform
specific quality, discharge, or technological standards. Obviously,
uniform rules will affect various states differently.
In the context of Great Lakes pollution, the issue of burden
sharing might have been posed in considerable complexity. For example, while the United States has both greater total and Great Lakes
basin population and GNP than Canada and in general contributes
more wastes to the Lakes than Canada, the Canadian Great Lakes
population and GNP are of considerably greater relative importance
to that country than the same factors are to the United States. On the
other hand, about two thirds of the Great Lakes water area is in the
United States and only one third in Canada. In practice, however,
the differences between the two countries have been primarily shaped
less by abstract theories of apportionment than by differing interpretations of the express provisions of the 1909 Treaty.
The Canadian position is reportedly based primarily on Article
VIII of the Treaty, which, inter alia, provides: "The ... Parties shall
have, each on its own side of the boundary, equal and similar rights
in the use of the waters hereinbefore defined as boundary waters."
Apparently, the Canadian view is that "use of the waters" in this
provision includes their use as a receiver of wastes and that Canada
is consequently entitled to an equal right to, or a share in, the use
of the Lake's capacity to assimilate polluted effiuents.207 Since the
United States has already discharged wastes into its waters in amounts
far in excess of the wastes that Canada has discharged into its waters,
Canada argues that it is in principle entitled to continue discharging
wastes into its waters until these discharges reach the level of United
States discharges into United States waters. Put otherwise, if the IJC
standards are to be met and Great Lakes pollution prevented, the
United States must restrict its discharges to a level not to exceed fifty
per cent of the total loading the Lakes can receive without exceeding
the IJC's water quality objectives. Carried to the extreme, this position would place virtually the entire burden of the reduction of waste
discharges and of effective Great Lakes pollution control on the
United States. In practice, however, Canada apparently does recognize
207. The discussion of these differing interpretations of the Treaty by the two governments is based on interviews with government officials. The author cannot, of course,
speak for either government or reflect more than his own understanding of the issues
involved,
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some obligation to reduce its discharges in order to help prevent
pollution.
The United States reportedly rejects the Canadian position and
takes the view that the broad prohibition on pollution in Article IV
of the Treaty is controlling.208 It argues that use of the Great Lakes
water as a receptor for waste efiluents is not one of the uses protected
by Article VIII; that Article VIII is by its terms concerned only with
establishing rules and principles for the specific purpose of governing
the Commission in passing upon applications for the use or obstruction or diversion of the waters; 200 and that the "equal and similar
rights" language relied upon by the Canadians consequently has no
relevance to broader questions of pollution. In the American view
the relevant Treaty provision is the provision in Article IV that "[i]t
is further agreed that the waters herein defined as boundary waters
and waters flowing across the boundary shall not be polluted on
either side to the injury of health or property on the other." Under
this provision, neither country has a right to pollute the boundary
waters and consequently there is no question about the division of
any such right to pollute. Instead, the two countries have equal obligations to take measures to limit and control harmful discharges that
the Commission has indicated emanate from both of their territories
even if these in fact come principally from the United States shore.
The important consideration is not how much waste each country
has in the past contributed to the Lakes but the fact that the Lakes,
for whatever reason, are now in a condition of threatened danger.
Faced with such a situation each nation has, under Article IV, an
equal obligation to act to correct it.
Neither country appears to have carried its position to the logical
extremes the above arguments suggest, and the differences have in
effect largely been bypassed and accommodated in the relevant ar-

2os.

Id.
209. Article VIII provides in relevant part:
This International Joint Commission shall have jurisdiction over and shall pass
upon all cases involving the use or obstruction or diversion of the waters with
respect to which under Articles III and IV of this Treaty the approval of this
Commission is required, and in passing upon such cases the Commission shall
be governed by the following rules or principles which are adopted by the
High Contracting Parties for this purpose:
The High Contracting Parties shall have, each on its own side of the boundary,
equal and similar rights in the use of the waters hereinbefore defined as boundary
waters.

The requirement for an equal division may in the discretion of the Commission
be suspended in cases of temporary diversions along boundary waters at points
where such equal division can not be made advantageously on account of local
conditions, and where such diversion does not diminish elsewhere the amount
available for use on the other side.
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rangements. In practice, Ontario has imposed strict 'o/ater q~ality
and discharge standards and other pollution controls and the United
States is apparently willing to concede that control of the situation
on its shore will require substantially greater expenditures-perhaps
as much as six times greater-than those Canada must assume. Moreover, it would seem that the IJC's recommended Specific Objectives,
if incorporated in the proposed Agreement, will as a practical matter
impose a substantially heavier burden on the United States than on
Canada. Since the objectives apply uniformly to inshore waters and
since the United States in general contributes more waste to the
Lakes, it will presumably have to take m.ore stringent measures of
control than Canada in order to maintain the same inshore water
quality. The proposed Agreement may thus in effect settle this issue.
However, neither government has formally abandoned its position.
This is made clear by the fact that, in the Joint Communique announcing the proposed Agreement the Ministers were careful to note:
"In designing the agreement, it was accepted that programs and other
measures established to meet urgent problems would in no way affect
the rights of each country in the use of its Great Lakes Waters." 210
The question of apportionment remains one that could on occasion
reappear and in principle prove very troublesome.
F.

Coordination

One of the more complex and confusing aspects of Great Lakes
pollution problems is the diversity of jurisdictions and the multiplicity of official and unofficial agencies and institutions that are
involved in these problems. A brief survey may indicate the dimensions of the difficulty. 211
Eleven separate major governmental jurisdictions border on the
Great Lakes. These are the United States and Canada (in their national governmental capacity), eight states (Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin),
and the Province of Ontario.212 Each of these jurisdictions has its own
laws, agencies, policies, programs, and enforcement techniques concerned with or bearing upon Great Lakes pollution problems. In
addition, several hundred municipalities and local communities, each
·with its own ordinances and practices, border both sides of the Lakes.
210. Joint Communique, supra note I, 1J 17.
211. See generally GREAT LAKEs INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10.
212. While the Province of Quebec is not a Great Lakes riparian, it was repre•
sented in the Ministerial Conference's Joint Working Group and may be represented
on a Great Lakes Pollution Advisory Board.
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Making sense of the complex governmental situation respecting Great
Lakes pollution problems in any one of these jurisdictions can be
difficult; when they are considered together, the problem is immense.
In the United States there are at least nine federal agencies that are
heavily involved in problems of Great Lakes pollution. These include
the Departments of State,213 Agriculture, 214 Interior,21u Commerce,216
Defense,217 Transportation,218 and Health, Education, and Welfare; 210
the Council on Environmental Quality; 220 and the Environmental
Protection Agency. 221 Other agencies such as the Department of
Housing and Urban Development, the Atomic Energy Commission,
Federal Power Commission, National Council on Marine Resources
and Engineering Development, National Science Foundation, and
the Water Resources Council also have strong interests in this area. 222
213. Principally, the Bureau of European Affairs, which has responsibility for relations with Canada.
214. Principally, the Soil Conservation Service, Forest Service, Agricultural Research Service, and Economic Research Service.
215. Principally, the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, U.S. Geological Survey, and National
Park Service.
216. Principally, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),
Economic Development Administration, and Maritime Administration. The NOAA,
established in 1970, consolidates the major federal oceanic and atmospheric research
and monitoring programs. Both the Weather Bureau and the Coast and Geodetic
Survey now operate within the NOAA.
217. Principally, the Army Corps of Engineers, Dept. of Navy (which is concerned
with ship pollution control), and Office of Naval Research.
218. Principally, the U.S. Coast Guard (which is concerned with ship sanitation and
oil spills), and the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation.
219. Principally, the Public Health Service.
220. The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) was established January I,
1970, by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47
(1970). The Act charges the Council with assisting the President in preparing an
annual environmental quality report and making recommendations to him on national
policies for improving environmental quality; empowers the Council to analyze conditions and trends in the quality of the environment and to conduct investigations
relating to the environment; and gives the council responsibility for appraising the
effect of federal programs and activities in environmental quality. See 43 U.S.C. § 4344
(1970).
221. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), officially established on December
2, 1970, consolidated into one agency the major federal programs dealing with air
and water pollution, solid waste disposal, pesticides regulation, and environmental
radiation. Presidential Documents: Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg.
15623 (1970). Its offices specifically concerned with Great Lakes pollution are the Office
of Waters Programs under the Assistant Administrator for Media Programs, and the
Assistant Administrator for Research and Monitoring. The Great Lakes is a primary
responsibility of the EPA's Region V regional office.
222. See GREAT LAKES INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 22-24. On March 25, 1971,
President Nixon sent to Congress legislation to create a Department ot Natural Resources, which would include, inter alia, an Administrator for Water Resources. S.
1431, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. 6959, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). See CEQ 1971
REPORT, supra note 7, at 6-7.
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All national agencies with an active interest in the Lakes are members
of the Federal Inter-Agency Committee on Great Lakes Research.
A considerable number of congressional committees are also concerned with various aspects of Great Lakes pollution and may on
occasion seek to exercise competing jurisdiction over relevant legislation.223 In addition, each of the states bordering the Great Lakes
has at least one, and frequently several, agencies concerned with
Great Lakes pollution problems.224
Two federal-state commissions and one interstate commission
have a major involvement in Great Lakes problems. ':!;'he Great Lakes
Basin Commission, established under the authority of the Water
Resources Planning Act of 1965,225 is composed of representatives of
the eight Great Lakes states, a number of concerned federal agencies,
and the Great Lakes (Compact) Commission. Operating with extensive federal financial assistance, this important Commission has responsibility for improved comprehensive planning of the water and
related resources in the United States portion of the Great Lakes
and is designed to be the effective coordinating agent for all federal,
state, and local agencies and nongovernmental entities with planning
responsibilities in these fields. 226 The Upper Great Lakes Regional
Commission, created by the Secretary of Commerce under the Public
Works and Economic Development Act of 1965,227 is composed of
a federal member appointed by the President and members from the
states of Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. It has the task of
identifying economic problems and potentials of the Upper Lakes
and recommending public investment to stimulate the lagging economy of the region. The performance of these responsibilities neces223. The Senate and House Committees on Public Works have been particularly
concerned with water pollution problems. The Senate and House have recently
passed joint resolutions to create a Joint Committee on the Environment. S.J. Res. 17,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R.J. Res. 3, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). The Congress
has also recently reorganized and expanded existing committees to give more explicit
attention to environmental problems. $ee CEQ 1971 REPORT, supra note 7, at 8. See
generally J. DAVIES, supra note 185, at 65-70.
224. See GREAT LAKEs INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 26-38 for a list of agencies
as of June 1969. Some reorganization and consolidation of state agencies has occurred
in the past several years. For more recent developments, see the BNA ENVIRONMENT
REPORTER, a weekly report on national and state legislative and other developments
in the environmental field, including water quality.
225. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1962-62d-3 (1970).
226. See generally GREAT LAKES INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 24-25; GREAT LAKES
BASIN COMMN., CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE, AN INTERIM REPORT ON THE GREAT LAKES
BASIN FRAMEWORK STUDY (1971); Great Lakes Basin Commission, What It Is-What
It Does (Commission pamphlet). The Basin Commission also issues a monthly newsletter, the Communicator. Its headquarters are located at Ann Arbor, Michigan.
227. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3226 (1970). See 42 U.S.C. § 3182 (1970).
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sarily involves the Regional Commission in consideration of Upper
Lakes pollution problems.228 The Great Lakes Commission was established by the Great Lakes Basin Compact, an interstate agreement
among the eight Great Lakes states, and was approved by Congress in
1968,229 which designated it as a joint state instrumentality on Great
Lakes water resources development, programs, and problems.230 It
serves as a clearing house for information, a council for joint consideration of common and regional Great Lakes problems, and an
instrument for coordinating state views, plans, recommendations,
programs, and policies.231
228. E.g., GREAT LAKEs INSTITUTIONS, supra note IO,' at 25.
229. Act of July 24-, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-4-19, 82 Stat. 4-14- (containing text of
Compact). U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 requires congressional consent to such compacts.
230. The Compact was formed in 1955 through ratification by five of the eight
riparian states; Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New York ratified subsequently. The text
of the Compact, with notes on its legislative history, is also reprinted in H.R. Doc.
No. 319, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 177-83 (1968) (Documents on the Use and Control of
the Waters of Interstate and International Streams).
It is interesting to note that Article II(B) of the Compact provides: "The Province
of Ontario and the Province of Quebec, or either of them, may become states party
to this compact by taking such action as their laws and the laws of the Government
of Canada may prescribe for adherence thereto." 82 Stat. 4-14-. In addition, Article VI
provides that the Commission shall have power to:
J.

1Nith respect to the water resources of the Basin or any portion thereof,

recommend agreements between the governments of the United States and
Canada.
K. Recommend mutual arrangements expressed by concurrent or reciprocal
legislation on the part of Congress and the Parliament of Canada including
but not limited to such agreements and mutual arrangements as arc provided for by Article XIII of the ••• [1909 Treaty].
M. At the request of the United States, or in the event that a Province shall

be a party state, at the request of the Government of Canada, assist in the
negotiation and formulation of any treaty or other mutual arrangement or
agreement between the United States and Canada with reference to Basin
or any portion thereof.
82 Stat. 4-17-18.
The State Department objected to these provisions wl1en the Compact was presented
to Congress for its approval on the grounds, inter alia, that Provincial participation
and the other above-cited provisions would involve the Commission in the field of
international relations. See D. PIPER, supra note 10, at 80. Section 2 of the Act of July
24-, 1968, consequently lixnited congressional consent by providing that the consent
granted does not extend to the above sections; Section 3 provided that nothing contained in the Act shall be "construed to establish an international agency or to limit
or affect in. any way the exercise of the treatymaking power or any other power or
right of the United States." 82 Stat. 4-19.
231. See, e.g., GREAT LAKES INSTITUTIONS, supra note IO, at 25. Under Art. VII(B)
of the Compact, the states agree to consider the recommendations of the Great Lakes
Commission with respect to "[m]easures for combating pollution," 82 Stat. 4-18.
The Great Lakes Commission is financed entirely by state funds. It bas its headquarters at Ann Arbor, Michigan.
On interstate compacts generally, see 3 R. CLARK, supra note 23, at 332•48; W,
BARTON, lNTERSTATE COMPACTS IN nm PoLmCAL PROCESS (1967); F. ZIMMERMANN &: M.
WENDELL, THE LAW AND USE OF INTERSTATE COMPACIS (1961).
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In Canada the recently created Department of the Environment
now exercises principal responsibility for Great Lakes pollution problems.232 Other Canadian federal agencies with concerns in this area
are the Departments of External Affairs; Energy, Mines and Resources; National Health and Welfare; Public Works; and Transport.233 Additional research responsibilities are carried out by the
Canada Centre for Inland Waters, the Fisheries Research Board of
Canada, and the Great Lakes Working Group of the Canadian Committee on Oceanography.234 In the Province of Ontario, the Ontario
Water Resources Commission has primary responsibility for Great
Lakes pollution problems; the Department of Lands and Forests and
the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario are also heavily
involved.235
Several United States-Canadian institutions other than the International Joint Commission are actively engaged in cooperation on
Great Lakes problems. The Great Lakes Fishery Commission is a
formal intergovernmental organization established by the Great
Lakes Fisheries Convention of 1955;236 it is primarily a research
organization but has also administered an extensive program of sea
lamprey control.237 The Great Lakes Study Group is an informal
international organization including representatives of Canadian and
United States agencies and institutions engaged in research and investigation related to the development and utilization of Great Lakes
resources and is intended to facilitate the exchange of information
and provide informal coordination, including the sponsorship of a
data repository. Other international cooperative institutions include
232. The Department of the Environment was established in 1971, incorporating
as components the former Department of Fisheries and Forestry; essentially all of
the Water Sector of the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, including the
Inland Waters Branch, the Marine Sciences Branch, the Policy and Planning Branch,
and the Canada Centre for Inland Waters; the Canadian Meteorological Service; the
Canadian Wildlife Service; and those units of the Department of National Health
and Welfare concerned with public health engineering and air pollution. The Department will have primary responsibility for support of the IJC. Government Reorganization C-207 (1971). See, e.g., Great Lakes Basin Commn. Communicator, Feb. 1971.
233. See GREAT LAKEs INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 8-10.
234. Id. at 7-8.
235. Id. at 10-11.
236. Convention with Canada on Great Lakes Fisheries, Sept. 10, 1954, [1955] 6
U.S.T. 2836, T.I.A.S. No. 3326, 238 U.N.T.S. 97 (effective Oct. 11, 1955), as amended
April 5, 1966, and May 19, 1967, [1967) 18 U.S.T. 1402, T.I.A.S. No. 6297. See also
Great Lakes Fisheries Act of 1956, 16 U.S.C. §§ 931-39c (1970).
237. See GREAT LAKEs INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 4-5. The sea lamprey is a
species of eel native to the Atlantic Ocean that entered the Great Lakes system through
the opening of the Welland Canal; it has multiplied in the absence of its natural
biological controls and has preyed upon and wreaked havoc among certain Great
Lakes fish species.
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the St. Lawrence Seaway Commission, the International Association
for Great Lakes Research, the Coordinating Committee on Great
Lakes Basic Hydraulic and Hydrologic Data, and the International
Field Year for the Lakes. A number of private scientific, professional,
research, and industry associations, as well as universities and colleges in all of the Great Lakes states and Ontario, are also active with
respect to Great Lakes problems.238
With so many jurisdictions concerned with controlling Great
Lakes pollution and a remarkable number of agencies and institutions engaged in studying these problems, the chances of interference,
overlap, and duplication are obvious.239 While various institutions
in each country attempt to coordinate national approaches to Great
Lakes problems, there is as yet no formal machinery for such coordination at the international level. The IJC has played an important informal role in this respect, particularly through the operation
of its joint technical boards. Since the members of these boards are
drawn from a variety of federal, state, and provincial agencies, 240
the boards serve to bring responsible officials at these levels from the
United States and Canada into continuing face-to-face contact in a
context which facilitates the free flow of information and views among
them. Presumably, some informal coordination results. Indeed, the
boards have in large part been able to perform their tasks through
collecting and assessing relevant work already done by the various
official agencies and other institutions in both countries; typically,
relatively little new research has been required. 241
Nevertheless, the IJC's role has remained informal, and the recent
238. Id. at 4-5, 11, 26-40.
239. See, e.g., the references to these problems in the IJC Low.ER LAKES REPORT,
supra note 10, at 108, 110-11. The Commission comments that
[w]hile in some cases the differences among jurisdictions are more apparent than
real, in others the differences are such that the laws as applied in the various
jurisdictions are incompatible. Obviously such inconsistency presents serious ob•
stacles to the effective implementation of any concerted programme of pollution
control and abatement throughout the Lower Great Lakes.
Id. at 110. It cites as an example of this incompatability the differing legal require•
ments for the control of waste discharges from watercraft using the Lakes. Id.
240. See, e.g., the list of members of the International Lake Erie Water Pollution
Board and the International Lake Ontario-St. Lawrence River Water Pollution Board,
and of their respective committees, in the Appendix of the IJC Low.ER LAKES REPORT,
supra note 10, at 165-67.
241. For example, in 1960, prior to the Commission's receipt of the Lower Lakes
Reference, Congress had already appropriated funds under the Federal Water Pollu
tion Control Act of 1956, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-75 (1970), for a comprehensive study of
Great Lakes pollution problems, and that study was already in progress at the time
of the Reference. IJC LoWER LAKES REPORT, supra note IO, at 8. Additional research
for the Lower Lakes study was conducted by the responsible government agencies of
the two governments rather than by the Commission itself. Id. at 8-9. See note 111
supra and accompanying text.
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Ministerial Conference was apparently the first effort at a concerted
and sustained high-level official discussion and exchange of views on
Great Lakes pollution problems. In the IJC's Lower Lakes Report,
which formed a basis for the Ministers' discussions, the Commission
noted:
In order to achieve effective pollution control and acceptable water
quality in these boundary waters, the policies and laws of the several
jurisdictions concerned must have a common goal and the programmes to achieve that goal need to be coordinated with the programmes of the other jurisdictions involved in the lakes. Othenvise,
efforts put forth in one jurisdiction may be frustrated either by inaction or by inconsistent action in another jurisdiction. Water
quality surveillance and monitoring to assess the effectiveness of
control measures undertaken or the need for additional measures
also need to be coordinated with similar activities in the other jurisdictions if meaningful results are to be obtained. A high degree of
cooperation and a free exchange of relevant data and information
among all jurisdictions concerned are essential elements of an effective programme to achieve and maintain a satisfactory water quality
in these boundary waters.2 42
With the conclusion of the proposed Agreement and the Commission's strengthened mandate to promote coordination, more formal arrangements for coordination might be considered. One likely
mechanism for such coordination might be the joint Great Lakes
pollution advisory board suggested by the Ministers; this board would
operate under the Commission but would include responsible officials
from all concerned planning, research, and operating agencies. Alternatively, institutions other than the IJC might be used for this
purpose. Thus, coordination might be sought, with respect to planning, through some type of "internationalized" Great Lakes Basin
Commission; with respect to research, through an expanded Great
Lakes Study Group; and in the area of actual policy-making, regulation, and implementation, through the establishment of a new highlevel joint United States-Canadian inter-agency committee on Great
Lakes pollution, which would in effect continue on a permanent
basis the work of the Ministerial Conference.
In pursuing the goal of coordination, some caution may be called
for. Clearly, coordination is desirable in certain areas; there is little
point in different jurisdictions or groups working at cross-purposes.
As the Commission suggests, coordination may also be essential to
the operation of an effective monitoring and surveillance program.
Moreover, a free exch~ge of data and information, p~rhaps with
242. IJC Lowm LAKEs R.EPoRT, supra note 10, at 111. See also id. at 120-31.
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centralized storage and retrieval capabilities, cannot fail to provide
mutual benefits. Finally, coordination may serve the function of
identifying and filling gaps in research or action programs. On the
other hand, coordination has its own costs and may even prove dysfunctional to the extent that it results in inflexible determinations
of priorities, the stifling of competitive research, or an unwillingness
to experiment with new approaches. Some overlapping, duplication,
inefficiency, and even a testing of inconsistent techniques may be
unavoidable in constructive attempts to solve a problem as complex
as that of Great Lakes pollution.
G. Implementation
A major problem of international cooperation in the environment
as in other fields is that of implementation. United States-Canadian
experience supports this judgment. The IJC has no direct authority
either to implement or to enforce its recommendations. The recommendations come to the governments by way of the Commission's
formal reports and are typically distributed to concerned agencies
within each government for comments. In the absence of strong
objection from within either government they are routinely "approved." However, there is no obligation upon either government
actually to implement the Commission's recommendations even if
approved, and their subsequent impact is hard to determine.
Until recently, there was apparently no established procedure
within the United States government for either feeding IJC recommendations into regular policy-making channels or ensuring that
they were carried out. Traditionally, the State Department, through
the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, has carried
primary authority for working with the Commission and taking
action on its recommendations. The State Department, however, has
little expertise or interest in the technical aspects of pollution problems, has only limited channels of regular communication with agencies that do, and has usually treated IJC matters as of comparatively
iimited importance and as appropriately handled at relatively low
9fficial levels. The Council on Environmental Quality now shares
implementing responsibility on certain IJC recommendations concerning environmental matters,243 and the Council may provide a
more interested, technically qualified, and effective United States governmental constituency for the IJC. Canada has traditionally put
243. Information supplied by U.S. government officials.
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more emphasis on the Commission and its work, and has apparently
accorded its recommendations more status and attention.
In practice, the Commission's influence may be somewhat greater
than is suggested above, though the means by which this influence
is exerted are principally informal. First, the Commission's reports
are significant technical studies that undoubtedly come to the attention of many relevant policy-making officials, and, because of their
high quality, may influence official decisions. This influence is, of
course, the major purpose of the governments' references and the
Commission's work. Second, the reports reflect the work of the joint
technical boards, which are themselves composed of influential officials from a variety of concerned agencies of each government. Since
these governmental officials are largely responsible for the Commission's recommendad.ons, they will presumably carry over these findings and judgments into their work within their own agencies. Third,
the wide publication of the IJC's reports, and also of the interim
reports which the Commission has adopted the practice of issuing,
may exert some public pressure on officials to take recommended
actions, though the extent and impact of these pressures are hard to
gauge. As a related technique, the Commission has recently instituted
the practice of convening public meetings to acquaint the public
with relevant problems and the Commission's recommendations regarding them. 244 To a very limited extent, the Commission has communicated with concerned officials, calling their attention to the lack
of progress made toward a recommended solution or to particular·
problems or polluters. On occasion, as in the case in which the
Commission called broad public attention to the contribution of
phosphorus-based detergents to Great Lakes eutrophication, it has
clearly had some effect on public policy,245 though the recent statement by the Surgeon General and by the Administrator of the En244. See note 76 supra.
245. The Commission's 1969 interim reports on the Lower Great Lakes Pollution
Reference, which stressed the role of phosphorus and particularly phosphorus-based
detergents in euthrophication of the Lakes, received wide attention and apparently
played some part in influencing environmental officials at that time to urge consumers
to avoid phosphate detergents. In February 1970 Canada announced plans to ban
all phosphates in detergents over a two-year span. N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1970, at 2,
col. 3. A number of states, such as Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Maine, Minnesota,
and New York, and communities such as Dade and Lake counties in Florida, and Chicago, Detroit, and Akron have subsequently passed legislation to regulate the phosphate
content of detergents. Most of this legislation is to take effect in 1972 or 1973. Many
other states and communities are considering phosphates legislation. See CEQ 1971
REPORT, supra note 7, at 44; Madison (W'is.) Capital Times, Sept. 17, 1971, at 6, cols.
1-5.
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vironmental Protection Agency, suggesting that housewives should
continue to use phosphate-based detergents rather than possibly more
hazardous substitutes, indicates that this particular impact may prove
short-lived.246
Since implementation of the Commission's recommendations rests
with the various national, state, and provincial governments, a brief
look at the current situation in regard to measures taken by these
entities may be of interest. Broadly speaking, there are considerable
differences among the various jurisdictions in the type and extent of
relevant legislation and programs, the level of financing, the strictness
of water quality standards and other control measures, and the procedures and practical level of enforcement.247 As previously indicated,
while the United States federal government has in recent years assumed a growing role in water pollution control programs, primary
authority for establishing and enforcing regulations and standards remains in the states.248 The Council on Environmental Quality has
noted that, although remarkable progress has been made with respect
to the scope of both federal and state legislation and programs in the
past five years, standards remain in many respects inadequate and compliance and enforcement leave much to be desired. 249 Nevertheless,
the federal government appears to have adequate authority under
existing legislation to implement both the Commission's recommendations respecting Great Lakes pollution and the provisions of the
proposed Agreement. The federal government also clearly has con246. See notes 202-03 supra and accompanying text.
247. See, e.g., IJC LowER LAKES REPORT, supra note 10, at 108.
248. See § l(b) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § I 15l(b)
(1970), which declares that the policy of Congress is "to recognize, preserve, and pro•
tect the primary responsibilities and rights of the States in preventing and controlling
water pollution"; § lO(b) of that Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1160(b) (1970), which provides that,
except when the Attorney General has actually obtained a court order of pollution
abatement on behalf of the United States, "State and interstate action to abate pollution of • . . navigable waters • • • shall not • • • be displaced by Federal enforce•
ment action." See also Environment Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No,
91-224, § 202(b)(2), 84 Stat. 114, which, while stating the general policy of Congress
in protecting the environment, also states: "The primary responsibility for implementing this policy rests with State and local governments."
For excellent and comprehensive discussions of federal and state water quality
legislation and practice, see generany H. Er.Lis, J. BEuscHER, C. HOWARD &: J. DEBRAAL,
supra note 23; Hines, Nor Any Drop To Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality,
Part I: State Pollution Control Programs, 52 IowA L. R.Ev. 186 (1966); Part II: Interstate Arrangements for Pollution Control, 52 IowA L. REv. 432 (1966); Part III: The
Federal Effort, 52 IOWA L. REv. 799 (1967). For a critical view, see D. ZWICK 8: M,
BENsrOCK, supra note 14.
249. See, e.g., CEQ 1970 REPORT, supra note 7, at 44. See also D. ZWICK &: M. BEN•
srociK, supra note 14. For several interesting case studies of the problems involved, sec,
e.g., Polikoff, The Interlake Affair, THE WASHINGTON MONTHLY, March 1971, at 7:
Reitze, supra note 15.
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-stitutional authority. to enact such further legislation in this respect
as it deems necessary.250
The principal federal legislation in the water pollution area is
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.251 - A 1965 amendment to
the Basic Act requires the states to establish water quality standards
for their interstate waters252 and these state standards can then be
approved as federal standards by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA). 253 The states retain primary responsibility both for
drawing up and for enforcing the standards. If the states fail to set
standards, the EPA may set and enforce them. 254 Currently, the standards of all of the states are "approved," though many of them have
serious deficiencies. 255 The Act also provides certain federal enforcement mechanisms for abating interstate water pollution, but the
procedures are limited and cumbersome.256 It is interesting to note
that section 10 (d)(2) of the Act specifically provides that a foreign
state affected by interstate pollution may participate in the Act's
enforcement conference on the basis of reciprocity; 257 Canada, however, has never sought to utilize this procedure.25 B
250. See note 23 supra.
251. 33 u.s.c. §§ Il51-75 (1970).
252. Federal Water Pollution Control Act § IO(c)(l), Act of Oct. 2, 1965, Pub. L. No.
89-234, § 5(a)(l), 79 Stat. 907, amending 33 U.S.C. § 466(g) (1964) (codified at 33 U.S.C.
§ 1160(c)(l) (1970)).
253. The Environmental Protection Agency [hereinafter EPA] has taken over the
Secretary of Interior's functions under the Act. Exec. Order No. 11,548, 35 Fed. Reg.
II677 (1970), 33 U.S.C. § 1151 (1970).
254. 33 U.S.C. § II60(c)(I) (1970). See note 253 supra.
255. See, e.g., CEQ 1970 REPORT, supra note 7, at 44.
256. Federal Water Pollution Control Act § I0(c)(5), (d)-(g), 33 U.S.C. ll60(c)(5) ,
(d)•(g) (1970). Two basic procedures are provided. The first is a three-step procedure
consisting of a conference of federal, state, and interstate water quality agency representatives, a public hearing, and finally court action. 33 U.S.C. § ll60(d)-(g) (1970).
Among the conferences convened under the Act are the four-state Lake Michigan
Enforcement Conference, which convened in 1968 and focused on the need to protect
Lake Michigan from waste heat discharges; the Lake Superior Enforcement Conference, which convened in 1969 and involved, inter alia, discharges of taconite tailing
into the Lake from a Reserve Mining Company facility in Minnesota; and the Lake
Erie Enforcement Conference, which convened in 1970 and studied all forms and
sources of pollution affecting Lake Erie. The second enforcement procedure calls
for notification of the applicable water quality standards both to the violator and to
interested parties, followed by court action if necessary in cases of noncompliance. 33
U.S.C. § 1160(c)(5) (1970). The EPA issued a violation notice to Reserve Mining
Company because of its failure to present an acceptable abatement plan to the Lake
Superior Enforcement Conference. See CEQ 1971 REPORT, supra note 7, at 12-13. Senator Muskie is reported to have noted that there has been almost no enforcement
under the Act, with only one case reaching the courts. N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1971, at
22, col. 3.
257. 33 U.S.C. § ll60(d)(2) (1970). Similar provisions are contained in the Clean
Air Act § 115, 42 U.S.C. 1857 (1970).
258. Canada does not have reciprocal legislation, and, in any event, may view the
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In addition to authority exercised under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, the federal government has recently initiated an
important program under the authority of the Rivers and Harbors
Appropriation Act of 1899,259 which makes permits mandatory for
all industrial discharges into navigable waters of the United States.200
Other federal legislation provides for federal control of water pollution in various special contexts (such as oil pollution and pollution
from vessels), authorizes extensive federal financial and technical
assistance to state and local water pollution control programs, and
supports federal efforts in the field of research and development,
monitoring, and surveillance.261 The Administration is presently
language of § IO(d)(2) giving it "the rights of a state water pollution agency" as unacceptable in terms of its national dignity.
259. 33 U.S.C. §§ 403-04, §§ 406-09, §§ 411-16, § 418 (1970). The Act makes it unlawful, without a permit, to " .•• throw, discharge, or deposit ••• any refuse
matter of any kind or description whatever other than that flowing from streets and
sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state, into any navigable water •• , or into
any tributary of any navigable water ••••" 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970). Knowing violation
of the Act is a misdemeanor, subject to a $2500 fine or six months imprisonment,
Violators are also subject to civil suits for injunctive relief. The Act was upheld and
broadly interpreted by the Supreme Court in United States v. Republic Steel Corp,,
362 U.S. 482 (1960).
260. On December 23, 1970, the President announced a new program to control
water pollution from industrial sources through the permit authority of the Rivers
and Harbors Appropriatiim Act. Exec. Order No. ll,574, 3 C.F.R. 188 (1970), See N.Y.
Times, Dec. 24, 1970, at I, col. I. See also Dept. of Army Corps of Engrs, Proposed
Reg. § 209.131, 35 Fed. Reg. 20005 (1970); id., 36 Fed. Reg. 983 (1971). Violators of
water quality standards-including standards imposed by the EPA when federal-state
or state standards do not apply or are clearly deficient-are ineligible for permits and
liable for enforcement proceedings. All dischargers were required to file information
on discharges by October 1, 1971. See, e.g., CEQ 1971 REPORT, supra note 7, at 10-12;
Rodgers, Industrial Water Pollution and the Refuse Act: A Second Chance for Water
Quality, II9 U. PA. L. REv. 761 (1971).
But see the recent opinion of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
in Kalur v. Resor, Civil No. 1331-71 (D.D.C., Dec. 21, 1971), ruling that under the
Act all discharges into nonnavigable waters are illegal and that the government may not
even issue permits for navigable waters unless it first prepares an environmental impact statement for each permit application. The ruling, if it stands, may raise ques•
tions as to the administrative practicability of the present permit program. See TIME,
Jan. 10, 1972, at 61-62.
261. Much of this legislation is in the form of amendments to the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act-for example, the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91, approved April 3, 1970, which embodies comprehensive
federal legislation covering the control of vessel wastes. Section 5(£) of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § ll55(f) (1970), specifically directs the Secre•
tary of the Interior (now transferred to the Administrator of the EPA) to "conduct
research and technical development work, and make studies, with respect to the
quality of the waters of the Great Lakes." Section 15 of the Act, 33 U.S.C, § 1165
(1970), authorizes the Secretary (the EPA), in cooperation with other government
agencies, to enter into agreements with state or other public agencies, with the federal
government paying up to 75% of the costs
to carry out one or more projects to demonstrate new methods and techni~ues
and to develop preliminary plans for the elimination or control of pollution,
within all or any part of the watersheds of the Great Lakes. Such projects shall
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seeking broader authority in this area, including authority to require
states to set specific effluent discharge requirements, and is seeking
congressional approval of legislation providing six billion dollars of
federal funds to support a twelve billion dollar total national program; a significant portion of these funds will be directed toward the
Great Lakes. 262 At the present time even more far-reaching legislation
is under consideration by Congress.263
Each of the Great Lake states has its own water control legislation, programs, and agencies; and these differ substantially in
breadth and effectiveness.264 In general, during the past several years
demonstrate the engineering and economic feasibility and practicality of removal
of pollutants and prevention of any polluting matter from entering into the
Great Lakes in the future and other abatement and remedial techniques which
will contribute substantially to effective and practical methods of water pollution
elimination or control.
33 u.s.c. § 1165(a) (1970). See generally HOUSE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, 91ST CONG.,
2D SESS., LAws OF THE UNITED STATES RELATING TO WATER POLLUTION AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (Comm. Print 1970).
262. See President Nixon's Message to Congress, Feb. 8, 1971, Program for a Better
Environment, H.R. Doc. No. 92-46, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), set out in CEQ 1971
REPORT, supra note 7, at 284-305. See also Joint Communique, supra note I, 1[ 16.
263. On November 2, 1971, the Senate approved 86-0, a far-reaching and comprehensive 180-page bill, The National Water Quality Standards Act of 1971, sponsored
by Senator Muskie and approved by the Senate Public Works Committee, which was
designed to eliminate the discharge of all pollutants into navigable watenvays by
1985 and in large measure to shift responsibility for controlling water pollution from
the states to the federal government and the Environmental Protection Agency. S.
2770, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CoNG. REc. S. 17464 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1971). This bill
would, inter alia, broaden the 1899 Rivers and Harbors Act by establishing federal
effiuent or discharge standards; by extending the ban on dumping without a permit
to municipal wastes, industrial wastes discharged into sewer systems, outfalls into the
ocean, and agricultural wastes for livestock over certain numbers on an acre of land;
and by transferring the permit system from the Army Corps of Engineers to the EPA.
The bill would permit the states to administer the permit programs once the EPA
approved their programs for achieving federal effluent standards, but the EPA could
cancel the state's authority to issue permits if the state did not administer its program in conformity with federal law. Moreover, the EPA could veto any state permit
and also take a violator to court if the state failed to act against him. The bill contemplates a two-phase program to achieve the national no-discharge standard. Under
phase one, cities must have secondary treatment plants for sewage under construction
by 1974, and industries must be using the "best practicable control technology" by
1976. Under phase two, to be in force by 1981, all industries and communities, if
they have been unable to achieve the goal of no discharge at reasonable cost, must
be able to demonstrate that they are at least using the. "best available technology."
The burden of proof is on the cities and industries. The bill would also authorize
$14 billion for sewage treatment construction grants for fiscal 1972-1975 and increase
the percentage of federal sewage treatment plant construction aid. See N.Y. Times,
Nov. 3, 1971, at 1, col. 10. See also BNA ENVIRONMENT REP., CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
719-20 (1971); N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1971, at I, col. 4.
264. For a listing of the principal current water pollution control laws of the
various Great Lakes riparian states, and a collection of the relevant state rules, regulation, standards, and criteria, see BNA ENVIRONMENT REP., STATE WATER LAws (2 vols.).
See also J. DAVIES, supra note 185, at 120-25; GREAT LAKEs INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10,
at 26-38; Hines, Nor Any Drop To Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality, Part I:
State Pollution Control Programs, 52 IowA L. REV. 186 (1966).
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there has-been·a tendency toward rationalization of pollution control
administration and a strengthening of legislation.200 The states
clearly have legal authority to enact legislation and standards implementing the Commission's recommended objectives if they so desire.
It is interesting to note that the Great Lakes states have enthusiastically backed the concept of an international Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreement and of a strengthened IJC,200 perhaps partly in
the hope that "internationalizing" the problem will increase the
likelihood of more extensive federal funding.
The Canadian federal government has also recently legislated
extensively in the area of water pollution, though primary responsibility in this regard remains in the Province of Ontario. As previously indicated, there is apparently some question among Canadian
constitutional experts about the permissible reach of Canadian federal power with respect to the broad regulation of Great Lakes pollution, even pursuant to treaty; it has been argued that provincial
authority may be, for the most part, paramount in this field. 201 These
doubts buttress the likelihood that the Province of Ontario will carry
the major burden of implementing the IJC's recommendations and
the provisions of the proposed Agreement. The Joint Communique
265. See, e.g., the recent Illinois Environmental Protection Act, H. Bill No, 3788,
Ill. Laws of 1970 (I BNA ENVIRONMENT REP., STATE WATER LAws 766:0101-09): New
York Environmental Conservation Law, ch. 140, N.Y. Laws of 1970 (2 BNA ENVIRON•
MENT REP., STATE WATER LAws 861:0081-90); Pennsylvania Department of Environmental
Resources Law, Act No. 275, H. Bill No. 2213, Pa. Laws of 1970, effective Jan. 19, 1971
(2 BNA ENVIRONMENT REP.• STATE WATER LAws 891:0051-54). See generally CEQ 1970
REPORT, supra note 7, at 50; CEQ 1971 R}:PORT, supra note 7, at 170-75.
266. The Environmental Conference of Great Lakes Governors and Premiers, meet•
ing at Mackinac Island, Michigan, August 16-17, 1971, adopted resolutions strongly
supporting the proposed Agreement. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1971, at 62, cols. 1-2.
The resolutions commended the proposal to extend the IJC's surveillance responsibil·
ities to Lakes Huron and Superior (Res. No. I): supported the establishment of a
single IJC Water Quality Board for all of the Great Lakes (Res. No. 2): urged that
the new Agreement provide the IJC with an independent staff and allied resources
(Res. No. 3); and recommended that the role of the IJC be strengthened by authorizing
its Water Quality Board to monitor the effectiveness of governmental water pollution
control programs, to recommend legislative and program improvements as warranted,
to coordinate water quality control activities, to direct specific recommendations rela•
tive to individual waste discharges to appropriate water pollution control agencies, and
to make public its finding and recommendations (Res. No. 4). Other resolutions
included a recommendation that national governments expand current programs to
provide financial assistance to aid communities to construct facilities to abate water
pollution from combined sewer overflows (Res. No. 6): recommendation of the implementation of a no-discharge concept for sewage from vessels in the Great Lakes
and the retention of all sewage for discharge at approved land treatment facilities
(Res. Nos. 7 and 11); acknowledgement of the importance of shoreland management
policies and control programs (Res. No. 5); and recommendation of the establishment
of a Michigan-Ontario committee to prepare a proposal for a cooperative program for
abatement of transboundary air pollution (Res. No. 9). Copy of Resolutions, supplied
by Office of the Governor of Wisconsin, on file with the Michigan Law Review.
267. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
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indicates that the Canadian government contemplates that a federalprovincial agreement will be entered into for this purpose.268 .
The major Canadian federal- legislation in this area is the Canada
Water Act of 1970.260 The Act provides a framework for federal-provincial planning and cooperation. Among other things it provides
for the creation of joint water quality management agencies for
waters designated for such treatment by the federal and provincial
governments. These agencies would be empowered by regulation to
set water quality standards and to implement programs to achieve
these standards. With regard to international waters and boundary
waters, it is provided that if provincial cooperation cannot be
achieved, the federal government itself may designate the waters,
establish the agencies and standards, and implement the programs.270
Other federal legislation is applicable to particular aspects of Great
Lakes pollution problems.271
The responsibilities of the Province of Ontario respecting Great
Lakes pollution are exercised principally under the provisions of the
Ontario Water Resources Commission Act. 272 The Act establishes
the Ontario Water Resources Commission and gives it broad jurisdiction over provincial water management. The Act generally prohibits any pollution that might impair the quality of the water in the
Province and empowers the Ontario Commission to seek injunctions
against and prohibit such activities. In addition, the Commission is
authorized to construct treatment facilities for municipalities, investigate water pollution and its causes, make regulations prescribing
standards of water quality, set operating standards for sewage works,
and make rules for discharges of wastes from boats. In general, the
Ontario Water Resources Commission has adopted strict standards
and broad programs, compatible with those recommended by the
IJC, and is enforcing them vigorously.
The proposed Agreement is in effect a formal endorsement of the
Commission's recommendations in its Report on the Lower Lakes
Reference and lifts these recommendations to the level of an international obligation. As such, the probabilities of compliance by the
governments will be greatly enhanced. Nevertheless, the Joint Communique makes clear that the Commission will not be vested with
268. Joint Communique, supra note 1, ,i 15.
269. CAN. STAT. c. 52 (1969-1970). The Act is briefly described in the IJC LowER
LAKES REPORT, supra note 10, at 109.
270. Canada Water Act, CAN. STAT. c. 52, § 5(2) (1969-1970).
•. 271._ See, e.g., the Navigable Waters Protection Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. 41 (1952);
Canada Shipping Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. 29 (1952), as amended, STAT. CAN. c. 34, vol.
~. § 25 (1956); Fisheries Act, CAN. REv. STAT. c. 119 (1952).
·
272, ONT. REV. STAT. c. 281 (1960).
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any new powers in the area of enforcement. The Communique
states:
"While the International Joint Commission would aid the Governments by providing an independent overview and other assistance,
the various agencies of the Federal, State and Provincial Governments would continue to implement the programs and measures
required to achieve the water quality objectives.273

However, the Commission's prestige and informal influence on both
governments and polluting municipalities and enterprises will presumably increase.
IV.

PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS

To attempt any detailed assessment of the proposed Agreement
at this time, before its negotiation is even completed, would clearly
be premature. However, some comments might be ventured regarding both the Agreement's general significance and the longer-term
prospects for American-Canadian Great Lakes cooperation.
The proposed Agreement would clearly constitute a major accomplishment. It represents a significant advance in United StatesCanadian efforts to control Great Lakes pollution and an important
addition to broader global experience in international evironmental
cooperation. The Agreement expressly recognizes the problem of
Great Lakes pollution as a major and independent subject of United
States-Canadian concern rather than as an adjunct of other water
problems and reflects firm national commitments by both governments to take urgent and effective measures to solve the problem. It
emphasizes the fact that these governmental commitments are a matter of international as well as national obligation, provides technical
criteria by which the extent of each government's compliance can be
determined, and thereby buttresses the pressures within each country
for adoption of meaningful pollution control programs. Moreover,
it reflects a more comprehensive, integrated and "basin-wide" approach to Great Lakes pollution problems than has previously been
taken. Finally, the Agreement serves to strengthen considerably the
IJC's international institutional role by recognizing the Commission
as the primary intergovernmental agent, coordinator, and overseer
for all Great Lakes pollution control programs. It can be expected
that the IJC's effectiveness with respect to its monitoring, surveillance, and coordinating activities ·will increase; that its recommendations will carry added weight; and that, through such devices as
regular public reports, it will be in a position to exert growing pressure for effective government action.
273, Joint Communique, supra note 1,

1 12.
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Yet, without discounting the considerable achievement the Agreement represents, it must still be asked whether this step goes far
enough-whether even the new Agreement is likely to prove a sufficient answer to the complex and pressing problems of Great Lakes
pollution. The IJC has conducted a number of Great Lakes pollution
studies in the past aventy-five years and the two governments already
have instituted a number of separate and joint Great Lakes pollution
control programs. But, despite those measures, the process of Great
Lakes deterioration has continued and indeed seems to grow worse.
And in substance the new Agreement is simply "more of the same,"
representing only a relatively limited departure from the past. The
Agreement, in concept and structure, is still primarily a matter of
binational cooperation rather than international regulation. The
choice of specific standards and techniques for meeting the international water quality objectives remains firmly in each government's
discretion, and procedures for inducing international compliance are
weak. Existing IJC powers are strengthened, but the role of the Commission and the scope of cooperation continue to be limited to
monitoring, surveillance, and coordination; the key functions of implementation, enforcement, and funding are solely in the governments' hands. Presumably, each government will continue to be
free to ignore Commission recommendations and to check any Commission activities that prove embarrassing to government policies.
There have been many suggestions that something more-some
different, more innovative and far-reaching approach-is needed.274
The range of possibilities is obviously broad. Some of these possibilities include simple expansion of the IJC's authority, while essentially
retaining the existing Treaty framework. For example, the IJC could
be given at least limited powers to establish pollution standards, to
approve or license particular waste disposal facilities, and to initiate
complaints of noncompliance before the courts or agencies of either
country. Other more far-reaching possibilities might involve abandoning the present framework of limited cooperation and establishing in its place a supranational Great Lakes Authority, exercising
direct and comprehensive investigatory, planning, regulatory, and
enforcement powers over all aspects of Great Lakes environmental
problems. Conceivably, the Authority might administer and allocate
274. See Jordan, supra note 35, at 300-01; L. Craine, Development and Use of the
Great Lakes: Policy and Institutional Needs (presentation to the Great Lakes Panel of
the National Council on Marine Resources· and Engineering Development at Symposium held in Ann Arbor, Michigan, Oct. 29-30, 1968), on file with the Michigan
Law Review. See also Heeney, supra note 35, at 6; C. Ross, supra note 35, at 8. For a
broad survey of relevant problems and experience, see A. KNEESE & B. BoWER, supra
note 14. ·
·
..
·
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a_substantial pollution control fund, financed by mandatory contributions from the two governments or through special taxes or effluent
charges on polluting enterprises. It might even enforce its rules
through a special international tribunal. International and federal
experience suggests a number of models for broader experiments in
Great Lakes regulation, such as the European Coal and Steel Community, 275 the Tennessee Valley Authority 276 and the Delaware River
Basin Commission.277 Such proposals for granting the IJC broad
regulatory powers or for establishing some type of supranational
Great Lakes agency might, of course, raise constitutional problems
for each government.278
There is much validity in the argument that effective solutions
to Great Lakes pollution problems may ultimately require a more
broad-ranging international approach than the present structure and
authority of the current Commission, or even of the Commission under the proposed Agreement, permits. Great Lakes pollution is but
one aspect of a total Great Lakes Basin ecological and social system
and cannot be dissociated from the complex and interrelated web of
physical, hydrologic, geographic, demographic, economic, cultural,
and political factors which together define and comprise that system.
For example, approaches in terms of separate programs aimed at individually controlling water pollution, air pollution, or land use
management make little sense when measures taken in one area inevitably affect the others. The establishment of a supranational Great
Lakes Authority would permit a rational, comprehensive, integrated,
275. Established by a Treaty signed at Paris, April 18, 1951, effective July 23, 1952,
26 U.N.T .S. 140, 1 EUROPEAN Y.B. 359 (1955). See L. LISTER, EUROPE'S CoAL AND ST.EEL
COMMUNITY (1960); H. MAsON, THE EUROPEAN COAL AND ST.EEL COMMUNITY (1955),
276. See, e.g., D. LILIENTHAL, TVA: DEMOCRACY ON THE MARCH (20th anniv. ed.
1953); C. PRITCHETT, THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY: A STUDY IN PUBLIC ADhllNlS•
TRATION (1943).
277. The Delaware River Basin Commission is a federal-state agency, established
by the Delaware River Basin Compact between Delaware, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and the United States, consented to by Congress by Act of Sept. 27, 1961,
Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688. The text of the Compact, together with congressional
conditions and reservations to consent, is set forth in H.R. Doc. No. 319, 90th Cong,,
2d Sess. 95-127 (1968) (Documents on the Use and Control of the Waters of Interstate
and International Streams). The Commission reviews all projects that might have
a substantial effect on the resources of the Delaware River Basin and, as part of this
review, requires that any project affecting water quality must conform to applicable
water quality standards. See generally the Commission's Annual Reports; A. KNEESE
& B. BowER, supra note 14, at 274-81; Grad, Federal-State Compact: A New Experiment
in Co-operative Federalism, 63 CoLUM. L. REv. 825 (1963); Hines, Nor Any Drop To

Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality, Part II: Interstate Arrangements for
Pollution Control, 52 IowA L. REv. 432, 454-55 (1966).
278. These questions would involve not only issues of delegation of national and
state or provincial power to an international authority but also the differing complexities
of U.S. federal-state and Canadian federal-provincial relations. CJ. P. HAY, FEDERALISM
AND SUPRANATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, PATTERNS FOR NEW LEGAL STRUCTURES ch. 6 (1966),
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and coordinated approach to these problems in accord with modem
concepts of "problem-shed" management; it would eliminate the recurrent problems of jurisdictional conflict, duplication, and lack of
coordination, which trouble present international efforts; and, finally, it would encourage effective decision-making in a sufficiently
broad context to permit a more complete analysis and balancing of
policy alternatives and thus the determination of optimal solutions. 270
While the concept of a supranational Great Lakes Authority has
considerable intellectual and dramatic appeal, it seems unlikely that
any such agreement will be achieved in the near future. Indeed,
there is much to suggest that the proposed Agreement represents the
practical limits that United States-Canadian cooperation can at present hope to reach, and that attempts to go further in the direction of
international or supranational regulation might be unrealistic, unnecessary, and even potentially harmful.
First, neither the United States nor Canada seems presently interested in broad regulatory schemes. There are many reasons for
this attitude. Important differences remain between the governments
concerning their respective share of responsibility for Great Lakes
problems and the burdens each should properly assume. The economic stakes of pollution control and the balance of internal political
pressures acting upon the governments are still uncertain.28°Furthermore, the potential costs involved in such programs are extremely
high. 281 In this context neither government appears prepared to relinquish control over relevant decisions affecting significant national
interests or to reduce its broad options to respond flexibly to developing situations. Thus, the relatively limited reach of the proposed
Agreement may reflect not a lack of imagination-both governments
have been well aware of the possibility of broader arrangements at
least since the tabling of the Commission's draft Convention in 1920
-but political realism.
Second, any considerable expansion of the IJC's regulatory power
279. See, e.g., Hines, Nor Any Drop To Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality,
Part II: Interstate Arrangements for Pollution Control, 52 IowA L. REV. 432 (1966):
Conditions of water pollution ••• frequently assume a configuration that bears
little resemblance to the political geography of any of the states affected. Great
acumen is not required to realize that little success is likely to accrue to attempts
to regulate pollution of interstate waters unless the control effort has a scope
of planning and an enforcement authority roughly congruent with the dimensions
of the problem. The vesting of regulatory power in some form of supra-state
organization seems essential to effective handling of pollution situations, the causes
and effects of which overflow state lines.
See also L. Craine, supra note 274, at 13.
280. See generally J. DAVIES, supra note 185, for a survey of the political and ad•
ministrative context of present U.S. efforts to deal with pollution problems.
281. See text accompanying note 126 supra.
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or the creation of a new Authority would probably require either
development of a new treaty or substantial amendment of the 1909
Treaty. The negotiation of such a treaty or amendment would be
complex, difficult, and time-consuming, with no guarantee of results.
In contrast, the proposed Agreement retains and exploits the remarkable flexibility of the present Treaty and has been comparatively easy to achieve. Moreover, it builds on established traditions
and experience which have in the past proved relatively successful.
In this respect, there seems to be wisdom in the adage "let well
enough alone."
Finally, the proposed Agreement appears in accord with the present level of real needs and cooperative possibilities between the two
governments. It commits the governments to new levels of cooperation in areas in which the immediate pay-offs from such cooperation
seem highest and the risks to the governments lowest: monitoring,
surveillance, technical recommendation, and coordination. Moreover, the Agreement is relatively open-ended, and it does not preclude the taking of more far-reaching measures should further
experience suggest their desirability. Indeed, the Commission will
presumably now be in a position to give sustained and expert study
to suggestions for further institutional change, and, if it considers it
desirable, to recommend that change to the governments.
As to the directions of future development of the United StatesCanadian Great Lakes cooperation, certain broad trends are possible
to predict. First, as the IJC's responsibilities grow in importance and
it begins to deal with issues more central to government concern, the
Commission may become more political in character. Each of the
governments will now follow its work more closely and may appoint
Commissioners who will reflect or be more responsive to their
government's attitudes and policies. Second, there may well be an
increasing movement toward treating Great Lakes problems on a
regional basis-dealing with the entire basin as a single research
planning, coordinating, and management unit. This tendency is already evident in the trend toward basin-wide references, the probable appointment of a single continuing pollution advisory board
for all of the Lakes, and in initial efforts to coordinate the work of the
Commission's separate water and air pollution boards.282 In this
connection, American-Canadian Great Lakes cooperation may ex·2s2. At its spring 1971 semiannual meeting, the IJC requested its various boards
that deal with water pollution to initiate a liaison with the International Air Pollution
Advisory Board in order to ensure that control measures for one type of pollution
would not nullify control measures for another. (Information supplied by IJC, U.S.
Section.)
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pand into the field of long-range planning.283 Third, the Commission,
with a strengthened staff and the additional prestige of its new status
and responsibilities under the new Agreement, may exhibit more
aggressiveness than in the past, both in terms of the strength of its reports and recommendations and in terms of its efforts to cultivate a
binational public constituency. Finally, if the Agreement proves
relatively successful, the two governments may be prepared to buttress and perhaps increase the Commission's authority.
Expansion of the Commission's powers and procedures might
take various directions. 284 Thus, it might include authority for the
Commission to initiate investigations, or at least to petition the governments for particular references; broader Commission authority
respecting issuance of subpoenas and the holding of public hearings;
or perhaps authority for informal Commission investigation of local
problems of immediate concern on its own initiative and without the
necessity for invoking cumbersome and time-consuming reference
procedures. The Commission might be given greater power to initiate, and perhaps participate in, proceedings against polluters in the
national courts and agencies of the nvo countries. Formal channels
of communication between the Commission and national policymaking and enforcement authorities in each country might be
strengthened. The Commission might also be given some role as a
forum for "preventative diplomacy" respecting environmental problems, perhaps through the institution, under Commission auspices,
of "confrontation" procedures under which either of the nvo governments could require the other to consult about proposed environmental measures that could significantly affect it.285
283. The Chairman of the Great Lakes Basin Commission, reviewing the Advisory
Board's Lower Lakes Report with the Council on Environmental Quality, stated:
Effective management of Great Lakes resources requires a comprehensive, coordinated joint effort in both operation and planning on both a short- and longrange basis. This approach is not to be confused with the artificial stapling together
of a number of independently arrived at, single-purpose plans and operations
agreements. Our present problems are largely a result of this approach. Their
solution surely does not lie in its continued application.
Great Lakes Basin Commn. Communicator, March 1971, at 6.
284. See, e.g., the suggestions in Jordan, supra note 35, at 300-01.
285. Compare the proposal for such "confrontation" procedures made at the March
1971 meeting of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's
(OECD) Environmental Committee, OECD Observer 10 (No. 52, 1971), as discussed
in Stein, The Potential of Regional Organizations in Managing Man's Environment, in
LAW, INSTITUTIONS AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT, supra note 5, manuscript at 16. That
a consultation procedure would find ample use is suggested by the Canadian reaction
to the recent U.S. "Cannikin" underground nuclear test on Amchitka Island, Alaska,
which occasioned protests by the Canadian Prime Minister, Secretary of State for
External Affairs, Minister of the Environment, and Ambassador to the U.S.; the
adoption on October 15, 1971, by the Canadian House of Commons, with only one
dissenting vote, of a resolution condemning the test; and mass demonstrations in
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Each government now has the capability-technical, economic,
and legal-to do what is required to control Great Lakes pollution.
Thus, the success or failure of efforts to control Great Lakes pollution will depend ultimately not on what the new Agreement says or
what the IJC does, but on what the two governments themselves
choose to do; the outcome will depend upon their willingness to
adopt the necessary national legislation and standards, to implement
these programs through effective judicial and administrative enforcement, and to provide the substantial funds required. What the governments choose to do will, in turn, depend largely on shifting public
attitudes and the eventual outcome of the clash of complex competing political and economic forces now operating upon relevant
governmental environmental policies in each country.
In this respect, it may be unrealistic to project more than moderate optimism. There are signs, at least in the United States, that the
present wave of public environmental concern may be diminishing
and that politicians may be perceiving the "environmental issue" as
having less practical political impact than previously assumed. Enthusiasm for stringent pollution controls has lessened as it has become
increasingly evident to both the public and politicians that effective
pollution control will be inconvenient, costly, slow to produce results, and detrimental to particular industries and communities.
Countervailing pressures by special interests affected by possible control programs are growing, and under these pressures government
attitudes are becoming increasingly ambivalent. 286 If these pressures
increase the course of least resistance for government policy-makers
may be programs and levels of funding that give the appearance
rather than the reality of effective action.
The IJC's role in working out these economic and political conflicts will be inherently limited. Its influence, however, will continue
to be felt in at least two ways. First, the governments, in making
their policies and decisions in this area will inevitably have to take
into account the relevant scientific data and technical assessments
concerning the facts of Great Lakes pollution that are supplied by the
Commission, and they will hopefully make sounder decisions because
Canada. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Oct. 28, 1971, at 1, col. 3; Washington Post, Oct. 28, 1971,
§ A, at 1, col. l; N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1971, at 29, col. 1.
286. See generally D. ZWICK 8: M. BENSTOCK, supra note 14. For some recent indications of such pressures, see Kenworthy, Efforts To Place Limits on Environmental
Agency, N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1971, at 33, cols. 5-8; Wall St. J., Sept. 24, 1971, at 1,
col. 5 (reporting that Surgeon General's advice to return to phosphate detergents (see
notes 202-03 supra and accompanying text) followed pleas from industry); N.Y. Times,
Nov. 3, 1971, at 1, col. 1, and Dec.·11, 1971, at 54, cols. 1-2 (reporting industry opposition to Senate's approval of bill to clean up watenvays, supra note 263). For a discussion of competing interest groups, see J. DAVIES, supra note 185, at 77-97.
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of the availability of these data. Second, by m·aking these facts pub.:.
lie, the Commission will exerr a continuing public pressure on the
governments to live up to their professed commitments and to adopt
policies reasonably related· to the realities of Great Lakes pollution
problems and long-run public needs. The Commission's performance
of these functions will in itself represent a substantial contribution,
amply justifying continued American-Canadian cooperation.
·
V.

SOME TENTATIVE LESSONS

The cooperative arrangements which the United States and Canada have developed in their efforts to control Great Lakes pollution
reflect a particular historical, geographic, and political context, and
any attempt at generalization involves risks. Nevertheless, this experience is one of the few examples we have of a relatively complex
system of international environmental cooperation and we should try
to derive what lessons we can. These lessons, both discouraging and
encouraging, might include the following.
First, large-scale environmental problems, such as that of Great
Lakes pollution, are extremely difficult to solve. Despite the long
history of cooperation in this area, the Lakes continue to deteriorate.
The roots of the problems often lie in social forces and attitudes that
defy control-exploitative attitudes toward the environment, economic expansion, population increase, and technological change. Our
knowledge of the specific causes and effects of environmental deterioration; of the multitude of scientific, technical, economic, sociological, and other factors and complex interactions involved in that
deterioration; of the optimal technical and institutional means for
remedy; and of the time scales such remedies may require, remains
limited, imprecise, and uncertain. The costs of effectively coping with
environmental deterioration may be substantial. Finally, alternative
patterns of solution may alter existing social and economic patterns
in different ways, and various groups may consequently have high
stakes in the approach chosen. When environmental issues engage
such strongly competing interests, they may transcend mere scientific
and technological treatment and become deeply involved in the political process.287
· Second, many environmental problem~ are largely localized, with
their causes and effects occurring principally within a single nation
or, at most, geographically contiguous nations. These problems must
287. See, e.g., IJC LowER LAKES REPORT, supra note IO, at 129:
Studies are also necessary to find solutions to legislative, legal and enforcement ·
problems related to water pollution. Indeed the solution of some of these complex
·social problems may well be as difficult and as time con.suming as the solution
of some of the scientific and technical problems. ·
·
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necessarily be handled primarily on a national basis, with international measures playing only a supplementary role. Moreover, even
when international measures are appropriate, limited bilateral or
regional arrangements may often prove more suitable than global
approaches. The United States and Canada have consistently regarded the problem of Great Lakes pollution as primarily a matter
for solution by national action, with international measures supplementing, buttressing, and coordinating rather than replacing country
programs. It is difficult to see how direct involvement by other nations in the problem of Great Lakes pollution could substantially
contribute to its solution.
Third, governments will be reluctant to subject their flexibility
and freedom of action regarding relevant environmental policies to
international constraints. The reasons for this reluctance have been
noted; they include the high potential costs of pollution control programs, the uncertainty of their national impact, and their consequent
political sensitivity. Governments will therefore enter into international environmental programs only when they are persuaded that
these programs offer substantial practical benefits unobtainable by
national action alone, or where these programs involve only minimal
obligations. Canada and the United States share a deep concern for
Great Lakes pollution problems, have cooperated in this area for
almost sixty years, and now concede the urgent need for common and
joint solutions; moreover, the two countries share common traditions
and have relatively close political, economic, and cultural ties. Despite the strength of the factors favoring cooperation, neither government seems yet prepared to delegate substantial powers to the IJC
or othenvise limit its national freedom of action in significant ways.
Fourth, since even concerned countries can be expected to be reluctant to accept international environmental constraints, it follows
that the price of setting up agreements between or among any but
the most strongly concerned countries may be an agreement that is
watered-down and ineffectual. The commitments will be reduced to
the "lowest common denominator" of the least interested potential
party. This factor again suggests that in many contexts bilateral and
regional environmental programs, involving only countries with a
direct and urgent concern with the problem, may prove more politically attainable, far-reaching, and effective than broader global programs, which may include nations with only marginal interests.
Moreover, neighboring or regional states may be more likely to share
common values, congenial legal systems, and traditions of cooperation, and these factors will also buttress the chances for successful
environmental cooperation.
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Fifth, in attempting to· deal with international environmental
problems, governments often prefer loose cooperative arrangements
to techniques of formal legal prohibition. Specific environmental
prohibitions will be difficult to agree upon, evidence of violations
may be hard to establish, and legal remedies may prove cumbersome
and incapable of dealing effectively with broad-scale, complex, and
multi-faceted environmental problems, which tend to change over
time. Again, the fact that neither the United States nor Canada has
sought to utilize the 1909 Treaty's provisions formally banning pollution, and that the two governments resort instead to the more
flexible techniques involved in IJC references, strongly support this
assertion. Furthermore, if formal treaty arrangements and institutions are established, there are strong arguments for making these
arrangements relatively flexible and open-ended, with a capacity to
expand and adapt as problems and needs clarify and the parties gain
confidence in their cooperative activities. The point is not that the
parties need abdicate control over the growth of the authority and
activities of such institutions, but that they should plan to permit
growth through relatively informal procedures rather than through
the difficult, cumbersome, and time-consuming process of formal
amendment. The development o~ American-Canadian environmental cooperation was clearly facilitated by the fact that the IJC was an
institution already "in place" and capable of such expanded and innovative use as the two governments wished to make of it.
Sixth, on the more positive side, the possibilities for successful
international cooperation with respect to particular environmental
problems may be enhanced by a formal acknowledgement of the
international character of those problems and of the propriety of
their international treatment. While the provision prohibiting pollution in the 1909 Treaty has had little direct application, it has
facilitated the subsequent development of international environmental cooperation through the IJC.
Seventh, the United States-Canadian experience demonstrates that
international environmental cooperation can yield useful dividends
at relatively low costs and with limited political risks. While Great
Lakes problems are still a long way from solution, the IJC has performed a valuable function in developing government and public
awareness of Great Lakes pollution problems, providing scientific
and technical information relevant to rational policy choice, suggesting the nature of the remed_ies required, and furnishing a means
through which national programs can be better coordinated. It has
also shown that even partial data may serve sufficiently to identify
problems and that even partial programs may be worth pµrsuing. ·
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Eighth, some of the functions potentially involved in international
environmental cooperation, such as monitoring, surveillance, and the
presentation of technical objectives and options, seem best performed
by institutions acting in a relatively expert and apolitical capacity.
The IJC's reputation as an expert impartial body has probably made
the American and Canadian governments more willing to use it and
give its reports more credibility. The Commission's technique of
using joint technical boards, composed of officials drawn from agencies of the participating governments and serving in an expert rather
than representative capacity, is particularly suggestive as a method
of deploying substantial expertise without incurring the problems of
large permanent international staffs and budgets. However, w~en
international cooperative institutions begin to take on policy-oriented tasks, such as coordination, program recommendation, implementation, and enforcement, the possibility and usefulness of a
wholly apolitical orientation may become more questionable.
Ninth, even limited patterns of international environmental cooperation may produce useful secondary effects. The IJC's pollution
studies have helped to create public pressures for effective government action in both countries, and the proposed Agreement will
buttress arguments for greater commitment of government resources
to this area. Moreover, the work of the Commission's various expert
boards has resulted in continuing contacts and interaction between
federal, state, and provincial officials concerned with Great Lakes
pollution and has helped to establish important informal channels
of communication, coordination, and influence.
Finally, the problem of pollution of the Great Lakes has much in
common with similar pollution problems in many other large lakes
and enclosed and semi-enclosed seas in other parts of the world, as
well as in some of the major international rivers. 288 Collectively,
these internationally shared water pollution problems comprise a
significant segment of the problems that countries are likely to
recognize within the next few years as requiring international treatment. International initiatives to promote the exchange of experience in this area, perhaps through periodic international meetings of
concerned officials or through the establishment of a small international Secretariat to facilitate exchanges of information on a continuing basis, might be useful and appropriate.
288. See note 178 supra. On the problem of Baltic Sea pollution, see A. Sparring,
supra note 206; Tonselius, The Stagnant Sea, 12 ENVIRONMENT, July-Aug. 1970, at 2-11.
On the problem of North Sea pollution, see The Christian Science Monitor, May 24,
1971, at 2, cols. 1-3. See also. the recent report that the Soviet leadership, in a decree
by the Central Committee, has called for prompt measures to protect the environ•
ment of Lake Baikal, the world's largest fresh water lake. N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1971,
at 4, cols. 3-6.

